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Abstract
This work applies the lens of relational theory to five Ontario Superior Court of Justice cases
where a party previously executed a spousal support agreement, but subsequently sought to have
it set aside pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act. While the outcomes in the five cases
differed as to whether section 56(4) of the Family Law Act was successfully engaged and, if so,
whether the judge in turn exercised his discretion to set aside the agreement, it is argued that the
cases are united by a common theme that is resonant with relational theory. The distinct
relational feature of the five cases is the judges’ understanding of autonomy through the contextspecific estimation of the wives’ capacity for informed consent and reflection.
Chapter 1 will provide an overview of spousal support, domestic contracts and contractual
autonomy in Canada. While the focus of this thesis is contractual support, the introductory
section will briefly outline how entitlement to spousal support may be established on three
conceptual bases. Chapter 2 will provide an overview of relational theory and review the limited
scholarly literature that exists in analyzing spousal support agreements through the lens of
relational theory. In this way, Chapters 1 and 2 will situate the reader and provide the necessary
background to the legal analysis, commentary, reflections and critique found in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 will argue that assessing domestic contracts through a relational lens helps to explain
the judicial reasoning as to why agreements were upheld or set aside while also highlighting
some of the deficits in the court process and analysis. It will also highlight the lessons learned
and the important implications for family law practitioners and scholars going forward.
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Chapter One: An Introduction to Spousal Support, Domestic Contracts and
Contractual Autonomy
The policy of promoting contractual autonomy is dependent on the integrity of the
bargaining process.1 While parties are encouraged to settle their marital affairs on their own
terms by way of a domestic contract,2 judicial intervention is generally justified where the
agreements are found to be either procedurally or substantively flawed. A party seeking spousal
support in the face of a previous contractual release or waiver of same may decide to do so
pursuant to the Family Law Act3 and/or the Divorce Act,4 although the latter legislation only
applies to married parties. The party may, for example, resort to section 56(4) of the Family Law
Act5 and/or paragraph 15.2(4)(c) of the Divorce Act in an effort to obtain a judicial order for
spousal support despite facing a contractual term in the party’s cohabitation agreement, marriage
contract or separation agreement that expressly states otherwise. While “[t]he test under s. 56(4)
is different than the test to set aside a release under the Divorce Act…it may often be the case
that the same facts are relevant to both,”6 especially where the party is challenging the spousal
support provision in the agreement pursuant to both acts. Under section 56(4), the party’s
challenge pertains to circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract. Similarly, the test
under section 15.2(4)(c) of the Divorce Act requires a two-stage Miglin analysis, which was

1

Rick v Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10, [2009] 1 SCR 295 at para 46.
Section 51 of the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F3 [Family Law Act] states that a “‘domestic contract’ means a
marriage contract, separation agreement, cohabitation agreement, paternity agreement or family arbitration
agreement.” For the purposes of this article, domestic contract refers only to a party’s cohabitation agreement,
marriage contract and/or separation agreement.
3
Ibid, section 33, which states “[a] court may, on application, order a person to provide support for his or her
dependants and determine the amount of support.”
4
A party may seek spousal support pursuant to section 15.2 of the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp) [Divorce
Act], which states that “[a] court… may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse
to secure or pay, or to secure and pay, such lump sum or periodic sums, or such lump sum and periodic sums, as the
court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse.”
5
The party can also refer to section 33(4) of the Family Law Act, supra note 2, if “the provision for support or the
waiver of the right support results in unconscionable circumstances.” [Emphasis added].
6
Murray v Murray, [2003] OJ No 3350 (Sup Ct).
2
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enunciated in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of the same name: Miglin v. Miglin.7 Where
a party is challenging a spousal support agreement pursuant to both section 56(4) of the Family
Law Act and section 15.2(4)(c) of the Divorce Act requiring the Miglin two-stage test,8 if the
analysis reaches a Miglin inquiry,9 it is at the first stage of the Miglin test where there is the
potential for the greatest overlap in the relevant facts.10 This is because section 56(4) takes into
account the relevant facts pertaining to the formation of the agreement while the court under
stage one of the Miglin inquiry also considers “the circumstances of negotiation and execution to
determine whether the applicant has established a reason to discount the agreement.”11
Miglin became the landmark Supreme Court of Canada decision on domestic contracts
and freedom of contract in family law as it addressed a spousal support release in the context of a
separation agreement under the Divorce Act. Although the Court upheld the spousal support
release in the separation agreement, it set out a contextual two-stage test regarding the reopening
of a domestic contract. While the approach in Miglin generated various scholarly commentaries,
the scholarly responses that provide the focal point for this work applied the lens of relational

7

Miglin v Miglin, [2003] 1 SCR 303 [Miglin]. Stage 1: focuses on the circumstances surrounding the negotiation
and execution of the agreement at the time of its formation. The judge must also assess whether the agreement is in
substantial compliance with the Divorce Act or if it represents a significant departure from the Act’s general
objectives when read as a whole. (2) Stage 2: asks whether the enforcement of the agreement still reflects the
intentions of the parties and whether it is still in substantial compliance with the objectives of the Divorce Act at the
time of application? For a complete discussion, see Miglin at paras 83-85 and 87-90.
8
In terms of the process, “the validity and enforceability of a [spousal support] agreement (under the common law,
and in Ontario under s 56 of the FLA) should logically be dealt with first, followed by a Miglin analysis if there is a
valid and enforceable agreement.” See Mary Jane Mossman, Families and the Law: Cases and Commentary, Second
Edition (Concord, ON: Captus Press, 2015) at 732 [Families and the Law] citing Carol Rogerson, “Spousal Support
Agreements and the Legacy of Miglin” (2012) 31 CFLQ 13 at 25-26 [The Legacy of Miglin].
9
After applying section 56, “Miglin should be used to determine whether an otherwise valid agreement should
nonetheless be overridden or disregarded in an application for spousal support under the Divorce Act.” See Ibid.
10
Rogerson observed “clear distinctions between the validity analysis and the Miglin analysis are rarely found in
practice” with a “doctrinal blurring aris[ing] when the agreements in issue deal with matters other than spousal
support.” Ibid at 25-26 and 27-28. In particular, she observed that a concerning application of the Miglin test relates
to the doctrinal blurring between the common law standards for unconscionability and stage 1 of the Miglin analysis.
11
Under stage one, the court also considers “whether the substance of the agreement, at formation, complied
substantially with the general objectives of the Act.” See Miglin, supra note 7 at para 4 [Emphasis added].
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theory to the reasoning of both the majority and dissenting judges.12 This is significant as
relational theory, which stands in distinction from liberal theory, views subjects as “socially
constituted, embedded in their contexts, their selfhood and agency formed by thick relationships
with others.”13 Thus, in determining whether an agreement should be set aside, an understanding
of autonomy through a relational lens strives “[t]o reconcile these apparently opposing
objectives- the vindication of choice and the recognition of constraints on the exercise of that
choice.”14
This work examines relational theory in a related statutory context by examining the
application of section 56(4) of the Family Law Act. The statutory language itself requires a
contextual analysis as both the provincial and federal legislation provide guidelines rather than
stringent rules, which in turn provides the scope to enter into the discussion of contextualism and
relational theory. For example, section 56(4) lists factors based on which a court may set aside a
domestic contract. These include: (a) whether a party failed to disclose significant assets, or
significant debts or other liabilities, existing when the contract was made; (b) if a party did not
understand the nature or consequences of the domestic contract; or (c) otherwise in accordance
with the law of contract. This exercise is both fact and context specific.
The lens of relational theory will be applied to five Ontario Superior Court of Justice
cases where a party previously executed a spousal support agreement, but subsequently sought to
have it set aside pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act in an effort to obtain a more

12

Robert Leckey and Lucy-Ann Buckley adopt a relational theory approach in the spousal support context. See
Robert Leckey, “Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds” (2007) 57 U Toronto LJ 1 [Contracting Claims] and
Lucy-Ann Buckley, “Relational Theory and Choice Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2015) 29 Can J Fam
L 251 [Choice Rhetoric].
13
Robert Leckey, Contextual Subjects: Family, State, and Relational Theory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2008) at 106 [Contextual Subjects].
14
Choice Rhetoric, supra note 12 at 253.
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favourable determination of spousal support. Chapter 1 will provide an overview of spousal
support, domestic contracts and contractual autonomy in Canada. While the focus of this thesis is
contractual support, the introductory section will briefly outline how entitlement to spousal
support may be established on three conceptual bases. Chapter 2 will provide an overview of
relational theory and review the limited scholarly literature that exists in analyzing spousal
support agreements through the lens of relational theory. In this way, Chapters 1 and 2 will
situate the reader and provide the necessary background to the legal analysis found in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 will argue that assessing domestic contracts through a relational lens helps to explain
the judicial reasoning as to why agreements were upheld or set aside while also highlighting
some of the deficits in the court process and analysis.
Section A: An Overview of Spousal Support: Discretion, Entitlement and Principles
Spousal support is a discretionary area of law. Unlike child support, which is the right of
the child that cannot be waived by the parents,15 spousal support is not only discretionary, but it
can also be waived. Given that there is no presumptive right to spousal support, entitlement to
spousal support is a crucial threshold issue that must be addressed before the determination of
the quantum and duration of an award for spousal support.16 In order to establish entitlement, a
recipient’s spousal support claim must be grounded in at least one of three bases: compensatory,
non-compensatory or contractual.17 These three bases are recognized by the Supreme Court of

15

DBS v SRG, [2006] 2 SCR 231 at para 104 citing Richardson v Richardson, [1987] 1 SCR 857 at 869. See also
Lukovnjak v Weir, 2016 ONSC 6893.
16
Fisher v Fisher, [2008] OJ No 38, 2008 ONCA 11. Before the application of the Spousal Support Advisory
Guidelines (“SSAG”), entitlement must first be established. Although they are advisory only and not binding on the
court, the SSAG were drafted to bring more certainty and predictability to spousal support awards.
17
Bracklow v Bracklow, [1999] 1 SCR 420 [Bracklow].
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Canada and are reflected in the principles, objectives and purposes of spousal support as outlined
by the federal and provincial statutes.
1) Legislative Purposes for Spousal Support: The Divorce Act and the Family Law Act
Since entitlement to spousal support is discretionary, it requires the balancing of different
legislative spousal support objectives and factors. For example, section 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act
states that “the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other
circumstances of each spouse, including: (a) the length of time the spouse cohabited; (b) the
functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (c) any order, agreement or
arrangement relating to support of either spouse.”18 In addition, section 15.2(6)19 specifically sets
out four objectives of a spousal support order:
(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising
from the marriage or its breakdown;
(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care
of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any
child of the marriage;
(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the
marriage; and
(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse
within a reasonable period of time.
Similarly, section 33(8) of the Family Law Act, sets out the purposes of a spousal support order:
(a) recognize the spouse’s contribution to the relationship and the economic
consequences of the relationship for the spouse;
(b) share the economic burden of child support equitably;
(c) make fair provision to assist the spouse to become able to contribute to his or her own
support; and
(d) relieve financial hardship, if this has not been done by orders under Parts I (Family
Property) and II (Matrimonial Home).20

18

Divorce Act, supra note 4, s 15.2(4). The interpretation and application of these principles, objectives and factors
were in issue in Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813 [Moge].
19
Divorce Act, supra note 4, s 15.2(6).”
20
Family Law Act, supra note 2, s 33(8).
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Further, subsection 33(9) of the Family Law Act outlines non-exhaustive factors that are to be
taken into account in determining the amount and duration of spousal support. Although reference
is made to the circumstances of both parties, some factors include consideration of only the
recipient spouse’s circumstances: assets and means; capacity to contribute to their own support;
age and health; needs with reference to the accustomed standard of living; the desirability to remain
at home to care for a child; and, contribution to the realization of the other spouse’s career
potential. In addition, paragraph 33(9)(l) specifically notes that where the dependant is a spouse,
the following shall be considered: (i) the length of cohabitation; (ii) the effect on the spouse’s
earning capacity of the responsibilities assumed during cohabitation; (iii) whether the spouse cares
for a child over 18 years of age who is unable to withdraw from the parent’s charge by reason of
illness, disability, or other cause or (iv) by reason of the continuation of a program of education;
(v) any domestic or child care service performed by the spouse for the family as if it were
remunerative employment; and (vi) the effect of the responsibility of caring for a child on the
spouse’s earnings and career development.21 These principles and objectives of spousal support
outlined in the statutes relate to the three main bases of spousal support.
2) Compensatory, Non-Compensatory and Contractual Spousal Support
The Supreme Court of Canada decision Bracklow is often referenced as a framework case
for the three conceptual bases of spousal support: compensatory, non-compensatory and
contractual.22 In addition, Bracklow remains the leading case addressing non-compensatory

21

Ibid, s 33(9).
Carol Rogerson, “Spousal Support Post-Bracklow: The Pendulum Swings Again?” (2001) 19 CLFQ 185 at 187188 [Rogerson, “Post-Bracklow”]. In this article, Rogerson discusses the significant impact Bracklow had on spousal
support. She observes that “Bracklow is generally regarded as further broadening the basis of spousal support even
beyond what was accomplished by Moge.” (Ibid at 188).
22
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support while Moge23 pertains to compensatory support. These two decisions inform the analysis
of whether a spousal support claim is based on compensation, need, or a combination of both
compensation and need, which in turn plays a significant role in the quantum and duration of the
spousal support award at first instance and on variation.24 On the other hand, Miglin remains the
landmark decision on contractual support as it addressed the weight to be given to an agreement
waiving or limiting spousal support where a spouse subsequently seeks a more favorable spousal
support determination – inconsistent with that agreement - under the Divorce Act. While the
focus of this thesis is contractual support and the setting aside of an agreement (or part of an
agreement) under subsection 56(4) of the Family Law Act, this section will briefly outline how
entitlement to spousal support may be established on all three bases. When crafting their own
agreements and choosing to create or waive a spousal support obligation, it is important for
parties to know what the state of spousal support law is where there is no agreement. Even when
parties choose to create a contractual spousal support obligation or waiver, they are informed of
the bases for spousal support so that they better understand the spousal support principles and
law at play. Moreover, where a contract is set aside, the courts will consider whether the spousal
support entitlement exists based on any of the three grounds.
1. Compensatory Support
Moge confirmed that where spousal support has not been resolved by way of agreement,
the legislative language setting out four objectives for spousal support governs entitlement and all

23

For a detailed discussion of Moge and its impact on spousal support, including its gendered sensitivity to the
economic reality of women’s lives and a pattern of more generous support awards, see Susan Boyd and Claire
Young, “Feminism, Law, and Public Policy: Family Feuds and Taxing Times” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall LJ 545 at
557 [Boyd and Young] and Carol Rogerson, “Spousal Support After Moge” (1996-1997) 14 CLFQ 281 ff
(WestlawNext Canada) [Rogerson, “After Moge”].
24
See, for example, Mary-Jo Maur, “Compensatory Support Update: Why It’s Important to Get the Basis for
Spousal Support Entitlement Right,” The Six-Minute Family Law Lawyer, 2010 (on file with the author).
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four objectives must be taken into account without according primacy to any of them.25 Most
significantly, Moge broadened the basis for spousal support with “its re-conceptualization of
spousal support around the idea of compensation.”26 Although the compensatory principle is “very
broad indeed, encompassing just about every possible compensatory theory,”27 the role of
compensatory support is described most often as “the equitable sharing of the economic
consequences of marriage or marriage breakdown.”28 For example, the recipient spouse might
suffer economic disadvantages such as:29 the financial impact of withdrawing from or not being in
the paid labour force (i.e. loss of future earning power, loss of skills, continuity and seniority,
missed promotions and lack of access to fringe employment benefits); 30 the economic impact of
children both during and after marriage;31 the economic consequence of prioritizing one spouse's
career interests or contributing to the other spouse's business; 32 and, the inherent economic
disadvantages revealed in the role assumed by one party through the “great disparities in the
standard of living that would be experienced by spouses in the absence of support.”33

This was significant as it confirmed that “the clean break model of spousal support, with its harsh application of
the principle of self-sufficiency, has clearly been rejected in Canada.” See Rogerson, “After Moge,” supra note 23.
26
Rogerson, “Post-Bracklow,” supra note 22 at 187-188.
27
Rollie Thompson, “Ideas of Spousal Support Entitlement” (2015) 34 CFLQ 1 at 6 and 11-13. Markers include
where one spouse: (1) stays home full/part-time to care for children while the other maintains full employment; (2)
takes a less demanding full-time job to assume greater childcare responsibility; (3) relocates to further the other’s
career or employment, but disrupts or modifies own employment; (4) earns income in order to support the other
spouse who completes education/training to improve income; (5) enters a relationship before acquiring much in the
way of labour market skills and is home full/part-time, or structures employment around childcare demands; (6) is
primarily responsible for the care of children after separation; (7) the sacrifices enhance the other spouse’s earning
potential who is free to pursue own economic goals; (8) contributes to the other’s career, including to the operation
of a business or taking on increased domestic or financial responsibilities to enable the other spouse to pursue
licenses, degrees, training, education etc.
28
Ibid.
29
Moge, supra note 18 recognizes that these disadvantages disproportionately affect women.
30
Ibid at 867.
31
Ibid at 867-869.
32
Ibid at 869-870.
33
Ibid at 870.
25
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2. Non-Compensatory Support
Although Bracklow is often treated as a framework case for the three conceptual bases of
spousal support, it was primarily a case about non-compensatory support. Bracklow broadened the
role of spousal support by confirming that even in a case where there is no entitlement to spousal
support on a compensatory basis, entitlement may be found where there is “need” alone. “[I]f need
is interpreted broadly to cover any significant drop in standard of living, the basis for entitlement
is very broad. Spousal support law was already moving in this direction after Moge, but Bracklow
has confirmed the trend.”34 Carol Rogerson observed this trend and acknowledged that “[a]ll
spouses in need tend to get support. ‘Need,’ the central concept that grounds entitlement to noncompensatory support, is being interpreted fairly broadly.”35 She also noted that there is a finding
of a non-compensatory claim “so long as there was economic dependence or interdependency
during the course of the relationship.”36 While it does not pin down “need” to a specific definition,
post-Bracklow case law reveals that “need” is conceptualized and found to exist in cases where the
spousal support claimant’s circumstances are characterized as involving:
a) illness and disability (i.e. seriously limiting or precluding employment);
b) limited earnings or earning capacity for other reasons (i.e. any situation…
including age, lack of education and skills, loss of employment due to shifts in the
labour market, or withdrawal from the labour market during the course of the
relationship for reasons other than childcare);
c) a significant drop in the standard of living (i.e. situations involving glaring need
where the claimant is in dire economic circumstances due to severely limited
earnings or earning capacity or even if working, a significant drop due to loss of
access to the income of the higher-earning spouse); and,
d) short marriages.37

Rogerson, “Post-Bracklow,” supra note 22 at 223.
Ibid at 228.
36
Ibid at 226.
37
Ibid.
34
35
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3. Contractual Support
A spousal support recipient can also establish entitlement in a third way: on a contractual
basis. For example, the parties might agree on the quantum and duration of spousal support in a
cohabitation agreement, marriage contract or separation agreement.38 However, in the same way
that parties might agree to a recipient spouse’s entitlement in this manner, they are also able to
agree that there is no spousal support entitlement or limit it by including extensive spousal
support waivers and/or releases in their domestic contract.39 While the parties are encouraged to
settle their own affairs, what happens when a party later decides to seek spousal support in the
face of a contractual waiver or release of same? The remaining part of this chapter will set out
the main principles at play in this context.
Section B: Freedom of Contract and Seeking Spousal Support despite the Domestic
Contract
While Miglin remains the landmark Supreme Court of Canada decision on domestic
contracts and freedom of contract in family law involving spousal support, it is important to briefly
touch upon the Pelech trilogy that governed judicial variation of spousal support agreements prior
to the Miglin decision. Significantly, the 1987 Supreme Court of Canada Pelech trilogy40 reflected
liberal notions of the autonomous individual and endorsed the clean break model of spousal
support, self-sufficiency and freedom of contract.

38

Family Law Act, supra note 2, ss 51-54.
The domestic contract can provide for no spousal support whatsoever or provide for both the quantum and/or
duration of support with or without releases.
40
The Pelech trilogy is comprised of: Pelech v Pelech [1987] 1 SCR 801 [Pelech]; Richardson v Richardson [1987]
1 SCR 857; and, Caron v Caron [1987] 1 SCR 892 [collectively referred to as the “Pelech trilogy” or “trilogy”]. In
all three cases, the spouses had agreed on spousal support with the benefit of legal advice. The wives subsequently
sought to vary the agreement. They were all unsuccessful.
39
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1) The Pelech Trilogy: Clean Break, Freedom of Contract and Self-Sufficiency
In the Pelech trilogy, the Supreme Court of Canada was tasked with addressing judicial
variation of spousal support agreements. Specifically, the issue the Court grappled with was the
choice between a deferential and an interventionist judicial approach to requests to alter
agreements that the parties had previously negotiated. This involved a discretionary balancing act
by the judiciary between the competing values of finality and fairness. Despite clear evidence of
dramatic economic inequalities and economic need on the part of the former wives (i.e. they were
all receiving social assistance) coupled with evidence of their former husband’s ability to pay, the
Supreme Court of Canada refused to order an increase in spousal support in all three cases. The
Court noted that the parties had negotiated spousal support agreements and insisted that they
should be respected absent evidence that met the Court’s causal connection test. The causal
connection test guiding variation applications required a radical and unforeseen change in
circumstances, causally connected to the marriage, before a court could alter the terms of an
agreement intended to be a full and final settlement of the claims arising from the breakdown of
the marriage. This approach permitted spousal support to be limited by domestic contracts except
in those circumstances satisfying the narrow interpretation and high threshold of the causal
connection test. Sheppard, for example, noted that “[i]n the interests of promoting negotiated
settlements of post-marriage economic matters and of making possible a clean and complete break
in economic obligations between former spouses, judicial deference was appropriate in
applications for variation of spousal support agreements.”41

Colleen Sheppard, “Uncomfortable Victories and Unanswered Questions: Lessons from Moge” (1995) 12 Can J
Fam L 283 at 288.
41
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The trilogy is described as “a product of its era…the era when the clean break model of
spousal support, with its emphasis on spousal-sufficiency after divorce, became dominant.”42 The
trilogy reflected concerns and values dominating the first wave of modern family law reform as
evidenced by the policy choice of upholding spousal support agreements and restricting the courts’
ability to relieve spouses of bad bargains.43 On a practical level, domestic contracts were construed
as a pragmatically efficient mechanism of dispute resolution, while on a symbolic level, the legal
concept of contract resonated with new images of marriage and divorce. As Rogerson explained:
The new view of marriage was as a contract between two autonomous and equal
individuals freely choosing the structure of their relationship to meet their own
needs and aspirations, without the paternalistic intervention of the state. New values
of gender equality meant that women were fully capable of making their own
choices and no longer assumed to be in need of protection. And just as spouses
chose the terms of their coming together, they would choose the terms of their
coming apart. If spouses made bad bargains, they had only themselves to blame. A
law upholding agreements would encourage people to act more
responsibly…Individual choice and individual responsibility were the mantras of
the time.44
The Pelech trilogy marked a substantial departure from the traditional view of need-based
spousal support. Instead, it “acknowledged that modern marriage is often not a life-long
commitment and suggested that couples should be able to extricate themselves, both financially
and emotionally, from their former marriage partners.”45 In practice, this translated into a twofold
effect. First, by endorsing the clean break model with support orders’ primary goal of severing
“the ties between the ex-spouses as quickly as possible…[the trilogy] had a profound impact on
spousal support awards for some time.”46 Second, the causal connection test’s high threshold for
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variation “led to the predictable result that it became extremely difficult to vary agreements
deemed to be final settlements of the entitlements arising from the marriage.”47 Given the high
variation standard, “people were often stuck with ‘bad’ deals - bad in the sense that they left one
of the former spouses in a precarious financial state. This was particularly pronounced for women
who frequently agreed to short term support on the expectation that it would not take them long to
become financially self-sufficient - an expectation that often failed to materialize.”48
The trilogy’s emphasis on self-sufficiency and freedom of contract inspired considerable
feminist commentary, which highlighted these adverse effects and their problematic impact on
divorcing women. The abstract principle of freedom of contract was criticized for sacrificing the
economic well-being of women. Feminist scholars49 advocated for a substantive equality approach
arguing that judges need to be attuned to “the gender-based inequality of women within
heterosexual families…as well as the unequal bargaining power as they interpreted legislation,
particularly in the spousal support context.”50 The feminist consensus found that “[i]t was
premature to treat women and men identically in family law, or in bargaining over domestic
contracts, because women and men were not yet equal within families, or indeed, within society.”51
Martha Bailey captured the trilogy’s insensitivity to these live issues when she explained:
The decisions are consistent with the global trend toward privatization, our
traditional protection of the private sphere of the family from state intervention, the
current push for settlement of family law cases, and the new family law's emphasis
on self-sufficiency and a clean break phenomena which are all problematic for the
disadvantaged. The privatized family, long exposed by feminists as a statesanctioned arena for male abuse of power, will not produce agreements consistent
with the standards of fairness embodied in our family laws because of the inequality
47
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of bargaining power between men and women in a patriarchal society ... The
trilogy's atomistic view of the family is consistent with dominant liberal discourse,
which represents the oppressive relationship between husband and wife as a freely
chosen contract between rational, unencumbered, autonomous individuals.52
It was against this backdrop that Moge entered the debate and significantly re-conceptualized the
role of spousal support, transforming “the legal landscape of spousal support, just as the Pelech
Trilogy had five years earlier.”53 It was said that despite the narrowing effects of the Pelech trilogy
on spousal support, “the pendulum swung back in the direction of a broader basis for spousal
support with the release of Moge and its re-conceptualization of spousal support around the idea
of compensation.”54 However, it was not until the release of Miglin that the Pelech trilogy
(formally) no longer governed cases where spousal support was claimed in the face of an existing
domestic contract.
2) Miglin’s Contractual Finality, Fairness and Autonomy
In Miglin, instead of resorting to litigation, the parties55 initially negotiated a
comprehensive settlement of their affairs. The separation agreement contained, inter alia, a full
and final release of spousal support following a 14-year marriage with four children that the parties
characterized differently. On the husband’s account, the parties had a modern marriage: they were
equal business partners and the wife advanced her career and education during the marriage. On
the wife’s account, the marriage was a traditional one with the husband managing the family’s
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finances while she raised the children and helped out with the family business. Against this
backdrop of the parties’ marital dynamics and despite the agreement, the wife subsequently applied
for and obtained a spousal support order under the Divorce Act, which the Supreme Court of
Canada overturned on appeal. The issue on appeal before the Court was the proper approach to
determining an originating application for spousal support under the Divorce Act, where the parties
have executed a pre-existing agreement that is inconsistent with the claim for spousal support. This
provided the Court “with an opportunity to address directly the question of the continued
application of the Pelech trilogy.”56 The Court held that the spousal support release in the parties’
separation agreement should be enforced and the wife’s claim for support dismissed.
While the Court’s ruling in Miglin is consistent with a pattern of deference to separation
agreements and with the endorsement of the principle of freedom of contract, the Court took a less
deferential approach than the one previously adopted in Pelech, explicitly rejecting “a nearimpermeable standard such that a court will endorse any agreement, regardless of the inequities it
reveals.”57 The Court held that where spousal support is sought in the face of a pre-existing
agreement, a two-stage investigation is required “into all the circumstances surrounding that
agreement, first at the time of its formation, and second, at the time of the application.”58
Under stage one, “the court should first look to the circumstances in which the agreement
was negotiated and executed to determine whether there is any reason to discount it.”59 The judges
are to consider both the circumstances of execution and the substance of the agreement. For the
former, this includes determining “whether there were any circumstances of oppression, pressure,
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or other vulnerabilities…and the conditions under which the negotiations were held, such as their
duration and whether there was professional assistance.”60 In terms of the level of deference and
respect that should be accorded to the agreement, the judges noted:
Where vulnerabilities are not present, or are effectively compensated by the presence of
counsel or other professionals or both, or have not been taken advantage of, the court
should consider the agreement as a genuine mutual desire to finalize the terms of the parties'
separation and as indicative of their substantive intentions. Accordingly, the court should
be loathe to interfere. In contrast, where the power imbalance did vitiate the bargaining
process, the agreement should not be read as expressing the parties' notion of equitable
sharing in their circumstances and the agreement will merit little weight.61
If the conditions surrounding the negotiation of the agreement are found to be “satisfactory”, the
court must then direct its attention to the substance of the agreement. In particular,
The court must determine the extent to which the agreement takes into account the factors
and objectives listed in the Act, thereby reflecting an equitable sharing of the economic
consequences of marriage and its breakdown. Only a significant departure from the general
objectives of the Act will warrant the court's intervention on the basis that there is not
substantial compliance with the Act. The court must not view spousal support arrangements
in a vacuum, however; it must look at the agreement or arrangement in its totality, bearing
in mind that all aspects of the agreement are inextricably linked and that the parties have a
large discretion in establishing priorities and goals for themselves.62
While “the court should defer to the wishes of the parties and afford the agreement great
weight”63 where the agreement is not impugned under step one of the inquiry pertaining to the
time of its formation, stage two recognizes that “the vicissitudes of life mean that, in some
circumstances, parties may find themselves down the road of their post-divorce life in
circumstances not contemplated.”64 As a result, “the court should assess the extent to which
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enforcement of the agreement still reflects the original intention of the parties and the extent to
which it is still in substantial compliance with the objectives of the Act.”65 The court explained:
The parties' intentions, as reflected by the agreement, are the backdrop against which the
court must consider whether the situation of the parties at the time of the application makes
it no longer appropriate to accord the agreement conclusive weight. We note that it is
unlikely that the court will be persuaded to disregard the agreement in its entirety but for a
significant change in the parties' circumstances from what could reasonably be anticipated
at the time of negotiation…66
… we do not consider "change" of any particular nature to be a threshold requirement
which, once established, entitles the court to jettison the agreement entirely. Rather, the
court should be persuaded that both the intervention and the degree of intervention are
warranted…67
The two-stage test in Miglin ostensibly overruled the trilogy, but the extent of its impact
and rejection of the Pelech trilogy was questioned. Rogerson noted that although the Miglin’s
majority reasons found the trilogy’s “privileging of values of clean break inappropriate in the
current legislative and jurisprudential context…[they] also emphasize the continued relevance of
the policy concerns that underlie the trilogy—certainty, finality, and autonomy.”68 Boyd and
Young argued that “the discourse that dominated the Pelech trilogy—of choice and individual
responsibility, and freedom from state-imposed norms—emerge once more;”69 so too Rogerson
observed that Miglin strikingly evokes the language of the trilogy, which is captured by the
majority quote: “Although we recognize the unique nature of separation agreements and their
differences from commercial contracts, they are contracts nonetheless. Parties must take
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responsibility for the contract they execute as well as for their own lives.”70 Despite Miglin’s “more
‘balanced’”71 two-tier test, Rogerson went on to caution, “[a]t best the new test will create
considerable confusion in the law as to its meaning, thus failing to resolve the uncertainty that has
plagued this area of the law for at least a decade. At worst, the new test reintroduces the stringency
of the trilogy test in a new guise.”72 As a result, the development of subsequent case law was and
continues to be the only way to determine the effects of its application and whether “[i]n the end,
finality continues to trump fairness.”73
The actual impact of Miglin in practice revealed that although lower courts initially
interpreted the ruling strictly, they increasingly became more concerned with both procedural and
substantive fairness. Rogerson observed this trend after conducting an extensive review of postMiglin case law up to 2011.74 The initial strict interpretation by lower courts resulted in agreements
being upheld unless there were serious flaws in the negotiation process.75 Little attention was paid
to the overall substantive fairness or compliance with the statutory objectives as the courts in their
deferential approach upheld many unfair agreements. 76 However, this initial strict interpretation
paved the way for a more gradual interpretation that emphasized fairness whereby courts became
reluctant to uphold agreements that were found to depart significantly from the objectives and
norms of the Divorce Act.77 The development of such case law arguably erodes what is construed
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as Miglin’s emphasis on upholding agreements.78 As Buckley noted, “[i]f the Pelech trilogy
represents the high point of enforcing agreements, Miglin represents an uneasy compromise
between the desire to uphold bargains and the recognition that agreements may be unfair or
exploitative.”79
Moreover, Miglin is now often read alongside Hartshorne v Hartshorne, 80 which is another
Supreme Court of Canada decision on domestic contracts and freedom of contracts in family law.
While Miglin addresses spousal support in the context of a separation agreement, Hartshorne
addresses marital property in the context of a prenuptial agreement. In Hartshorne, both parties
were lawyers, although the wife withdrew from legal practice to raise the children. The husband
was previously married and decided he would never again subject his assets to property division
in the event of a divorce. Shortly before the wedding, and at his insistence, a marriage contract
was drafted and executed to that effect. According to the terms, the parties were separate as to
property except for the matrimonial home on which the wife would earn a percentage for each year
she lived there. Despite being advised that the agreement was “grossly unfair” and receiving
independent legal advice, the wife signed the agreement. The majority judges enforced contracts
in both Miglin and Hartshorne.
In Miglin, the majority judges held that the global Separation Agreement should be
accorded significant and determinative weight. The parties engaged in extensive negotiation over
a lengthy period of approximately 15 months. They engaged the services of professionals,
including experienced and expert counsel. The wife received legal and detailed financial advice
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throughout the negotiation process and there was nothing to indicate that the circumstances
surrounding the negotiation and execution of the Separation Agreement were fraught with
vulnerabilities. While the wife testified at trial that she felt pressured by her husband to agree to
the spousal support release, was not content with the Separation Agreement and found it a
confusing and emotional time, the majority judges held that any vulnerability experienced by the
wife was more than adequately compensated by the independent and competent legal counsel
representing her interests over the substantial period of negotiation as well as the services provided
to her by other professionals. Similarly, nothing in the substance of the agreement demonstrated a
significant departure from the overall objectives of the Divorce Act. The division of assets in the
Separation Agreement reflected the parties’ needs and wishes at the time and fairly distributed the
assets acquired and created by them throughout their marriage. Moreover, the quantum of child
support was established in full contemplation of the wife’s spousal support release. The judges
held that the Separation Agreement at the time of its formation was in substantial compliance with
the Divorce Act.
In Hartshorne, the majority judges noted that the marriage agreement was entered into after
the wife received independent legal advice at the time of negotiation, which is an important means
of ensuring an informed decision to enter into an agreement. The majority judges found that the
wife was forewarned of the agreement’s shortcomings, which was evidenced by her lawyer’s
detailed opinion letter. Despite her lawyer’s advice, the wife still signed the agreement. The
majority judges held that the wife could not now rely on her lawyer’s opinion to support the
allegation that because she thought the agreement was unfair from its inception that she never
intended to live up to her end of the bargain.
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3) Section 56(4) of the Family Law Act and the Judicial Discretion to Set Aside a
Contract
While the two-stage Miglin analysis under the Divorce Act is one way that a party may try
to obtain a more favourable determination of spousal support in the face of a domestic contract,
section 56(4) of the Family Law Act provides a party seeking spousal support with the opportunity
to set aside the domestic contract. Pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act, a court may
set aside a domestic contract or one or more of its provisions if at least one of three grounds is
engaged. As noted in subsections (a)-(c), this may happen if: “(a) a party failed to disclose to the
other significant assets, or significant debts or other liabilities, existing when the domestic contract
was made; (b) if a party did not understand the nature or consequences of the domestic contract;
or (c) otherwise in accordance with the law of contract.”81 With respect to subsection 56(4)(c)’s
“law of contract” provision, a party’s pleadings may refer to various contractual law principles,
including for example, the existence of undue influence, duress, fraud, coercion, unconscionability
or misrepresentation.82 While different definitions and criteria apply to successfully establish the
existence of these diverse doctrines, the “law of contract” grounds are united in their shared
concern: whether the formation of the contract is compromised and warrants judicial intervention.
Regardless of which ground(s) a party is relying on, section 56(4) consists of a two-stage analysis:
(1) Can the party seeking to set aside the agreement demonstrate that one or more of the s. 56(4)
circumstances is engaged? (2) If so, is it appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to set
aside the agreement?83 It is to this two-stage judicial exercise under section 56(4) that this author
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wishes to apply the lens of relational theory in order to illuminate the judicial reasoning as to when
judicial intervention is warranted.
While scholars have applied relational theory to the spousal support agreement context under
the Divorce Act, this author will apply relational theory to a different yet related statutory context
by examining five cases where the judges were tasked with determining whether to set aside the
domestic contract pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act. The statutory language itself
requires a contextual analysis as the legislation provides guidelines rather than stringent rules,
which in turn provides the scope to enter into the discussion of contextualism and therefore
relational theory. Although relational theory helps to explain how the judges approach the validity
of the domestic contract, the relational approach also exposes some of the deficits and limitations
in the court process and reasoning. Prior to embarking on this author’s analysis found in Chapter
3, Chapter 2 will provide an overview of relational theory and will then explore the scholarly
literature that applies relational theory to the spousal support agreement context in Canada.
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Chapter Two: An Overview of Relational Theory and its Application to the Canadian
Spousal Support Context
This chapter will introduce relational theory and review the scholarly literature that
applies relational theory to the spousal support agreement context in Canada. The literature is
comprised of Robert Leckey’s and Lucy-Ann Buckley’s relational analysis under the Divorce
Act. Section A will provide an overview of relational theory. Section B will discuss Leckey’s
Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds and Section C will focus on Buckley’s Relational
Theory and Choice Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of Canada. As part of this account, the
relevant paragraphs of Miglin and Hartshorne84 will be incorporated and referenced to illustrate
Buckley’s and Leckey’s claims about relational theory and its role in the decisions. It should be
noted that although Hartshorne is not a spousal support case as it deals with property in the
context of a marriage contract, the analysis regarding relational theory is still informative. This
relational analysis will act as a useful point of reference for the subsequent chapter in which the
relational lens will be applied to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.
Section A: An Overview of Relational Theory
In Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law, Jennifer Nedelsky
conceptualizes a contextual, relationally embedded self. She observes the constitutively
interdependent and interconnected nature of human beings and the centrality of their
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relationships. As she explains, “[i]t is the very nature of human selves to be in interaction with
others”85 and “[t]he self is relational because human beings become who they are – their
identities, their capacities, their desires- through the relationships in which they participate.”86
On her account, “[t]he individual self is…constituted in an ongoing, dynamic way by the
relationships through which each person interacts with others.”87 Thus, she emphasizes that
“[w]hen we see the self as constituted by relations, then the core values of human life have to be
understood in ways that take account of this centrality of relationship.”88 This understanding is
significant; it provides the main premise of relational theory given that relational theorists are
united in their “shared conviction that persons are socially embedded and that agents’ identities
are formed within the context of social relationships shaped by a complex of intersecting social
determinants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity.”89
Writing in the context of both family law and administrative law in Canada, Robert
Leckey observes that “law has come to suppose and produce contextual subjects…that is,
subjects regarded as rooted in their relationships and social settings [who] have come to replace
ones defined rather more abstractly by legal categorizations.”90 According to Leckey, this shift in
emphasis from abstraction and categorical framings to a focus on relationships, embeddedness
and context is relational theory’s basic premise. Considered “[a] branch of feminist political
theory,” Leckey notes that “relational theory is not an officially constituted school, and its
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boundaries are contestable.”91 Yet despite contestable boundaries, differing conceptualizations
and internal tensions92 among individual relational theorists, Leckey observes that there are
shared threads underlying relational theorists’ overall approach. In particular, he identifies three
discernible elements, which not only provide a summary understanding of relational theory, but
also act as “a useful reference point for legal analysis.”93 These three common elements are: (1)
“the description of subjects as relationally embedded;” (2) “a methodology of contextualism;”
and, (3) “relational theory’s normative commitment to relational autonomy and to promoting
constructive relationships conducive to it.”94
1) First Element: The Contextual, Relationally Embedded Self
Relational theorists are united in their “shared conviction that persons are socially
embedded and that agents’ identities are formed within the context of social relationships shaped
by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity.” 95 As
Leckey explains, this shared conviction is relational theory’s “point of departure;”96 the
“descriptive premise”97 of subjects as embedded and relationally constituted is the first key
element of relational theory. In contrast to the image of a separate liberal self, the “self exists
fundamentally in relation to others.”98 On the relational account, “subjects are socially
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constituted, embedded in their contexts, their selfhood and agency formed by thick relationships
with others.”99
Nedelsky observes the constitutively interdependent and interconnected nature of human
beings and the centrality of their relationships. She states that “[t]he self is relational because
human beings become who they are – their identities, their capacities, their desires- through the
relationships in which they participate.”100 In order to illustrate the varied nature of these
relationships ranging from the intimate and interpersonal to the systemic, Nedelsky explains:
People’s interactions with one another matter not simply because their interests may
collide. In my view, each individual is in basic ways constituted by networks of
relationships of which they are a part – networks that range from intimate relations with
parents, friends, or lovers to relations between student and teacher, welfare recipient and
caseworker, citizen and state, to being participants in a global economy, migrants in a
world of gross economic inequality, inhabitants of a world shaped by global warming.101
Nedelsky captures the meaning of being “constituted by relationships rather than just living
among others”102 by using the familiar example of children to highlight this relational notion of
“people being fundamentally shaped by relationship.”103 As she explains, it “is the idea that
children are shaped by their families, often their parents in particular…Both the child and the
future adult are recognized to be profoundly shaped by the kinds of relationships they had with
their parents.”104 Accordingly, instead of viewing a human being as the liberal, atomistic and
separate self whose interactions are relevant only when linked by agreement or when interests
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collide, the relational approach recognizes “the idea that people continue to be profoundly
shaped by relationships.”105
This conceptualization of the self is similarly captured by other scholars. For example,
Donchin acknowledges that the “self exists fundamentally in relation to others”106 and Williams
explains that selves “are formed in time and in relational space.”107 Time plays an important role
as the view of the self is also historical in nature while the passage of time itself is important in
terms of revealing the effect of relations over time.108 On Fletcher’s account, the “historical self”
may comprise the notion of obligations, which is implied by the “sense of being historically
rooted in a set of defining familial, institutional, and national relationships.”109 Once again, this
emphasizes the broad range of relations and their continued effects over time, highlighting the
importance of people’s embeddedness and context.
2) Second Element: The Methodology of Contextualism
In addition to the first element of relationally embedded and contextual subjects, Leckey
observes that the second element is “a methodology of contextualism.”110 As Leckey explains by
drawing on Nedelsky’s work, “[r]elational theorists consistently advocate close attention to the
contexts in which individuals interact…Good feminist theorizing begins with people in their
social contexts, insisting on context and particularity over abstract universality.”111 This context,
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however, is “larger than the set of personal relationships” 112 as it also includes the broader
“political, socio-economic, and cultural conditions.”113 As Mackenzie and Stoljar emphasize, in
order to understand the capacities and characteristics of the relational self, it is important to “pay
attention to the rich and complex social and historical contexts in which agents are
embedded.”114
Contrary to liberal theory’s atomistic self, relational theory’s embedded contextual self
relates to the third element of relational theory: autonomy. Relational theorists recognize the
importance of having a true understanding of the self, because an inaccurate understanding of the
self is likely to create an erroneous conception of autonomy. As Nedelsky points out, “[a]
distorted picture of the self is likely to generate a distorted understanding of autonomy [and other
values], and a system of rights designed to promote and protect that vision of self and autonomy
is unlikely to optimally foster and protect human capacities, needs and entitlements.”115 Instead,
the relational conception of the self and relationships recognizes that “[a]ll core values, such as
security, dignity, equality, liberty, freedom of speech, are made possible by (or undermined by)
structures of relationships.”116
Similarly, Buckley recognizes this interaction when she observes that there has been “a
continuing debate on the significance and the nature of personal choice,”117 which “derives from
the competing models of autonomy posited by neoliberal and feminist theorists.”118 As she
explains, when the self is seen as an “atomistic, independent agent,”119 it is deemed to have “the
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ability, and the duty, to make ‘responsible’ decisions in one’s “own best interests.”120
Conversely, personal decision-making is cast in a different light when “the effects of structural
barriers and social context”121 on the relationally embedded self are considered. This includes
taking into account and emphasizing “the structural implications of what Williams has termed
the ‘rhetoric of choice’ where negative consequences are deemed to flow from ‘personal choice,’
without further interrogation of that ‘choice’ or its gender implications.”122 Thus, “[r]elational
autonomy requires attention to the impact of oppressive social and political structures on
individuals’ lives and opportunities.”123 In an effort to vindicate women’s agency, relational
autonomy strives to “[t]o reconcile these apparently opposing objectives- the vindication of
choice and the recognition of constraints on the exercise of that choice.”124
3) Third Element: Relational Autonomy
The third common element of relational theory is its “normative commitment to relational
autonomy and to promoting constructive relationships conducive to it.”125 On the note of
constructive relationships, relational theorists perceive liberal theory’s extreme individualism as
a failure “to account for the ways in which our essential humanity is neither possible nor
comprehensible without the network of relationships of which it is a part.”126 Contrary to the
relational self, the liberal selves “protected by rights are seen as essentially separate and not
creatures whose interests, needs and capacities are mutually constitutive.”127 Thus, by
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conceptualizing autonomy as relational in nature, relational theorists starkly oppose the liberal
notion of autonomy. Mackenzie and Stoljar, for example, characterize the liberal conception as
being “inherently masculinist.”128 On their account, it is “inextricably bound up with masculine
character ideals, with assumptions about selfhood and agency that are metaphysically,
epistemologically, and ethically problematic from a feminist perspective.”129 On the other hand,
relational responses “focus attention on the need for a more fine-grained and richer account of
the autonomous agent.”130 To this end, a corresponding emphasis is placed on “autonomy as a
characteristic of agents who are emotional, embodied, desiring, creative, and feeling, as well as
rational creatures.”131
This reconstruction of autonomy in relational terms disassociates the concept of
autonomy from its traditional liberal associations, which commonly include terms such as
“independence,” “self-determination” and “control.”132 Nedelsky explains that “[b]ecause we are
always dependent on others for the possibility of autonomy, it follows that autonomy cannot
mean independence” or “control.”133 Nedelsky best captures this reality when she focuses on the
choice of language and notes that “the best language for autonomy is not independence, selfdetermination, or control – despite their common associations with autonomy.”134 Instead, the
language she proposes is “autonomy as part of the capacity for creative interaction- which
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includes the capacity for self-creation.”135 On her account, “this approach makes the embodied,
affective, and relational nature of human beings central rather than peripheral.”136
Nedelsky highlights the importance of capacity and its role in the conception of
autonomy. She states that she shares “the widely held belief in the capacity for autonomy and its
value… focus[ing] on what enables this capacity to develop, to thrive, to manifest in autonomous
behavior and the experience of autonomy.”137 In order to capture this focus and emphasis,
Nedelsky explains that the best language to use “is ‘relations of autonomy.’”138 On this point, she
elaborates as follows:
I prefer this language to ‘conditions’ for autonomy because I think the language of
relations of autonomy highlights the dynamic, interactive quality of autonomy- in
contrast to a picture of it as a strictly internal state of mind that comes into being when
certain- separable- conditions are in place. The functioning of the capacity for autonomy
is highly fluid; it varies across time and spheres of our lives. Autonomy exists on a
continuum. As we act (usually partially) autonomously, we are always in interaction with
the relationships (intimate and social-structural) that enable our autonomy. Relations are
then constitutive of autonomy rather than conditions for it.139
Hence, on her account, autonomy is not best conceived “as a static presumption about human
nature, but a capacity whose realization is ever shifting”140 in relation to “the inherently fluid and
contingent dynamics of process and relationship.”141
As captured by the quoted passage above, both the self and autonomy are constitutively
relational, an important point that Leckey similarly acknowledges when he states that relational
“autonomy is not a capacity that can be exercised in isolation.”142 Instead, he emphasizes that
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“[t]he crucial insight is that it depends ‘also on our relations with others.’”143 In the same vein,
and broadly speaking, Buckley states that relational models of autonomy “focus on the social
situation of the individual (including the social connections and pressures that may affect
personal decision making), and the impact of social forces on the development of personal
capacities for reflection and action.”144 Speaking in the family law context, Buckley explains that
“[d]rawing on the common elements identified by Leckey, a relational approach to autonomy
emphasizes the social situation of the actors and the context in which bargaining occurred.”145 To
illustrate this point in practice, she cites a real-life family law example and explains:
This highlighted discrepancies in the parties’ bargaining positions, as well as the
emotional concerns and vulnerability arising in the prenuptial and marital breakdown
contexts and the pressures arising from abusive relationships or concern for children. It
highlights the implications of structural inequalities (such as gender inequality in the
market place and in caring work) for individual decision making. The relational approach
also acknowledges the social constitution of individuals and the significance of broader
social context (such as the cultural location of the subject). All of these offer potential
grounds for contesting the neoliberal assumption of atomistic self-interest.146
Despite this thematic emphasis on “the role of emotion and interdependency in personal
decision making”147 and “the significance of relationships and context,”148 Buckley explains that
for relational theorists, emotion or emotional pressure does not preclude autonomy. Otherwise,
“as Leckey has argued, women might be pathologized by assumptions of emotionalism and
vulnerability.”149 As Leckey explains, “the contestable patriarchal construction of men as
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rational and women as emotional”150 would serve to imply “that the only conduct that can be
taken seriously in the juridical sphere, and to which autonomy can be ascribed, is
unemotional.”151 Speaking in the context of the (un)enforceability of contracts, he elaborates:
Such an implication stands in direct opposition to relational theorists' efforts to reconceive
autonomy in embodied, relational terms. Asserting the unenforceability of contracts
concluded by emotional women reinforces the ideal that women, to contract effectively,
should strive to be unemotional and more like men. On the contrary, the strategic objective
must surely be to foster a state of affairs in which there is space for all subjects, irrespective
of their gender, to be simultaneously emotional and reasonable, emotional and autonomous.
The presence of emotion should not lightly be coded as indicative of the absence of agency
and thus of consent.152
As recognized by various scholars, relational theory moves beyond gender constructions and
categorical framings with its “emphasis upon relational autonomy and family diversity.”153 For
instance, Leckey highlights relational theory’s “commitment to promoting a diversity of family
forms”154 and its “openness to diverse models of thick family relationship, including same-sex
couples.”155 He emphasizes relational theory’s “commitment to the capacity for individuals,
especially women, to revise their life plans and choose ways of living other than those presented
to them by the social contexts in which they are embedded and by which they are constituted.”156
In the same vein and drawing on Nedelsky’s work, Buckley states that relational theory “also
holds that individuals can move beyond those contexts and shape their own lives, rather than
simply accepting social roles and definitions.”157 Similarly, on Barclay’s account, relational
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theorists emphasize that autonomy is necessary “‘[t]o consider which particular attachments we
should reshape, which to reject, which to choose, and which to promote.’”158
This all resonates with Nedelsky’s account of “finding one’s own” law.159 As Nedelsky
states, “[i]ndeed, feminists are centrally concerned with freeing women to shape their own lives,
to define who they (each) are, rather than accepting the definition given by others (men and
male-dominated society, in particular.)”160 For Nedelsky, “the essence of autonomy”161 is the
possibility of selecting “which of the myriad of influences in one’s life to make ‘one’s own.’”162
To this end, Nedelsky’s reference to autonomy consists of “finding one’s own” law 163 where
“one’s own” is to be conceptualized in relational terms.164 As Nedelsky explains:
I see autonomy as the core of a capacity to engage in the ongoing, interactive creation of
our selves- our relational selves, our selves that are constituted, yet not determined, by
the web of nested relations within which we live. We have the capacity to interact
creatively, that is, in an undetermined way, with all the relationships that shape us- and
thus to reshape, re-create, both the relationships and ourselves. The idea that such acts
arise from the actor rather than being determined by something else is captured by the
notion of autonomy. The value of the capacity for creative interaction is at the heart of
why I care about autonomy.165
Referring to Nedelsky’s work, Leckey summarizes that “[b]ecoming autonomous - being
able to find and live in accordance with one's own law - is necessarily social in two
dimensions.”166 As he explains, “the capacity to find one's own law develops only in the context
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of relations with others; autonomy is made possible not by separation but by relationships”167
while “the ‘content’ of one’s own law is comprehensible only with reference to shared social
norms, values, and concepts.”168 Hence, “[r]elatedness is seen as a precondition of autonomy,
with interdependence one of its constant components” 169 whereby “[a]utonomy becomes possible
in social interaction through relationships, such as those with parents, teachers, friends, and
agents of the state.”170
As set out above, there are three main elements of relational theory. While this author has
attempted to set them out separately, it is important to note that given their overlap and
interconnected nature, the embedded nature of the relational subject, the methodology of
contextualism and the corresponding relational autonomy are in constant interaction and do not
exist in isolation from one another.
Section B: Leckey’s Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds
In Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds, Leckey applies relational theory to the
Miglin and Hartshorne decisions. In response to the majority judges’ enforcement of both
contracts (i.e. a separation agreement and a prenuptial agreement respectively) whereas the
dissenting judges would have set them aside, Leckey notes that the prevailing scholarly narrative
views the decisions as the story of “two diametrically opposed camps.”171 On this account, “the
majority ideologically holds people to their so-called choices, producing family law subjects as
abstract choosing agents” while the dissenting judges consider “contextual factors,” adopt a
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“richer view of negotiation and consent” and apply a “contextually sensitive criticism of
‘autonomy’ and ‘choice.’”172 However, according to Leckey, “[a]ll the judges explicitly adopt a
contextual method… [and] maintain the necessity of chalking out some scope for individual
choice.”173 While Leckey focuses on proving that “relational theory provides a middle
ground”174 instead of the dominant “story of a stark opposition”175 between the majority and
dissenting judges, this section will outline the elements of relational theory that Leckey identifies
in Miglin and Hartshorne. These elements and where they are found in the decision will serve as
a useful and illustrative point of reference for the next chapter. In particular, the two significant
elements that Leckey discusses in great detail are the “methodology of contextualism” and the
“need to recognize the autonomy to craft intimate relationships on one’s own model.”176
1) The Relational Approach in Miglin: A Contextual Methodology
a. A “Contextual Assessment of All the Circumstances” and a “More Flexible and Contextual
Approach:” The Rich Complexity of the Two-Stage Investigation or Approach

Leckey identifies the methodology of contextualism as an element of relational theory
that is found throughout Miglin. First, it is evidenced by the use of interchangeable and
indistinguishable wording to that effect. For example, the emphasis on context is captured by the
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majority’s directive that “a contextual assessment of all the circumstances” 177 is required when a
spouse applies for support inconsistent with a prior agreement, which mirrors the dissent’s
language of “a more flexible and contextual approach.”178 The judges describe this endeavor as
an “investigation into all the circumstances surrounding that agreement,”179 which they explicitly
situate in its “appropriate temporal context.”180 Specifically, the judges state:
An initial application for spousal support inconsistent with a pre-existing agreement
requires an investigation into all the circumstances surrounding that agreement, first, at
the time of its formation, and second, at the time of the application. In our view, this twostage analysis provides the court with a principled way of balancing the competing
objectives underlying the Divorce Act and of locating the potentially problematic aspects
of spousal support arrangements in their appropriate temporal context...181
The contextual methodology is further found in the paragraphs explaining that the
contextual approach is grounded in the Divorce Act and exemplified by Moge and Bracklow. The
judges state “[t]he fact that the 1985 Act mandates a flexible and contextual approach to spousal
support is underscored by the Act's treatment of support agreements themselves.”182 In reference
to the case law, they go on to observe:
… The contemporary framework cases on spousal support, Moge and Bracklow… both
espouse a contextual approach to spousal support that is fundamentally inconsistent with
the emphasis on absolute autonomy, formal equality, and deemed self-sufficiency… This
contextual approach reflects the varied models of marriage and is sensitive to the
difficulties inherent in unbundling a marital relationship...183
As a result, and against this backdrop, the contextual methodology is found within the contextual
complexity of the two-stage approach itself 184 and highlighted in the paragraphs explaining the
177
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two-stage Miglin analysis. For example, the judges note that the process of determining the fairness
of an agreement “will of necessity be fact and context specific... [and] require… case-by-case
determinations based on the whole picture of the parties' relationship, including their respective
functions during the marriage, their allocation of capital and income upon the breakup, their
childcare responsibilities, their employment prospects, and a range of other factors.”185 While
“[t]he parties’ own attempts to achieve the [Divorce Act’s] objectives…in the context of their
unique situation should not lightly be disregarded,”186 the inquiry necessitates a contextual
analysis. As the judges emphasize in paragraph 241:
…To this end, as I indicated above, parties will need to do more in an agreement than
merely parrot the objectives of the 1985 Act, or the language of this Court's jurisprudence
stripped of its context. The inquiry into whether an agreement is objectively fair at the time
of the application is not a formalistic one, about whether the terms of the agreement appear
to be in technical compliance with the Act. Rather, this inquiry involves a probing,
contextual analysis of the content of the agreement and the circumstances of the parties at
the time of the application…187
b. Sensitivity to Context: The Unique Family Law Context as opposed to the Commercial
Context
The contextual methodology in Miglin is found in the paragraphs capturing the judges’
sensitive awareness of the unique context of marital negotiations as compared to the commercial
context. Described as “a time of intense personal and emotional turmoil,”188 the judges note that
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“Negotiations in the family law context of separation or divorce are conducted in a unique
environment.”189 As they go on to state,
In the typical divorce scenario, spouses negotiate a settlement, often with the aid
of lawyers, at a time when they are still experiencing the emotional trauma of
marriage breakdown. Spouses who have not come to terms with the death of their
marriage and who feel guilty, depressed or angry in consequence of the marriage
breakdown are ill-equipped to form decisions of a permanent and legally binding
nature…190
The judges observe “the intimate nature of the marital relationship that makes it difficult to
overcome potential power imbalances and modes of influence.”191 As they go on to explain,
“The reality ... is that often both contracting parties are vulnerable emotionally, with their
judgment and ability to plan diminished, without the other spouse preying upon or influencing
the other. The complex marital relationship is full of potential power imbalance. In a sense,
vulnerability is implicit in the difficult emotional process of separation.”192 As a result, the
judges emphasize the unique193 marital context as distinct from the commercial context:
… The test should ultimately recognize the particular ways in which separation
agreements generally and spousal support arrangements specifically are vulnerable to a
risk of inequitable sharing at the time of negotiation and in the future…194
... We see this in the direction to the court to consider an agreement as only one factor
among others, rather than to treat it as binding, subject merely to remedies in contract law.
Accordingly, contract law principles are not only better suited to the commercial context,
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but it is implicit in s. 15 of the 1985 Act that they were not intended to govern the
applicability of private contractual arrangements for spousal support. 195
Therefore, in searching for a proper balance between consensus and finality on the one
hand, and sensitivity to the unique concerns that arise in the post-divorce context on the
other, a court should be guided by the objectives of spousal support listed in the Act…196
In addition to the sensitive contextual discussion of marital negotiations, the contextual
methodology is found in paragraphs 214 and 215 where the “discussion of the circumstances of
negotiation explicitly notices factors that may disadvantage women vis-à-vis their male
partners.”197 Elaborating on the gendered inequalities in bargaining power, the judges observe:
Comments such as these underscore the importance of recognizing the degree to which
social and economic factors may constrain individuals' choices at the bargaining
table…The inequalities in bargaining power at play in the settlement process are not
gender neutral…198
… it is typically women who come to the bargaining table as the financially dependent
spouse, and hence the more vulnerable party in the negotiating process…199
Moreover, the dissent openly recognizes that the negotiation of separation agreements “may be
further complicated by what are typically gender-based inequities in bargaining positions between
the parties.”200 The judges highlight these gender nuances as follows:
The unconscionability test is blind to these and other subtle ways in which the economic
disparities between the parties and the parties' respective familial roles, both of which
continue to be gender-based, may play into the negotiating process and significantly
influence its outcome…201
… Separation agreements may "require individuals to make predictions about every
aspect of their future lives" and… are "inherently speculative"…Their accuracy may be
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undermined by the emotional overlay… and by the gendered disparities in bargaining
power …202
…While it is important to respect the will of the parties, courts cannot assume that the
parties' spousal support agreements necessarily provide a clear and transparent guide to
their intentions, which … are often difficult to ascertain. In the family law context, the
parties' "freedom" to contract may be significantly constrained by social and economic
factors, and may be decidedly unequal...203
Overall, whether gendered nuances are explicitly acknowledged or not, the above paragraphs
capture the contextual methodology and the judges’ sensitive awareness of the unique context of
marital negotiations.
c. The Contextual Methodology of Working Out the Meaning of Justice in a Particular Setting
Despite the fact that the judges acknowledge the unique nature of the marital context and
of separation agreements, they “do not ascribe an irrebuttable autonomy to the spouses by virtue
of their rational personhood.”204 Leckey notes that the judges are “cognizant of the contextual
constraints upon contracting spouses”205 and “the emotional stress of separation or divorce.”206
However, they are “unwilling to place the burden of proof upon the party who wishes to enforce
an agreement” and warn against certain presumptions.207 These include “presuming an imbalance
of power” or presuming that “parties are incapable of assenting to a binding agreement.”208 As a
result, Leckey observes that “[t]he idea that the meaning of justice is to be worked out in a
particular setting is consistent with relational theory’s contextual methodology.”209
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Paragraphs 82 and 91 of Miglin are telling in this regard. While both paragraphs
acknowledge the uniqueness of the marital context, the majority judges temper their discussion
with “three important points”210 and acknowledge that separation agreements are “contracts
nonetheless.”211 Specifically, in these paragraphs, the majority judges note the following:
…First, we are not suggesting that courts must necessarily look for ‘unconscionability’ as
it is understood in the common law of contract… Next, the court should not presume an
imbalance of power in the relationship or a vulnerability on the part of one party, nor…
that the apparently stronger party took advantage of any vulnerability… Rather, there must
be evidence…of a fundamental flaw in the negotiation process. Recognition of the
emotional stress of separation or divorce should not be taken as giving rise to a presumption
that parties… are incapable of assenting to a binding agreement… Finally, we stress that
the mere presence of vulnerabilities will not, in and of itself, justify the court's intervention.
The degree of professional assistance received by the parties will often overcome any
systemic imbalances between the parties.212
Although we recognize the unique nature of separation agreements and their differences
from commercial contracts, they are contracts nonetheless. Parties must take
responsibility for the contract they execute as well as for their own lives. It is only where
the current circumstances represent a significant departure from the range of reasonable
outcomes… in a manner that puts them at odds with the objectives of the Act, that the
court may be persuaded to give the agreement little weight….213
These paragraphs acknowledge the unique family law context without reaching automatic
conclusions or presumptions that would make it devoid of its contextual methodology. Instead,
they capture the contextual approach where “the meaning of justice is to be worked out in a
particular setting.”214 This ties into another element of relational theory that is present in Miglin:
the normative commitment and “need to recognize the autonomy to craft intimate relationships
on one’s own model.”215 In light of this, and in order to fully appreciate the contextual
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methodology, it is necessary to explore the conceptualization of autonomy and “the necessity of
chalking out some scope for individual choice.”216
2) The Relational Approach in Miglin: The Conceptualization of Autonomy
A Capacity, Being Governed by One’s Own Law, Diversity and Space for Individual Choice
Leckey identifies the conceptualization of autonomy in Miglin as an important element of
relational theory with the judges concurring “on the necessity of space for the parties to structure
their own relationship.”217 This relational understanding of autonomy maintains “the necessity of
chalking out some scope for individual choice”218 while also being “consistent with the word’s
literal meaning, the idea of being ‘governed by one’s own law.’”219 As Leckey explains,
autonomy is understood as “a capacity of the couple to resolve their differences in accordance
with their own values and their own understanding of the relationship.”220 While the parties have
“a large discretion in establishing their own priorities and goals,”221 the understanding of
autonomy as “a capacity that must have been exercised for an agreement to be upheld”222 is
demonstrated by the majority’s “attention to vulnerability during negotiation and the palliating
effect of professional assistance.”223 Indeed, autonomy is “a capacity that can be measured, not
something to be stipulated or universally ascribed to agents.”224 As Leckey observes, “[e]ven the
explicit legislative objective of self-sufficiency has been interpreted, following the general
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orientation in Miglin, as a capacity rather than a responsibility.”225 On Leckey’s account, the
conception of autonomy in Miglin is not “something necessarily abstract and conceptual. Indeed,
following Miglin, a judge may regard autonomy as explicitly relational.”226
Several paragraphs of the decision capture this relational understanding of autonomy as a
capacity of the parties to resolve their differences in keeping with the idea of being “governed by
one’s own law.”227 Leckey cites paragraph 73 and also makes reference to paragraphs 55 and 66
of the decision in support of this position. In discussing the appropriate legal approach, the
majority judges note that “the test must not undermine the parties’ right to decide for themselves
what constitutes for them, in the circumstances of their marriage, mutually acceptable equitable
sharing.”228 They emphasize that “spousal support objectives should not operate so as to preclude
parties from bringing their own concerns, desires and objectives to the table in negotiating what
they view as a mutually acceptable agreement.”229 In addition, the language of these three
paragraphs also focuses on: the “parties’ autonomy and freedom to structure their post-divorce
lives in a manner that reflects their own objectives and concerns”230 in a way that is “mutually
acceptable to them;”231 the “parties’ right to decide for themselves what constitutes for them, in
the circumstances of their marriage, mutually acceptable sharing;”232 and “the autonomy to
organize their lives as they see fit and to pursue their own sense of what is mutually acceptable in
their individual circumstances.”233
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Given the importance of the relational conception of autonomy, it is worth briefly
mentioning a few key excerpts about the role of autonomy itself within the decision. Now that
autonomy is understood as a “capacity” and being “governed by one’s own law” in the
establishment of the two-stage inquiry, what weight is it accorded and how is it to be balanced by
the competing objectives given that it is one of the policy goals and objectives of the Divorce
Act? Paragraphs 56, 67 and 78 are informative in this regard. The majority judges state:
This is not to suggest that courts should prioritize the policy goal of autonomy to the
exclusion of all other concerns. Nor are we suggesting that courts should condone
agreements that manifestly prejudice one party…234
Having said this, we are of the view that there is nevertheless a significant public interest
in ensuring that the goal of negotiated settlements not be pursued, through judicial
approbation of agreements, with such a vengeance that individual autonomy becomes a
straitjacket. Therefore, assessment of the appropriate weight to be accorded a pre-existing
agreement requires a balancing of the parties' interest in determining their own affairs with
an appreciation of the peculiar aspects of separation agreements generally and spousal
support in particular.235
The passage above acknowledges once again “the parties’ interest in determining their own
affairs,”236 which echoes the paragraphs reproduced earlier for the notion of autonomy as “a
capacity of the couple to resolve their differences in accordance with their own values and their
own understanding of their relationship.”237 However, the judges temper the role of autonomy
through the two cautionary paragraphs outlined above and conclude:
Therefore, in searching for a proper balance between consensus and finality on the one
hand, and sensitivity to the unique concerns that arise in the post-divorce context on the
other, a court should be guided by the objectives of spousal support listed in the Act. In
doing so, however, the court should treat the parties' reasonable best efforts to meet those
objectives as presumptively dispositive of the spousal support issue. The court should set
aside the wishes of the parties as expressed in a pre-existing agreement only where the
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applicant shows that the agreement fails to be in substantial compliance with the overall
objectives of the Act. These include …certainty, finality and autonomy.238
This conceptualization of autonomy can also be found in the dissenting judgment. As
Leckey notes, “[w]hile the dissent would test the fairness of agreements by an objective measure,
it nonetheless contemplates a ‘generous ambit’ within which reasonable disagreement is
possible.”239 This generous ambit provides the parties with the space to attempt to achieve the
objectives in the Divorce Act and to structure their affairs in a way that accords with their own
law, their own desires, concerns, objectives and priorities. For instance, the judges state:
Any attempt to apply the objectives in s. 15.2(6) in a particular case will involve
judgment calls, accommodation, and interpretation. The parties' own attempts to achieve
the objectives codified in s. 15.2(6) in the context of their unique situation should not
lightly be disregarded… To be given substantial weight, the parties' agreement,
objectively assessed, must indicate a genuine attempt to achieve the objectives in s.
15.2(6), and must fall within the parameters of "the generous ambit within which
reasonable disagreement is possible" in terms of actually achieving them…240
This can also be seen in the discussion of the parties’ autonomy. As the judges explain:
… Provided that at the time of the application the arrangement falls within the generous
ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible in terms of realizing the objectives
in s. 15.2(6), it will be enforced. This approach does not deny individuals the autonomy to
organize their lives as they see fit or prevent them from bringing their own concerns,
desires and objectives to the negotiating table as the majority suggests. Instead, it accords
parties a considerable degree of flexibility in negotiating arrangements that reflect their
particular priorities.…241
3) The Relational Approach in Hartshorne
Leckey also applies the relational lens to Hartshorne, a Supreme Court of Canada case
addressing marital property in the context of a marriage contract (prenuptial agreement).242 As
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he explains, “[t]he contention is that Hartshorne, like Miglin…presumes a vision of choosing and
bargaining that treats the spouses as formal equals but overlooks the myriad ways in which
spouses do not act as commercial players at arm’s length.”243 Leckey acknowledges that some
scholars find Hartshorne “disappointing for its lack of contextualism,”244 yet for him “this
criticism understates the contextualism of the majority judgment.”245 While he argues that there
is less convergence between the two groups of judges in Hartshorne as compared to Miglin,246
the relational elements that Leckey identifies are of interest for this thesis. Specifically, this
section will discuss these relational principles that Leckey identifies in Hartshorne: the
methodology of contextualism, the context-specific estimation of one’s capacity for informed
consent and the space for autonomy.
4) Relational Theory’s Contextual Methodology in Practice: An Estimation of One’s
Capacity for Informed Consent and the Space for Autonomy
Leckey argues that the majority undertakes a contextual approach, but “simply draws a
different conclusion than do the dissenting judges and some critics.”247 Given that Ms.
Hartshorne is a lawyer, Leckey observes that the majority might have sensed “a whiff of bad
faith” and are “reluctant to accept that a lawyer would not understand the implications of a
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contract she signed.”248 Rather, they “weigh heavily” the fact that she is a lawyer.249 As Leckey
explains, the “judges probably detect a whiff of bad faith on [her] part that makes them reluctant
to minimize factors – such as her receipt of independent legal advice – that ought to have
palliated any potential vulnerability.”250 He goes on to state “[t]his sense of bad faith may be
discerned in the discussion of the legal opinion obtained by Ms. Hartshorne, which underscored
the agreement’s prejudice to her.”251 Paragraph 61 of the decision is of interest in this regard.
There, the judges observe that the lawyer forewarned the respondent about the agreement’s
“shortcomings” and that it was “grossly unfair”, which was clear from the lawyer’s detailed
opinion letter. However, the judges went on to state:
Despite this advice, or because of it… the respondent signed the Agreement. The
respondent cannot now rely on her lawyer's opinion to support her allegation that because
she thought the Agreement was unfair from its inception, for all intents and purposes, she
never intended to live up to her end of the bargain. It is trite that a party could never be
allowed to avoid his or her contractual obligations on the basis that he or she believed,
from the moment of its formation, that the contract was void or unenforceable. 252
On Leckey’s account, “[t]he majority rely not upon an abstract conception of choice but a contextspecific estimation of Ms. Hartshorne’s capacity for informed consent.”253 For him, it is not that
the majority judges overlooked contextual factors. Instead, he explains that what exists is a
disagreement “over the relative salience of different facts: [the majority] leans on legal training,
[the dissent] upon child rearing and homemaking.”254 Thus, he states “…where one person weighs
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a bundle of contextual factors differently than another would, it does not follow that the other
person overlooks those factors.”255
In addition, Leckey opines that the majority’s upholding of the agreement is chiefly based
on the fact that the Hartshorne’s “married life carried out precisely the terms of their
agreement.”256 Instead of promoting “formal choice over the ‘reality of the parties’
circumstances,”257 Leckey observes that “[t]here was no conflict, since the reality of the parties’
circumstances tidily executed the contractual blueprint.”258 The judges note this in paragraph 45:
At the time of the triggering event, both the financial and domestic arrangements between
the appellant and the respondent were unfolding just as the parties had expected. With
respect to their financial arrangement, they were living out their intention to "remain
completely independent of the other as regard to their own property, both real and
personal". There was no commingling of funds, there were no joint accounts of significant
value, and the assets that the appellant brought into the marriage remained in his name. On
a personal level, as planned, the appellant and respondent had a second child and, as
decided by the respondent, she did not resume her position at the law firm but remained at
home to raise their two children.259
Leckey acknowledges that the parties’ intentions can be viewed in a different light by referencing
Shaffer who observes that it was in fact “Mr. Hartshorne living out his intention to maintain control
of his income and his assets.”260 However, Leckey states that “irrespective of whose will shaped
the parties’ lived reality, it is hard to oppose to the contract any significantly different normative
regime derived from conduct or custom.”261
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In order to illustrate the “majority’s conception of fairness,” Leckey once again cites
Shaffer whom he considers as “nicely presenting the disputed point.”262 On Shaffer’s account of
Hartshorne, fairness is construed “less about ensuring that agreements are substantively fair
according to public norms of fairness, but more about ensuring that people are entitled to enter
into and rely upon contracts that reflect their personal vision of fairness in the context of their
intimate relationships.”263 In response, Leckey observes that this is resonant with relational
theory; “[t]he majority’s recognition of the potential for contract to make space for diversity
within the state’s matrimonial regime resonates with a recent account of relational contract”264 in
addition to relational theory’s “commitment to the aspiration of autonomy and the idea that
women, in particular, need to be able to criticize and revise the roles socially assigned to
them.”265 As he explains, this commitment inclines “against automatically enforcing the state’s
regime in order to invalidate relationship-specific arrangements.”266 Instead, Leckey emphasizes
“that in an increasingly diverse society, it is inappropriate for the state to impose unilaterally
upon its citizenry a single conception of marriage. Individuals and couples vary, and it is
appropriate to allow couples to alter their rights and obligations.”267
Leckey clarifies that “it is mistaken to read Hartshorne as implying that all persons will
be held unflinchingly to their ex ante marriage agreements.”268 Despite the allegations of
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abstractness and acontextualism, Leckey argues that the judges employ a contextual approach.
On this note, he concludes as follows:
The point to retain from this analysis for that occasion is how little work is performed by
the ostensible contrast between abstract and contextual views of the subject and abstract
and contextual conceptions of autonomy and choice. What seems to have happened, in the
judgments discussed here, is that the judges have adopted a contextual approach but
normative disagreements persist.269
5) Leckey’s Conclusion regarding Miglin and Hartshorne
In Contracting Claims, Leckey acknowledges that “the prevailing story characterizes
Miglin and Hartshorne as defeats for feminists… slot[ting] the majority and minority reasons
into a matrix in which abstract liberalism and contextual feminism contend in what could be
called a family law feud.”270 On this interpretation, the majority and minority reasons produce
respectively “atomistic liberal subjects, uncritically holding parties to their bargains in the
furtherance of choice and autonomy” and their “contextually embedded” counterparts.271
However, on Leckey’s account, the “better reading of the judgments is a second story, one that
shows both camps of judges to have decided consistently with the lessons and ongoing dilemmas
of relational theory.”272 In reference to both Miglin and Hartshorne, Leckey summarizes:
This second version reveals significant convergence on the part of the judges. It detects
commitment on the part of all judges to relational theory’s methodology of
contextualism. Further, the judges explicitly concur on the importance of recognizing the
complexity of interdependent relationships while seeking to preserve space for autonomy.
... Yet even here- the normative disagreements- conditions for the exercise of relational
autonomy and its scope- concern tensions elucidated within relational theory rather than
radically opposing ideologies.273
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Section C: Buckley’s Relational Theory and Choice Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of
Canada
Lucy-Ann Buckley in Relational Theory and Choice Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of
Canada engages with “Leckey’s critique, concurring with some aspects of his case analysis,
disagreeing with others, and extending the analysis to subsequent decisions.”274 Specifically, she
agrees that the judgments of both groups of judges in Miglin are “highly relational in their
conceptualization of autonomy.”275 Regarding Hartshorne, however, she finds that the “parties’
autonomy was something of a side issue” and that there are “clear problems with the majority
interpretation of autonomy.”276 Given that she engages with Leckey’s analysis, this section will
explore Buckley’s comments and main arguments about relational theory and its role in Miglin
and Hartshorne without reproducing the paragraphs of the decisions that have already been
provided under Leckey’s Contracting Claims above. In addition to the contextual methodology
and conceptualization of autonomy, Buckley’s insights and arguments about relational theory
will also serve as a useful point of reference for the next chapter.277
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1) Relational Theory in Brief: Emotions, Autonomy, Diversity, Choice, Context and
Capacity

Before analyzing the decisions, like Leckey, Buckley notes that “although relational
theory emphasizes the role of emotion and interdependency in personal decision making, it does
not suggest that either emotion or emotional pressure precludes autonomy” as otherwise “women
might be pathologized by assumptions of emotionalism and vulnerability.”278 Instead, emotions
can enhance decision-making and be empowering, although certain emotions like fear may
undermine it. As Buckley notes, “emotional pressure does not necessarily vitiate an individual’s
decision-making capacity, since capacity is a continuum, with a wide range between competence
and incompetence.”279 Where agreements are disadvantageous or noticeably unequal, “[o]ne
substantive approach might incorporate normative equality standards, so that unequal agreements
or agreements which deviate significantly from statutory entitlements based on equality
principles, would be deemed non-autonomous.”280 However, this would preclude “diversity and
undermine freedom of choice” and while “choice rhetoric is clearly open to abuse, it does not
follow that bad choices even those made in bad circumstances, are invariably nonautonomous.”281
Another substantive response might be based on the promotion of “constructive
relationships,” which are thick, interdependent and autonomy-enhancing relationships, yet
Buckley’s preference is in a third approach, which “encourages a consideration of a broader
range of factors than those traditionally legally recognized as potentially negating volition” and
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“suggests an increased level of scrutiny where an agreement made in emotional or pressured
circumstances seems particularly one-sided, without however adopting any presumption of nonautonomy.”282 This third approach rests on holding that “individuals must be able to reflect
critically on equality norms, even if they ultimately depart from them, and must feel that they
have a real choice in how they respond to a particular situation.”283 On her account, “[t]his would
permit both diversity and responsiveness to the particular context, consistent with relational
methodology and would also, as Leckey notes, ensure that the weaker party, as well as the
stronger, can reasonably rely on agreements.”284
2) The Relational Conceptualization of Autonomy in Miglin: Placing Autonomy in
Context
Buckley notes that Miglin is the “Supreme Court of Canada’s most detailed discussion of
autonomy in the spousal support context.”285 Although the Court “rejected any presumption of
unequal bargaining power, and emphasized that professional advice might counteract
vulnerabilities,”286 Buckley agrees with Leckey that the majority’s approach is not only
“sufficiently nuanced and alive to contextual considerations to fall within the relational camp,”287
but it is also similar to that of the dissent given its “highly relational…conceptualization of
autonomy.”288 While Buckley opines that the dissent “went significantly further” in its
conceptualization of autonomy,289 she notes that relational theory’s methodology of contextualism
is found throughout the majority judgment.
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First, the contextual methodology is found in the paragraphs where the judges use
terminology that emphasizes the unique context of marital negotiations. Specifically, these
paragraphs reference the “unique environment” of marital breakdown negotiations, the “emotional
turmoil,” the “potential power imbalances” and “any circumstances of oppression, pressure, or
other vulnerabilities.”290 Like Leckey, Buckley cites specific paragraphs that use this terminology
in order to reveal where the methodology of contextualism is found.291 For Buckley, this relational
approach is further captured when the majority judges situate the wife Linda Miglin within her
context. Instead of characterizing her as an abstracted individual of liberal theory, Buckley notes
the judges’ observation that “Linda claimed to have felt pressured, confused, and emotional at the
time of the agreement.”292 As such, Buckley goes on to state:
…both the majority and dissenting judgments are highly relational in their
conceptualization of autonomy. Both emphasize the importance of context,
including all the circumstances of the agreement, and the parties’ needs and
concerns. Although the dissent went further than the majority in terms of relational
analysis (for example, expanding greatly on the inherently gendered nature of
bargaining inequalities and the fraught nature of separation negotiations), the
majority also appeared fully alive to these issues.293
This leads to Buckley’s second observation about relational theory in Miglin: in its
relational approach, the dissent “went significantly further, emphasizing that autonomy is affected
by situational differences and established patterns of interaction as much as by obvious power
imbalances and exploitation.”294 To this end, Buckley acknowledges their emphasis on: “the
significance of ‘social context;” the “importance of recognizing the degree to which social and
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economic factors may constrain individuals’ choices at the bargaining table;” the “complicated
and gender-based interdependencies;” and, that “women generally have less bargaining strength
than men due to financial dependency.”295 Once again, Buckley references the relevant paragraphs
analyzed by Leckey and produced earlier in this work. However, Buckley also references
paragraphs 199 and 204. In paragraph 199, , the dissent’s emphasis on social realities and social
context is found:
L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s emphasis on social context in Moge contrasts sharply with Wilson J.'s
reluctance in the trilogy to acknowledge systemic gender inequality in establishing the
threshold for judicial intervention in spousal support agreements… it was "not paternalism,
but realism" to recognize continuing disparities along gender lines in spouses' bargaining
power and ability to become economically self-sufficient following marriage breakdown.
…in a majority of cases the marriage will have involved economic sacrifices by one spouse,
typically the wife, and corresponding economic benefits to the other… The logic of
compensatory support requires that these respective roles be reflected in the spousal
support arrangement … recognizes that work within the home has undeniable value and
transforms the notion of equality from the rhetorical status to which it was relegated under
a deemed self-sufficiency model, to a substantive imperative.296
Meanwhile, the dissent’s emphasis on the complicated and gender-based interdependencies that
often arise during marriage is found in paragraph 204. Here the judges elaborate as follows:
Bracklow, like Moge, thus emphasizes a more holistic and fact-based approach to spousal
support, in keeping with the diversity of factors and objectives in the 1985 Act. The
recognition in Moge and [page404] Bracklow that the relationship of marriage often creates
complicated and gender-based interdependencies that cannot adequately be addressed by
stressing formal equality or deemed self-sufficiency is incompatible with the mantra of
individualism that underscores the trilogy: individual choice, individual responsibility, and
individual autonomy. Moge and Bracklow provide compelling support for the proposition
that it is inappropriate to defer to a support agreement based on unrealistic assumptions
about the absolute autonomy or deemed self-sufficiency of the parties…297
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Against this background, Buckley raised the issue of relational theory in practice. Having
found that “the conceptual analysis of autonomy was relational in each judgment,”298 Buckley
notes “[t]he question is therefore whether relational theory made, or could have made, any practical
difference to the outcome?”299 In response, she first observes that “one might argue that the
dissent’s narrative was more relational in practice,”300 a point on which she elaborates as follows:
The dissent depicted Linda, the wife, as economically vulnerable and with little
human capital, as she had not worked outside the family business for many years,
whereas the majority felt that because she had worked, she should be employable.
The dissent considered that Linda was prevented from working outside the home
due to her increased childcare burden; the majority felt that she could have
employed a baby-sitter, as she had done while married, irrespective of her changed
circumstances. The dissent, but not the majority, also implicitly represented Eric,
the husband, as controlling, though it did not explicitly consider whether this
impacted on the negotiation process.301
According to Buckley, “the tenor of the dissenting judgment suggests that, if pushed, the
dissent would have found that the bargaining process was not unimpeachable, even with
legal advice.”302 Furthermore, she notes that a question left open by the majority judges,
given that they did not feel that there was a need to address it, is “the question of whether,
given inadequate advice, Linda’s evidence of pressure would have been sufficient to
demonstrate either vulnerability or exploitation for the purposes of the Act.”303 In light of
the foregoing, Buckley concludes:
Both narratives therefore depend on contextual interpretation. The dissent
highlights concerns identified in the feminist literature, and while its interpretation
is arguably stereotypical and disempowering, it is also more relational in its deeper
298
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examination of context. Nevertheless, even if the majority had adopted a similar
characterization, it might well still have considered that any vulnerabilities were
counteracted by the high level of professional advice Linda received. Accordingly,
a more relational analysis of the facts might have made little significant difference,
once the majority had decided to eschew the dissent’s greater emphasis on objective
fairness.304
3) Choosing Questions in Hartshorne: Relational Theory or Atomistic Context and
Choice Rhetoric?
Although Buckley agrees with Leckey regarding Miglin’s “richer sense of
autonomy…more consistent with relational theory,”305 she disagrees with his view regarding
Hartshorne. Specifically, she notes that while the majority does adopt a contextual analysis, “the
analysis is limited and constrained by atomistic assumptions” omitting “a truly ‘relational
perspective.”306 Buckley opines that the judgment does not support Leckey’s argument that “the
majority ‘is aware of the complex emotional dynamics’ and ‘simply draws a different conclusion
than do the dissenting judges and some critics.”307 For her, “there is no evidence of this in the
judgment.”308 Instead, Buckley explains that “[t]he repeated use of ‘choice rhetoric’ is highly
suggestive in terms of how the court conceptualized broader autonomy issues.”309
To illustrate this point, Buckley notes that the majority “repeatedly characterized” Mrs.
Hartshorne’s decision to give up her career in order to care for the parties’ children as a “personal
‘choice’ and [that] she was assumed to have understood and accepted the consequences of what
she had ‘chosen.’”310 Paragraphs 45, 46 and 63 are relevant in this regard. While paragraph 45 does
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not explicitly use the word “choice”, the majority judges describe Mrs. Hartshorne’s act of staying
at home and not resuming her legal career as something that she “decided.” Specifically, the
majority states that “both the financial and domestic arrangements…were unfolding just as the
parties had expected… On a personal level, as planned, the appellant and respondent had a second
child and, as decided by the respondent, she did not resume her position at the law firm but
remained at home to raise their two children.”311 Interestingly, in paragraphs 46 and 63, Mrs.
Hartshorne’s decision and the corresponding consequences are characterized through the use of
“choice rhetoric:”
Where, as in the present case, the parties have anticipated with accuracy their personal
and financial circumstances… and… truly considered the impact of their choices, then,
without more, a finding that their Agreement operates unfairly should not be made lightly.
This does not mean that no attention should be given to the possible deficit in the assets
and future income of the spouse who chose to stay at home and facilitate the professional
development of the other spouse… A fair distribution of assets must… take into account
sacrifices made and their impact… But this must be done in light of the personal choices
made and of the overall situation considering all property rights under the marriage
agreement and other entitlements. In the present case, the main feature of the Agreement
was the desire that each spouse retain the assets earned before the marriage… 312
…It has not been overlooked that the respondent gave up her own law practice to take
primary care of their two children and postponed any further career development.
However, these were decisions that the respondent herself made prior to the marriage. It
is not realistic to assume that the consequences of such a choice were not understood and
that the decision made should now be totally ignored. The implications of the Agreement
were understood as well, the respondent having specifically reviewed its shortcomings with
her lawyer…313
In light of the foregoing and drawing on relational theory, Buckley argues that while
“[r]elational autonomy should allow her to make this decision, provided she can reflect critically
on the issue,” it also “holds that the context in which the decision was made is relevant and
should not be simply screened out, so that the decision and its consequences are automatically

311

Hartshorne, supra note 80 at para 45 [Emphasis added].
Ibid at para 46. [Emphasis added].
313
Ibid at para 63. [Emphasis added].
312

59

attributed to ‘personal choice.’”314 Buckley stresses the importance that instead of making the
assumption that Mrs. Hartshorne “understood and accepted the consequences of what she had
‘chosen,’” questions like the following need to be considered: “why” did she make this choice?;
“where was [Mr. Hartshorne] in the decision-making process?;” how did the special needs of one
of the children “(something not mentioned by the majority)…affect [her] decision to remain at
home?”315 For Buckley, these are important considerations as they illuminate the relational
context and shed more insight on one’s decision-making and autonomy. Thus, Buckley is critical
of the judges’ characterization of Mrs. Hartshorne’s “decision” to stay at home as the context
within which it was made needs to be considered in greater detail by these fundamental
questions. Otherwise, one runs the risk of reaching a superficial characterization and an
automatic presumption either of a “personal choice” or an “unequal power dynamic.”
Buckley explains that “[t]he repeated use of ‘choice rhetoric’ is highly suggestive in
terms of how the court conceptualized broader autonomy issues” with the attribution of
an “unrealistic level of mutuality to the parties’ financial arrangements, implicitly
assuming that separate bank accounts were a matter of mutual agreement and
satisfaction.”316 This can be seen in paragraph 45 of the decision, which was also set out
above during Leckey’s analysis, where the majority judges state:… At the time of the
triggering event, both the financial and domestic arrangements between the appellant
and the respondent were unfolding just as the parties had expected. With respect to their
financial arrangement, they were living out their intention to "remain completely
independent of the other as regard to their own property, both real and personal". There
was no commingling of funds, there were no joint accounts of significant value, and the
assets that the appellant brought into the marriage remained in his name. On a personal
level, as planned, the appellant and respondent had a second child and, as decided by the
respondent, she did not resume her position at the law firm but remained at home to raise
their two children.317
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Choice Rhetoric, supra note 12 at 292. Buckley is also critical of the dissent. In reference to paragraph 90 of the
dissenting decision, she notes that it is “incorrect to suggest” that Mrs. Hartshorne’s decision to stay at home
indicates “an unequal power dynamic” given that it might have been based on other driving forces and factors. For
instance, she states the wife “may have been happy to adopt a caring role, may have believed it was ‘right,’ or may
simply have believed that it was necessary, given her child’s needs.” See Ibid.
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“Yet,” Buckley notes in response, Mr. Hartshorne “was the sole earner and clearly the
controlling party in terms of making financial arrangements.”318 To further highlight the role of
“choice rhetoric,” Buckley explains that Mrs. Hartshorne’s act of having “signed the agreement
is taken to imply that it represented her wishes and understanding of fairness, even though the
agreement explicitly stated otherwise.”319 She references the majority’s emphasis on the idea that
if Mrs. Hartshorne “‘truly believed that the Agreement was unacceptable at that time, she should
not have signed it.”320 For Buckley, “[t]his ignores the relational aspects of the decision-making
process, including the clear power imbalance between the parties.”321 However, she goes on to
state that “[n]one of this is to suggest that the agreement should not be upheld. The point is that
the contextual discussion actually ignores or misrepresents significant aspects of the context,
which contained sufficient indications of vulnerability (as the dissent put it) to suggest potential
unfairness and warrant additional scrutiny.”322 She references paragraph 90 in this regard:
There are indications that the respondent was in a vulnerable position in negotiation -- not
enough for the agreement to be unconscionable, but enough to suggest that the trial judge
should be alive to the possibility that the agreement was unfair. The respondent had already
been out of the workforce and dependent on the appellant for almost two years and had
only ever worked as a lawyer (and before that, an articling student) in the appellant's firm.
The agreement was concluded under pressure with the wedding fast approaching. The
respondent sought changes to the agreement before execution but was unable to persuade
the appellant to agree, except with respect to minor changes, such as the insertion of a
clause to the effect that her signature was not voluntary and was at his insistence. These
circumstances illustrate the appellant's position of power within the relationship, as well as
the respondent's correlative dependence. That she remained at home for the rest of the
marriage relationship to take care of the couple's children further illustrates the power
318

Choice Rhetoric, supra note 12 at 293.
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Hartshorne, supra note 80 at para 65. [Emphasis added].
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Choice Rhetoric, supra note 12 at 293 referring to Schaffer, Domestic Contracts, supra note 260 and Martha
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dynamics at play. Taken as a whole, these circumstances justify reviewing the agreement
with increased scrutiny.323
Despite these indications, Buckley explains that “[t]he Court’s reluctance to engage with these
concerns may be due to what Rogerson describes as its ‘commitment to the value of upholding
spousal support agreements.’”324 This commitment is “bolstered by an interpretation of Miglin that
focuses on that decision’s general presumption of spousal autonomy, rather than its emphasis on
potential power disparities and recognition of vulnerabilities.”325
4) Buckley’s Conclusion: A Relational Paradigm Shift?
In reference to and contrary to Leckey’s conclusion, Buckley suggests that “while Leckey
has argued that the self-sufficient, rational, ‘choosing’ subject of liberal theory has now been
supplanted by the contextualized legal subjects in Canadian family law…this transition is still
highly contested, and…liberal and neoliberal conceptualizations of the subject continue to
compete with more relational understandings, even in contextualized judicial discourse.”326
Buckley, however, notes:
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding overarching ideological trends from so
few cases. Taken at face value, the cases on both spousal support agreements and marital
property agreements suggest a movement from a neoliberal model of autonomy to a more
relational perspective. In relation to spousal support, this is evidenced by the differences
between the early Pelech trilogy and the later decision in Miglin, while in relation to
property, there is a clear difference in the model of autonomy applied in Hartshorne and
that underlying Rick.327
In conclusion, Buckley goes on to state that “it cannot be said that there is a clear, overall shift
from neoliberal to relational views within the Court” given that “(neoliberal) Hartshorne was
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decided a year after (relational) Miglin.”328 Moreover, she opines “[n]or can the different
paradigms be explained simply by reference to the constitution of the Court, as the approaches of
individual judges vary considerably.”329 For her, “[t]he real distinction may be between
prenuptial and separation agreements, with the Court attaching greater weight to relational
factors and pressures in the emotional context of marital breakdown.”330
Buckley also concludes that despite relational theory’s “more realistic and nuanced”
conceptualization of autonomy than neoliberalism, it “may not always make the degree of
practical difference that many feminists might expect.”331 She offers three explanations for this.
The first relates to “statutory fairness standards: where courts can intervene to rectify agreements
that are considered objectively unfair, the issue of autonomy becomes less important.”332 The
second “lies in the potential for different relational narratives” and the third “is that the variable
approaches to marital property and spousal support agreements simply reflect the broader legal
debate in Canada on autonomy concerns.”333 She concludes: “[g]iven the intensity of the debate,
it is hoped that the Supreme Court of Canada does not regress from its adoption of relational
theory and continues to apply relational understandings to marital agreements.”334
Having reviewed the scholarly literature on relational theory in the Canadian spousal
support agreement context, the attention now turns to this author’s analysis of recent case law
dealing with section 56(4) of the Family Law Act through the lens of relational theory.
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Chapter Three: Understanding Contractual Autonomy: An Analysis of the Formation of
the Contract through the Lens of Relational Theory
Section A: Introduction
While the review within this work described scholars’ application of relational theory to
the spousal support agreement context under the Divorce Act, this chapter will engage in a
comparable analysis in the context of the Family Law Act. In particular, this author will examine
five cases335 where the judges were tasked with determining whether to set aside the domestic
contract involving a spousal support release or waiver pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family
Law Act. It should be noted that like the Divorce Act the statutory language itself requires a
contextual analysis as the legislation provides guidelines rather than stringent rules. This in turn
provides the scope to engage with contextualism and therefore relational theory. In addition to
the methodology of contextualism, this chapter will explore the relational conceptualization of
autonomy as an estimation of parties’ capacity for informed consent and reflection.
The five cases are comprised of two cohabitation agreement cases 336 and three separation
agreement cases. Spousal support was awarded in three of the cases, 337 but on different grounds.
In two of the cases,338 the judges awarded spousal support after exercising their discretion to set
aside the agreement pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act. In particular, one case
failed under section 56(4)(c) for unconscionability and the other failed under both sections
56(4)(a) and 56(4)(c) for the failure to disclose and misrepresentation respectively. Having
found that the wives successfully engaged section 56(4) in these two cases, the judges exercised

Golton, supra note 82; JS v DBS, [2016] OJ No 1485 (Sup Ct), aff’d [2017] OJ No 5115 (CA) [“JS”]; McKenna v
McKenna, [2015] OJ No 2814 (Sup Ct) [“McKenna”]; Butler v Butler, [2015] OJ No 6881 (Sup Ct) [“Butler”]; and,
Virc v Blair, [2016] OJ No 2813 (Sup Ct), aff’d Virc v Blair 2017 ONCA 394 [“Virc”].
336
Golton, supra note 82 and JS, supra note 335 are the cohabitation cases.
337
Spousal support was not awarded in two cases: JS, supra note 335 and McKenna, supra note 335. It was awarded
in the three cases of: Golton, supra note 82, Butler, supra note 335 and Virc, supra note 335.
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Butler, supra note 335 and Virc, supra note 335.
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their discretion to set aside the agreement on this basis. However, in the third case, 339 spousal
support was not awarded as a result of the application of section 56(4). Although the wife
successfully engaged section 56(4)(a) for the husband’s failure to disclose, the judge did not
exercise their discretion to set aside the agreement on this basis, but awarded spousal support
after applying the Miglin test.340
This Chapter is divided into five parts. Section B provides an introductory overview of
the cases, the methodology used in selecting them and a summary of section 56(4) and its
application in the five cases. Section C analyzes the cases through the lens of relational theory
while Section D provides this author’s commentary, reflections and critique of the cases.
Sections C and D reveal that approaching domestic contracts through the relational lens helps to
explain the judicial reasoning as to why agreements were upheld or set aside while also
highlighting some of the deficits in the court process and reasoning. Section E highlights the
lessons learned and the important implications for family law practitioners and scholars going
forward.

339

Golton, supra note 82.
The judge declined to exercise his discretion to set aside the Cohabitation Agreement for the husband’s failure to
provide proper financial disclosure. In support of this position, he noted: “it seems to me unfair to permit Kim to
now rely upon non-disclosure when she knew at the time that she was entitled to ask for financial disclosure and did
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Section B: An Overview of Golton, JS, McKenna, Butler and Virc and Section 56(4)’s
Application
1) Methodology

The cases of interest to the author were those where a party sought spousal support in the
face of a domestic contract involving a contractual release or waiver. To facilitate this research,
the author used Lexis Advance Quicklaw and WestlawNext Canada. The initial search noted up
section 56(4) of the Family Law Act. In addition, three separate searches with the following
terms were done: “spousal support and Miglin and release,” “spousal support and Miglin and
(release or waive! /s support)” and “spousal support and Miglin and (‘no spousal’ or waive! /s
support).” These initial searches were very broad in order to capture as many cases as possible
within the search results.341 Miglin was specifically used as one of the search terms, because the
author hoped to obtain cases where both the Family Law Act and the Miglin analysis were
applied. The author hypothesized that a case that dealt with both would be more elaborate in its
reasoning given the application of two different yet related statutory contexts and thus provide a
better basis for the analysis. Moreover, at the outset, the author did not limit her analysis to the
Family Law Act alone, but narrowed down the approach after further discussions with her
supervisor.
The research project was concerned exclusively with Canadian spousal support
jurisprudence and in particular Ontario decisions from 2015 onwards. The results were narrowed
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Given that the search terms were not in close proximity to one another, there were many cases that were
irrelevant or not directly on point. Specifically, some of them did not even involve a spousal support release or
waiver or the party was not even seeking spousal support in the face of a domestic contract stating otherwise. For
example, one such decision was the case of Toscano v Toscano, [2015] OJ No 315 (Sup Ct) [“Toscano”]. It was a
well-written decision that dealt with a marriage contract, but the issue there was that the contract provided that the
parties would be separate as to property. There was no spousal support release or waiver within the contract and so
the case was not relevant to this author’s research.
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by the timeframe of January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2018. With regard to the scope of time of
the jurisprudence, the author wished to review more current case law while having an
opportunity to examine four years of recent developing case law in Ontario, which addressed the
issue of a party seeking spousal support despite a contractual term that explicitly denied or
waived that entitlement. The author’s focus was on the Ontario Superior Court of Justice cases as
they dealt with the matter at first instance and would thus contain a more fulsome factual
analysis.
Cases that did not involve a party seeking spousal support in the face of a contractual
release or waiver were discarded. Thus, the search for the most relevant cases was limited by this
topic and the author’s hopes to find well-written cases that engaged in a discussion as to whether
spousal support should be awarded despite the contractual agreement. Given that lower court
decisions can vary in terms of their length and substantive analysis of the issues in dispute, this
author hoped to find decisions that contained a more substantial and informative analysis of
section 56(4). By approaching the search results with this in mind and the author’s supervisor’s
advice that the case sample should be narrowed to a manageable three or four cases, this author
looked at the cohabitation agreement/marriage contract cases on their own as well as the
separation agreement cases on their own that applied section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.
Specifically, the goal was to find a decision where spousal support was awarded and where it
was denied within these respective types of agreements. In the end, five well-written cases were
selected for the analysis: Golton, JS, Butler, Virc and McKenna.342
Having selected these five cases, this author read them in depth with attention to the
judges’ analysis of whether spousal support should be awarded and to their understanding of
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contractual autonomy. Given that the analysis regarding the formation of the agreement is first
considered under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act in these five cases and mostly unrepeated
at stage 1 of the Miglin analysis due to the evidentiary overlap of relevant facts, the analysis
below of contractual autonomy as it relates to the formation of the contract is restricted to the
judges’ determination of the validity of the agreement pursuant to section 56(4).
2) An Overview of the Cases
This section provides a summary to familiarize the reader with the cases generally. The
overview is divided into two sections: the cohabitation agreement cases and the separation
agreement cases. This is followed by an introduction to section 56(4)’s application in the five
cases.
The Cohabitation Agreement Cases – Golton and JS
Golton
In Golton, the parties met in the late 1980s at a hotel where the husband was a patron and the
wife a waitress/bartender. She was a single mother and he was married to his ex-spouse at the
time that the parties began an extramarital relationship. Following the husband’s separation, the
parties began living together in September 1993 and married in July 1998. They initially
separated in April 2002, reconciled in the spring of 2007 and had their final separation in May
2010. Each party had a daughter from a prior relationship.
The parties have an 11-year age difference. When they first met, the wife had a high school
education, but she attended an adult job retraining program in the 1980s to upgrade in computers.
The husband was a truck owner operator until he started an office job. He initially worked as a
general manager, but eventually became a VP. In December 2017, he retired from this position.

68

In 1991, the wife also started working at Laidlaw, the same company where the husband
worked, but quit while the parties’ relationship was briefly suspended. However, after the parties
began cohabiting in 1993, she returned to Laidlaw in 1994 and held various positions until 2005
when she sustained a back injury. She did not work after her last part-time job in 2013 and was
in receipt of disability payments since 2005.
During the parties’ marriage, the wife was primarily responsible for domestic duties. She
cared for her daughter and also assisted in the care of the husband’s daughter both when she
stayed with them and also when she moved in and lived with the parties on a full-time basis. The
husband was the main income earner who took the lead in dealing with the parties’ finances,
including assisting the wife with her financial matters post-separation.
The parties signed a Cohabitation Agreement in 1996. It was entirely the husband’s idea to
enter into the agreement given that he was unhappy that he had paid his former spouse a
significant sum for both property division and spousal support. He did not want to find himself in
that situation again or to have any financial obligations to the wife upon relationship breakdown.
As a result, the agreement addressed three issues: (1) division of property; (2) spousal support;
and, (3) child support for the wife’s daughter. Pursuant to the terms, there was a mutual waiver
of spousal support and a mutual release of property claims. The wife was only to receive the
appreciation value of the residence in which they cohabited. Although the husband’s lawyer
prepared the agreement, both parties received independent legal advice.
The wife brought proceedings in October 2015 seeking to set aside the domestic contract,
equalization and spousal support. Following a four-day trial, Justice Raikes concluded that the
agreement was a valid and binding domestic contract, which should not be set aside. However,
after applying the Miglin analysis, Justice Raikes found that the agreement no longer reflected
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the original intention of the parties in light of the wife’s unexpected and significant health issues.
He ordered the husband to pay a lump sum spousal support payment in the amount of
$250,000.00.
JS
In JS, the parties began cohabiting in March 1997 at the husband’s mother’s residence and
they moved into their custom built home in December 1997. They had their first child in 2001.
They married in 2003 and their second child was born the same year. The parties separated in
September 2013. When the parties met, the husband had a daughter from a previous relationship.
That relationship ended shortly after the child’s birth and resulted in family proceedings with his
ex-partner prevailing in court. After this experience and prior to moving into the parties’ home,
the husband presented the wife with the cohabitation agreement in October 1997. The wife
skimmed it and signed it without seeking independent legal advice or making inquiries about the
value of the husband’s assets. At the time, both parties had annual incomes of $70,000.00.
At the time of the proceedings, the husband was 55 years old. He was working at the Ford
Oakville plant, a job he held since 1979. The wife was working on a part-time basis and earning
$18,204.00 as she left her last full-time employment in 2004.343 Throughout the parties’
marriage, both parties overspent and the husband’s mother helped them financially.
The wife sought to have the agreement set aside claiming that she did not read the agreement
carefully, did not receive independent legal advice and made no inquiries about the value of the
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The judge found that it was reasonable to conclude that the wife intended to return to work in 2007 when the
children were in school on a full-time basis, but that she never obtained full-time work “despite her and [the parties’]
severe financial difficulties which both were responsible for. Had it not been for family help, this couple would have
lost their home long ago.” JS, supra note 335 at paras 106-107. Also, the wife “admitted that in December of 2014
she was offered a data entry full-time job…[but] told them she was not interested as she was separated and going to
court.” Ibid at para 110.
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husband’s assets. She sought, among other things,344 spousal support despite the agreement’s
mutual spousal support release. The judge held that the agreement was valid and enforceable and
found that the wife was not entitled to spousal support.345
The Separation Agreement Cases – Butler, Virc and McKenna
Butler
In Butler, the parties started living together in 1979 when the wife was 18 and the husband 21
years old. They married in 1982 and separated in 2013 after a 31-year traditional marriage and
two children. Early in the parties’ relationship and before her pregnancy, the wife had some
short-term jobs. After the birth of the parties’ two children, she adopted a homemaker role for
almost 35 years, maintaining the parties’ jointly owned home while the husband worked. At the
time of separation, the wife had not engaged in any gainful employment for 26 years or any
competitive work experience or training. The husband, on the other hand, worked throughout the
marriage and continued to work at the time of separation in a stable and well-paid job. He was
earning over $80,000.00 per year plus significant benefits, which included a pension, for his
work on the automotive assembly line at Honda Canada.
The wife decided to leave the marriage. About two weeks after telling the husband about this
decision, she received a letter from the husband’s lawyer, which enclosed the Separation
Agreement for her signature and two post-dated cheques for $10,000.00. The husband’s lawyer
prepared the agreement on his instructions. The husband also told the wife that she was not

Additional issues included the wife’s entitlement to proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home and the
husband’s requirement to pay child support and the amount. Ibid at para 3.
345
On the other issues, the judge held that the wife was entitled to the net proceeds of the sale of the home in the
amount of $21,385. Having found that she was intentionally underemployed and that she failed to obtain full-time
employment, her income was imputed at $40,000 for the purposes of child support. On the issue of imputation, he
noted that the wife’s “non-attempts to obtain employment and maximize her court-ordered support payments is a
common practice in my experience and must be discouraged by the courts. This unscrupulous practice in reality
harms the children…deliberately lowers the possible lifestyle of the children. Further, this practice embitters the
payor spouse.” Ibid at para 114.
344
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entitled to anything from him as she did not work outside the home or contribute financially. The
wife trusted him. She signed the agreement a few days after the husband’s lawyer sent it to her
without retaining a lawyer or receiving independent legal advice. The husband did not sign the
agreement until much later, but almost immediately after the parties’ failed reconciliation
attempt.346 According to the husband, the main reason prompting the wife’s decision to leave
was “the stress of what was going on with our family”347 as well as her desire to start a new life
with her new boyfriend. The husband felt hurt and betrayed while the wife wanted to avoid any
prejudice to the parties’ adult children348 and grandson.
On June 29, 2015, the wife brought a summary judgment motion seeking, among other
things, to set aside the parties’ separation agreement dated May 12, 2014. Pursuant to the
agreement, the wife: waived any spousal support upon the husband’s payment of $25,000.00;
transferred her interest in the parties’ home to the husband who was to pay off the parties’ debts
(the equity of the home was $210,000.00 and the debts amounted to $39,000.00); and, waived
any claim to the husband’s pension and equalization of assets. The husband’s pension was worth
approximately $272,000.00 and he would receive approximately $34,000.00 per year upon
retirement. The value of the equalization payment to which the wife was entitled was
approximately $160,000.00 at separation or $275,000.00 when including the family law
valuation of the pension.

The judge noted that the husband’s “feelings of hurt and betrayal when Ms. Butler first said she was leaving the
marriage paled when compared with his reaction now.” He noted that it was a “false reconciliation” on her part and
that the “reconciliation attempt was a fraud” as the wife “tricked [him] into making an attempt because of her lies”
and her “pretending to get back together” although she was “carrying on her relationship with [the new boyfriend.”
Butler, supra note 335 at para 31.
347
Ibid at para 28.
348
The parties’ son and daughter (26 and 31 years old respectively) were described by the judge as “exhibiting
significant difficulties in finally achieving a semblance of adult responsibility.” Ibid.
346
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The judge found that the agreement was grossly improvident and set it aside on the grounds
of unconscionability.
Virc
In Virc, the parties met in 1991, when the wife was 26 years old and working as a lawyer at a
small Toronto litigation firm with a focus on commercial litigation. The husband was 46 years
old and a firm client. He was involved in several lawsuits both in a personal capacity and through
corporations that he controlled. The husband had a controlling interest in a corporation,349 which
was a holding company that was also the primary corporate litigant. The wife was a junior
lawyer on his files. At the time, she was married while the husband was separated from his
spouse of 27 years, but not yet divorced. The wife separated from her spouse in 1992.
The parties began cohabiting by 1993. In that year, the wife left her law firm and started
working almost exclusively for the husband. She began handling his litigation in varying
capacities as well as his related corporate affairs, but in most cases, not as counsel of record. The
parties married in 1994 and soon after had their first child.350 In 1997 and 1999, the parties had
two more children. As the parties’ family grew so too did the husband’s business interests. He
directed the parties’ finances while the wife administered the parties’ joint bank account.
The wife continued to practice law until 2001. She did not work outside of the home with the
exception of some part-time work between 2004 and 2006. Although the husband was an
involved father, the wife had primary caregiving responsibilities for the children. The parties had

The husband was a 60% controlling shareholder of Renegade Capital Corporation (“Renegade”) with his then
spouse holding the remaining 40% interest.
350
The husband also had two children from a previous marriage.
349
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“a busy recreational and traveled lifestyle”351 with the husband noting that the children’s lifestyle
was also “privileged.”352
In 2007, the wife became involved with someone else. The husband found out, but the parties
continued with their married life until their separation in early 2008. In early January 2008, the
husband emailed a pro forma Separation Agreement to the wife, but there were no further drafts
exchanged until May 16, 2008. Throughout that time, the husband was in regular contact with his
lawyer, arranging disclosure and refining the agreement. In the latter half of May 2008, the
parties made several revisions to the May 16th draft. However, around mid-May, the husband
provided the wife with a Net Family Property statement. According to this statement, the wife
owed the husband an equalization payment of almost $954,000.00 given the values the husband
used in (mis)representing his date of marriage interest. While this surprised the wife, she did not
consult a lawyer for the purposes of reviewing the husband’s representations. Among other
reasons, the wife testified that she would have needed to find an error of more than
$1,900,000.00 in his statement in order to negate the payment the husband claimed she owed.
The parties signed the Separation Agreement on May 31, 2008 in which they agreed, among
other things,353 that the wife would be released from her obligation to make the $954,000.00
equalization payment. She would receive spousal support in the amount of $10,000.00 per month
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The parties were private ski club members, enjoyed the use of a chalet, travelled to various holiday destinations
on their own and with children and spent $100,000 on ballroom lessons.
352
In addition to the lifestyle noted in footnote 369, the children also attended private school.
353
1) Children’s Issues: (a) joint custody; (b) no child support due to equal parenting time (reviewable prior to
December 31, 2010 and annually thereafter); and, (c) the husband was solely responsible for section 7 expenses
amounting to $97,760 annually. 2) Matrimonial home: (a) the wife was to move out by September 2008; (b) the
husband’s right to buy the home from the wife for $1,250,000.00, proceeds from which she was to discharge the
$500,000 mortgage; (c) Renegade would lend the wife $250,000 towards a home purchase if requested. 3) Renegade
interest and parties’ incomes: (a) the wife was to transfer or permit a redemption of her Renegade shares for
$250,000 (NB: the NFP statement valued them at $368,512.65); (b) Renegade would invest $150,000.00$250,000.00 in a private company the wife was considering incorporating to carry on a business; (c) the husband’s
annual income was $590,000.00/year and the wife’s $329,000.00/year, inclusive of support; (d) Renegade would
retain the wife until December 31, 2010 as a corporate secretary and general counsel at a rate of $10,000.00/month.
See, Virc, supra note 335 at para 26.
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until December 31, 2010, which was followed by extensive releases regarding property and
spousal support obligations. However, after taking vocational upgrading courses, the wife
emailed the husband in June 2009 asking for an explanation as to why different methodologies
had been used in the valuation of his marriage and valuation date interests. After the husband’s
response, which was not reassuring, and an unproductive email exchange, the wife retained
counsel.
In 2010, the wife applied to have the Separation Agreement set aside, but the husband
successfully obtained summary judgment. In 2014, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment
and directed the matter to trial on all issues, except one. At trial, Justice Jarvis exercised his
discretion to set aside the Separation Agreement pursuant to section 56(4) having found that the
husband’s material misrepresentation induced the wife to sign it. As he went on to hold, “[t]he
husband’s non-compliance with the obligations imposed by sections 56(4)(a) and (c) of the Act,
and the parties’ evidence about their Separation Agreement, when viewed contextually, lead to
no other conclusion than that the Agreement should be, and is hereby, set aside.”354
McKenna
In McKenna, the parties married in 1992 when the wife was 23 and the husband 33 years old.
They separated in 2012 after 20 years of marriage, two children and a million-dollar home. The
wife had a college education while the husband’s highest level of education was grade 8. She
worked as a city traffic-planning technologist. The husband ran his own excavating business.
The parties enjoyed a lavish lifestyle as they were “excellent business partners… [who] reduced
their tax burden in a questionable manner by taking cash payments and writing personal
expenses through the husband’s business.” 355 The husband did the physical labour for his
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business and made the business decisions, but given his limited education and difficulty with
both reading and writing, the wife was in charge of bookkeeping, payrolls, invoicing and the
general ledger.
The wife left the marriage and claimed that the husband abused her for many years. The
police and CAS investigated, but only concluded that the parties had a volatile relationship.
Although the husband admitted that he was a recovering alcoholic and a diagnosed sex addict, he
denied the wife’s abuse allegations. The wife consulted a lawyer and a Separation Agreement
was drawn up 37 days after the wife left the matrimonial home. According to the wife’s
evidence, the husband handed her a pamphlet from a lawyer and instructed her to get a
separation agreement. The wife contacted Angeline Clarke (“Ms. Clarke”) and the parties
attended a meeting Ms. Clarke. Both parties indicated the terms they wanted in the separation
agreement. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement: the wife received her share of the
matrimonial home in the amount of $600,000.00; the wife kept her pension and the husband kept
his businesses, which were valued $400,000.00 and $500,000.00 respectively; the husband paid
$1,000.00/month in child support with annual increases; and, there was no spousal support.
The wife subsequently sought to have the agreement set aside due to: duress, threats and fear;
insufficient disclosure; and, lack of independent legal advice. She also sought spousal support, a
greater share of the marital assets and increased child support. The judge held that the Separation
Agreement was valid and enforceable subject only to child support adjustments.
Section 56(4) of the Family Law Act Applied
In the face of a domestic contract, section 56(4) of the Family Law Act provides a party
seeking spousal support with the opportunity to set aside the domestic contract. Pursuant to
section 56(4) of the Family Law Act, a court may set aside a domestic contract or its provision if
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at least one of three grounds is engaged. As noted in subsections (a)-(c), this may happen if: “(a)
a party failed to disclose to the other significant assets, or significant debts or other liabilities,
existing when the domestic contract was made; (b) if a party did not understand the nature or
consequences of the domestic contract; or (c) otherwise in accordance with the law of
contract.”356 Regardless of which ground(s) a party is relying on, section 56(4) consists of a twostage analysis: (1) Can the party seeking to set aside the agreement demonstrate that one or more
of the s. 56(4) circumstances is engaged? (2) If so, is it appropriate for the court to exercise its
discretion to set aside the agreement?357
Against this legislative backdrop, the wives in the five cases of Golton, JS, McKenna,
Butler and Virc had the onus of proving that section 56(4) was successfully engaged and
persuading the judges to exercise their discretion to set aside the agreement. Despite this
common goal, the outcomes in the five cases varied. In particular, only two wives successfully
set aside the contract pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act. For the reader’s ease of
reference, a case summary chart outlining the application and outcome of the section 56(4)
analysis is included below.
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Golton
56(4)(a)
successfully Yes
engaged?
If yes, why? Non-disclosure

JS

Virc

Butler

McKenna

No

Yes

No

No

Misrepresentation
DOM value

56(4)(b)
successfully N/A
No
N/A
engaged?
56(4)(c)
successfully No
N/A
Yes
Yes
engaged?
If yes, why?
Misrepresentation Unconscionability
Wife had
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
ILA?
Discretion
to set aside No*
No
Yes
Yes
No
exercised?
Spousal
Support
Yes**
No
Yes
Yes
No
Awarded
*The judge declined to exercise his discretion to set aside the Cohabitation Agreement.358
**The matter failed at stage 2 of the Miglin analysis.359

No Judicial Intervention: A Summary of Section 56(4) in Golton, JS and McKenna
Golton, JS and McKenna are three of the five360 cases where the judges found that the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract, including the conditions of negotiation
and execution, did not warrant judicial intervention. In these cases, the validity of the agreement
was challenged pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act on the following grounds: (1)
failure to disclose (in all three cases); and, (2) pursuant to the law of contract i.e. (i) signing under
duress or undue influence (in Golton and McKenna) and (ii) signing in unconscionable
circumstances (Golton). The wives in JS and McKenna also raised the lack of independent legal
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advice as an important consideration although the wife in the former case was the only wife in
these three cases who was actually not in receipt of independent legal advice. The judge framed
the issue in JS as whether a cohabitation agreement is valid in circumstances where “[t]he wife
does not seek independent legal advice.”361 In determining the validity of the agreement, the judge
considered whether the lack of independent legal advice in the circumstances of this case
successfully engaged section 56(4)(b), the failure to “understand the nature or consequences of the
domestic contract.”362 On the other hand, the wives in Golton and McKenna both received
independent legal advice, but the wife in the latter case claimed that she did not.363 The reason for
this claim was the belief that her lawyer, Ms. Clarke, met with the husband alone and represented
him, which even led to a Law Society complaint against Ms. Clarke by the wife’s counsel.364
However, the judge found that the wife in McKenna did in fact receive independent legal advice
based on the evidentiary record. While the wives in all three cases attempted to engage section
56(4), Golton was the only case in which the wife was successful and specifically on the basis of
the husband’s failure to disclose. However, Justice Raikes decided not to exercise his discretion to
set aside the agreement for the husband’s failure to provide proper financial disclosure. In support
of this determination, he noted:
I decline to exercise my discretion to set aside the Cohabitation Agreement for failure to
provide proper financial disclosure. As in Butty, it seems to me unfair to permit Kim to
now rely upon non-disclosure when she knew at the time that she was entitled to ask for
financial disclosure and did not. Further, I am not satisfied that if proper disclosure had
been made, Kim would have refused to enter into the agreement or the terms of that
agreement would have been any different than they are. Finally, I am troubled by Kim's
failure to move expeditiously to set aside the agreement and by the fact that she has done
so only after she has reaped the benefits of the agreement albeit limited as they are.365
361
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As a result, in all three of these cases the wives were unsuccessful in setting aside the
contract pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.
Judicial Intervention Cases: A Summary of Section 56(4) in Butler and Virc
Although the judges in Golton, JS and McKenna found that the circumstances pertaining
to the formation of the contract did not warrant judicial intervention in accordance with section
56(4) of the Family Law Act, the judges in Butler and Virc held otherwise. In these two cases, the
validity of the agreement was challenged pursuant to the 56(4)(a) failure to disclose and 56(4)(c)
the law of contract provisions of the Family Law Act. With respect to the law of contract, the wives
in these two cases pleaded: (a) duress (in Virc), (b) unconscionability (in Butler and Virc) and (c)
misrepresentation (in Virc). Neither wife received independent legal advice, a factor that was
considered under unconscionability. In the end, the agreement was set aside for unconscionability
in Butler and for failure to disclose and misrepresentation in Virc.366
Section C: The Relational Application of Section 56(4): Contractual Autonomy in Context
While the outcomes in the five cases differed as to whether the wife discharged her
burden to successfully engage section 56(4) of the Family Law Act and, if so, whether the judge
in turn exercised his discretion to set aside the agreement on this basis, the cases are united by a
common theme in the application of sections 56(4)(a) and 56(4)(c) of the Family Law Act.
Specifically, the notable feature of the five cases is that the judges understood party’s autonomy
not through an abstract conception of choice, but through one that is resonant with relational
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theory as outlined by both Leckey and Buckley.367 In particular, the relational aspect is
evidenced by the fact that the analysis pertaining to the formation of the contract was driven by a
contextualized conception of choice and a context-specific estimation of the wives’ capacity for
informed consent. Part I will analyze the judges’ application of section 56(4)(a) (failure to
disclose), whereas Part II will discuss the judges’ analysis and application of section 56(4)(c)
(“otherwise in accordance with the law of contract”).
Part I: 56(4)(a): The Failure to Disclose discloses Contextualized Choice
The validity of the agreement was challenged on the grounds of financial disclosure
pursuant to section 56(4)(a) of the Family Law Act in Golton, JS, McKenna, Butler and Virc.
Despite the issue of financial disclosure being raised in these five cases, section 56(4)(a) was
successfully engaged by the wife in two of the cases, Golton and Virc, yet only one judge
exercised the discretion to set aside the agreement. This occurred in Virc whereas the judge in
Golton decided to not exercise his discretion in this regard.368 While the outcomes in these five
cases differed, the cases are united by a common theme in the application of section 56(4)(a). All
five cases feature a relational understanding of the party’s autonomy. In particular, the distinct
relational feature of Golton, JS, McKenna, Butler and Virc is the understanding of autonomy
through the context-specific estimation of the wives’ capacity for informed consent and
reflection. The judges’ context-specific estimation of the wives’ capacity for informed consent
and reflection is revealed through their consideration of three elements: (1) the nature of
(non)disclosure on the part of the husbands; (2) the extent of the wives’ knowledge about
financial issues; and (3) the effect of the non-disclosure on the wives’ decision to enter into the
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agreement. A general overview will first be provided with respect to the issue of non-disclosure
in the five cases with some preliminary comments about choice rhetoric. This will be followed
by an analysis of the five cases through the lens of relational theory and specifically the three
contextual elements identified above, which show the judges’ context-specific estimation of the
wives’ capacity for informed consent and reflection.
1) An Overview of the Issue of Non-Disclosure in the Cases
The backdrop to non-disclosure was characterized similarly in the three cases of Golton,
JS and McKenna. While the issue of financial disclosure was framed as the wife in Golton
claiming that the husband “failed to provide financial disclosure as required,”369 the wife in JS
being generally “aware of the husband’s assets but… not know[ing] the value of them” and
“mak[ing] no inquiries as to their valuation,”370 and, the wife in McKenna claiming she received
“insufficient disclosure,”371 the three cases share a common premise. Specifically, this premise is
based on a lack of disclosure with the wives not exchanging, receiving or pursuing financial
disclosure, not making further inquiries or not valuing the husbands’ income and assets. On the
other hand, the nature of the non-disclosure allegation in Butler and Virc was different. The issue
of financial disclosure in these two cases was structured respectively as “the possibility of a
failure to disclose significant assets on the part of Mr. Butler”372 and the husband’s failure to
disclose that “the book value of Renegade’s373 long term investments was significantly different
from their market value.”374
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In Golton, the judge observed that “no formal financial statements were provided, nor
was there an exchange of even a rudimentary list of assets, debts and other liabilities. There was
no financial disclosure beyond what each knew of the other's income, assets and debts from
living together.”375 The Cohabitation Agreement did not include “financial information as a
schedule” and was “silent as to the parties’ incomes and assets/debts.”376 As the judge went on to
state, “[s]imply put, there was no financial disclosure by either of them to the other beyond what
they already knew of each other’s finances.”377 The judge concluded that the wife discharged her
burden in proving that the husband “did not provide financial disclosure of his assets and debts
or other liabilities including estimates of value or amount”378 and that his “failure to provide
financial disclosure… is perhaps understandable but does not comply with the requirements of
the Family Law Act.”379 Despite the husband’s failure to provide financial disclosure, which was
“wholly inadequate; in fact, there was no disclosure per se,”380 the judge decided to not exercise
his discretion to set aside the Cohabitation Agreement.381 He noted that it seemed “unfair to
permit Kim to now rely upon non-disclosure when she knew at the time that she was entitled to
ask for financial disclosure and did not.”382 Even if proper disclosure had been made, he was not
satisfied that she “would have refused to enter into the agreement or the terms of that agreement
would have been any different than they are.”383 Lastly, the judge noted that he was “troubled by
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Kim’s failure to move expeditiously to set aside the agreement and by the fact that she has done
so only after she has reaped the benefits of the agreement albeit limited as they are.”384
Unlike in Golton, where the judge found that section 56(4)(a) was contravened, in JS and
McKenna the judges concluded otherwise. In JS, the judge noted that based on the evidence the
wife “was aware of all of [the husband’s] sources of income and assets” and that “[s]he may or
may not have been aware of their values,”385 but that “[s]he did not pursue further disclosure.”386
On his account, she in fact “failed to make any further enquiries.”387 In holding that “section
56(4) disclosure obligations have not been contravened,”388 he concluded that the wife
“consented to the incomplete disclosure;” “had the means to ascertain precisely the exact amount
of [the husband’s] assets,” “had a general awareness of [the] assets;” and, “was aware of the
shortcomings of the disclosure.”389 Similarly, in McKenna, the judge also found that “[n]one of
the s. 56(4) FLA circumstances have been engaged.”390 In that case, the wife “maintained that
she wanted to conclude the separation agreement as soon as possible and did not need financial
disclosure.”391 In response to her lawyer’s repeated insistence that “it was in her best interests to
get financial disclosure,”392 the wife insisted that “she did not need financial disclosure because
she was taking care of the books and finances, and was fully aware of [the husband’s] financial
situation.”393 Against this backdrop, the wife argued that the separation agreement should be set
aside for a lack of disclosure, but the judge concluded otherwise.
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In contrast to Golton, JS and McKenna, the nature of non-disclosure was different in
Butler and Virc. In Butler, there was no detailed discussion about the allegation of non-disclosure
aside from the failure to disclose “significant assets.”394 According to the facts and evidence
section of the case, the wife received a letter from her husband’s lawyer “who enclosed the
agreement for her signature and two post-dated cheques.”395 There was no mention made as to
what financial details were included, if any, within the agreement, but the case law that was
referenced referred to the principle that “formal disclosure by way of sworn financial statements
prior to executing an agreement is not necessary to meet the obligations to disclose”396 given that
a “general awareness of the assets of the other party may be sufficient to avoid setting aside an
agreement.”397 It can thus be inferred that sworn financial statements were likely not exchanged.
Moreover, the judge acknowledged that “[s]ome argument was directed to the possibility…[of
the husband failing to disclose] significant assets,”398 but held that “[t]here is no merit to the
complaint of non-disclosure.”399
In Virc, the nature of non-disclosure was unlike any of the other four cases. Specifically,
here the husband used the book value for the purpose of valuing his date of marriage interest in
Renegade, 400 but the liquidation value at the date of separation.401 In that case, the judge noted
that when “the wife requested the husband’s explanation why [this] was ‘appropriate,’”402 the
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husband’s response “was not reassuring.”403 The judge concluded that “[t]he husband never
alerted the wife to the fact that the book value of Renegade’s investments significantly exceeded
their market value”404 and found that “the husband failed to fully and honestly comply with the
duty imposed on him by s. 56(4)(a).”405
2) Choice Rhetoric at First Glance
Given the similar characterization of the non-disclosure allegation in Golton, JS and
McKenna, it is unsurprising that the judges’ choice of words and descriptions are comparable.
When reading these decisions, what immediately becomes apparent is how the wife’s role with
respect to the non-disclosure complaint is portrayed. In particular, it is explicitly characterized
either as a choice or a decision. If explicit wording to that effect is not used, the judge considers
it an act attributable to the wife, and one that she failed to undertake despite knowing that she
could do so. Again, the inference is that this was her choice or decision.
Specific word choices in each case illustrate this attribution of choice. In Golton, the
judge noted that the wife “chose not to ask and to execute the agreement”406 and that it was her
“decisions not to seek disclosure and to sign the Cohabitation Agreement.”407 In terms of her
failed action, the judge observed that: “[s]he did not ask and he did not volunteer the
information;”408 “she was entitled to ask for financial disclosure and did not,”409 she “did
nothing”410 and she “made no effort to seek disclosure…[yet]…There was nothing preventing
[her] or her lawyer from asking for financial disclosure.”411 Importantly, this was done in the
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context of having the knowledge that she could do so. For example, the judge observed at
various paragraphs of the decision that: “Kim knew she could ask for disclosure from Dave and
did not do so;”412 she “knew that she could ask… but did nothing;”413 “[s]he knew what she could
ask for by way of disclosure”414 and “she knew at the time that she was entitled to ask for
financial disclosure and did not.”415
Similarly, in JS, the judge explicitly characterized the wife’s role in the non-disclosure
context as a choice or a failed action. For instance, he observed that the wife “consented to the
incomplete disclosure and had the means to ascertain precisely the exact amount of [the
husband’s] assets but chose not to…She was aware of the shortcomings of the disclosure that she
had and chose not to investigate further.”416 It was a failed action on her part as she “was aware
of all of [the husband’s] assets and failed to make further inquiries.”417 In the same vein, the
judge in McKenna noted that the wife chose not to pursue or wait for full financial disclosure
although she knew that she could do so. The judge observed that the wife “was advised of her
rights to disclosure by her lawyer, but was satisfied with the disclosure she had.” 418 He went on
to state, “…as testified to by [her lawyer] Ms. Clarke, Tanya was told that it was in her best
interests to get financial disclosure.”419 However, despite this knowledge and despite being
“advised by [her lawyer] to be patient and to wait[,] Tanya chose to ignore this advice.”420
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While the choice-rhetoric employed by the judges in Golton, JS and McKenna is readily
apparent, a closer reading of the cases reveals that the context and consequences of this choice
are not abstracted. When reading these cases alongside Butler421 and Virc, the distinct relational
feature that comes to light is the understanding of autonomy through the context-specific
estimation of the wives’ capacity for informed consent and reflection, which is revealed through
the judges’ consideration of three significant elements. Specifically, these elements are: (1) the
nature of (non)disclosure on the part of the husbands; (2) the extent of the wives’ knowledge
about financial issues; and (3) the effect of the non-disclosure on the wives’ decision to enter into
the agreement.
1. The Nature of the Husbands’ (Non)Disclosure
First, in order to determine the context-specific estimation of the wives’ capacity for
informed consent and reflection, the judges considered the nature of (non)disclosure on the part
of the husbands.422 This included, for example, whether there was a lack of transparency or
concealment in the husband’s dealings with the wife or whether the information that the husband
provided was misleading, incomplete, misrepresented or omitted. This is significant, because
these considerations impact the wife’s capacity to make an informed decision. In Butler, for
example, where the wife made “some argument” with respect to the possibility of the husband
failing to disclose “significant assets” and without any evidence in this regard, the judge found
that the “the evidence shows nothing close to the sort of infringement which might lead to
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redress.”423 As he went on to observe, “[h]ere, the assets held by the parties were simple, obvious
and not extensive. There was nothing in any of the evidence to suggest that there had ever been
any concealment or lack of transparency with respect to any financial dealing by the couple over
34 years.”424 In the same vein, this can also be seen in JS and in Golton. In the former case, the
judge found that “[t]here were no misrepresentations or concealing of assets by [the
husband].”425 In the latter case, the judge similarly observed that “[t]his is not a case where the
parties exchanged financial information that was misleading or incomplete in the sense that one
side misrepresented or omitted some information.”426 In fact, the judge found that “[t]here was
no concealment in the sense of hiding assets nor any misrepresentation as to value. There was
simply no disclosure.”427
In contrast to both JS and Golton where the judges noted that there was no
misrepresentation, the facts and findings in Virc were unique. In Virc, the judge stressed the
principle that “[i]nformational asymmetry as a result of innocent or deliberate non-disclosure
compromises the bargaining process on which the integrity of a domestic contract depends.” 428
In determining the nature of the husband’s (non)disclosure and its impact on the wife’s ability to
exercise informed choice, the judge considered the husband’s “valuation expertise and the wife’s
deference to that expertise.”429 He noted that the husband was “uniquely qualified,”430 and that in
this context, he had to do more than merely “stand by silently and leave it for the wife to verify
the accuracy of his representation.”431 This can be seen in the following paragraphs:
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94 The evidence in this case is that the husband never alerted the wife to the fact that the
book value of Renegade's investments significantly exceeded their market value. At best,
the husband's evidence is that he did nothing to prevent the wife from testing the veracity
of his representation of the company's value. That, in my view, is not a sufficient discharge
of his duty. In the circumstances of this case, especially given the husband's valuation
expertise and the wife's deference to that expertise, it was incumbent on him to do more
than stand by silently and leave it for the wife to verify the accuracy of his representation.
95 Not all cases will impose such a positive obligation. That, of course, will depend on the
facts of each case. But the husband in this case was uniquely qualified. He knew that the
book value of Renegade's long term investments was significantly different from their
market value. He said nothing. This is precisely the kind of informational asymmetry noted
in Brandsema, and is why, in my view, the husband failed to fully and honestly comply
with the duty imposed on him by s. 56 (4) (a).432
Moreover, the judge explicitly found that the husband’s “disclosure was materially defective and
deliberate.”433 Given the degree to which “materially defective” disclosure compromises one’s
capacity for informed consent, it is unsurprising that the judge in Virc decided to exercise his
discretion to set aside the agreement on this basis.434 However, regardless of whether section
56(4) was successfully engaged, the judges attempted to determine the wives’ capacity for
informed consent and reflection by considering the nature and degree of the husbands’
(non)disclosure and especially in the context of a second contextual element: the wives’ financial
knowledge.
2. The Wives’ Financial Knowledge
Second, the judges’ context-specific estimation of the wives’ capacity for informed
consent and reflection is revealed through their consideration of the extent of the wives’
knowledge about financial issues. This is an important consideration as it once more impacts the
wife’s reflective capacity for informed consent and contractual autonomy.
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In Golton, for example, the judge observed the wife’s general awareness and knowledge
pertaining to the husband’s finances in light of the evidentiary record. He observed that “[s]he
knew generally what Dave owned but not everything.”435 In terms of her actual knowledge, the
judge elaborated that the wife knew of the husband’s “company, his cottage, and that the house
was in his name and there was a mortgage. She knew that he had investments... She knew he had
a good paying job at Laidlaw. She did not know nor did Dave provide any estimates of value for
any assets.”436 Similarly, in JS, the wife admitted in cross-examination that “at the time of the
signing of the agreement she was aware of J.S.(1)'s Mustang, Ford pension and rental property.
After the signing of the agreement, she discovered that J.S.(1) had no other property.”437 Based on
this evidence at trial, the judge concluded that she “was aware of all of [the husband’s] sources of
income and assets. She may or may not have been aware of their values...She did not pursue further
disclosure….”438 While the wife in Golton “knew generally what [the husband] owned but not
everything,”439 in JS the wife also had “a general awareness of [the husband’s] assets.”440
Moreover, the judge in JS similarly observed that while the wife was aware of all of the husband’s
assets, “[s]he may or not have known their approximate values.”441
The judge in Butler also recognized the “general awareness” on the part of the wife. In
light of the evidence, the judge concluded “[t]here is no merit to the complaint of non-disclosure.
Ms. Butler had the requisite general awareness of the couple’s finances. The onus remains on
her and she has failed to meet her evidentiary burden on this point.”442 In reaching this
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conclusion, the judge observed the “simple, obvious, and not extensive”443 nature of the parties’
assets and noted that “[w]hile Mr. Butler may have been given general responsibility to look
after the money and distribute it… Ms. Butler knew their financial circumstances at separation
with the exception of what Mr. Butler’s pension would yield as a family law value – but Mr.
Butler himself then had no idea what that figure would be.”444
In contrast to the wives’ general awareness that was considered and determined by the
judges in Golton, JS and Butler, the judges’ findings in McKenna are Virc were different. In the
former case, the wife was found to not just be “generally aware,” but “fully aware” of the
parties’ financial issues whereas the wife in Virc was not financially aware at all about the
husband’s misrepresentation with respect to his interest in Renegade.
In McKenna, the parties were described as “excellent business partners, in part due to the
fact that they reduced their tax burden in a questionable manner by taking cash payments and
writing personal expenses through the husband’s business.” 445 The context of financial nondisclosure was at the behest of the wife and the extent of the wife’s overall financial knowledge
about the parties’ affairs was significant. For example, the judge noted as follows:
There were discussions [with the wife’s lawyer] regarding financial disclosure. Tanya
stated that she did not need financial disclosure because she was taking care of the books
and finances, and was fully aware of Howard's financial situation. Tanya knew what the
situation was with reference to Revenue Canada, and she did not want financial
disclosure.446
Tanya was asked about the value of Howard's business. Tanya again indicated that she was
fully aware of her and Howard's finances and was okay with what she knew…447
Tanya maintained that she wanted to conclude the separation agreement as soon as
possible and did not need financial disclosure…448
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The wife further emailed her lawyer to that effect advising “we are satisfied with the financial
disclosure.”449 While the agreement did not include any “income or asset information from either
party,”450 it was the wife who actually provided the values of the parties’ matrimonial home and
the husband’s business. 451 Her values were later revealed to be fairly accurate. As the judge
noted, the wife “was remarkably astute in her valuation of the family assets.”452 Unlike the wives
in Golton and JS, who had a “general awareness,” in McKenna the wife’s knowledge was even
more extensive and “full.” By virtue of being “the bookkeeper and beneficiary of the income
being drawn from the company,”453 the judge concluded that the wife “was aware of her rights to
disclosure and was fully aware of what matrimonial assets were and what their approximate
value was. She was also fully aware of Howard’s income status.”454
On the other hand, although the wife in Virc was a lawyer, she was not imputed abstract
knowledge based on this fact. The judge once again in this case adopted a contextual
consideration of the wife’s capacity for informed consent when he considered the evidence as to
whether the wife was aware and had actual knowledge of the husband’s defective disclosure, and
specifically, his representation about the value of his marriage date interest in Renegade. He
noted the wife’s unawareness about the veracity of the husband’s financial representation given
that the husband “never alerted the wife” and her “deference” to the husband’s expertise.455 The
judge took into account the totality of the evidence and concluded that given “…all of the
foregoing… the husband failed to comply with sections 56(4)(a) and (c)… the wife…did not
know that the husband overvalued his marriage date interest in Renegade when the Separation
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Agreement was signed. His disclosure was materially defective and deliberate.”456 This
highlights both the first and second contextual elements in terms of the nature of the husband’s
non-disclosure and the wife’s knowledge about financial matters, which in turn interact with a
third important contextual element – the effect of non-disclosure on the wife’s capacity for
informed consent and reflection.
3. The Effect of Non-Disclosure
The third contextual element that is related to both the nature of the husband’s nondisclosure and the wife’s knowledge about financial matters is the effect of the non-disclosure on
the wives’ decision to enter into the agreement. In Golton and JS, the two cases involving a
cohabitation agreement, the judges found that the effect of the non-disclosure in the context of
these cases was immaterial to the wives’ decision to enter the agreement. In Golton, for example,
the judge specifically found that it was “immaterial” 457 and that the wife was “content to enter
into the agreement without that disclosure.”458 As the judge explained:
Dave's non-disclosure was immaterial to Kim's decision to enter into the Cohabitation
Agreement. There is absolutely no evidence that Kim would have refused to enter into
the agreement if she had known the full details of Dave's financial affairs. To the
contrary, Kim executed the agreement which expressly provided that she was content
with the financial disclosure she had. She made no inquiries of Dave whatsoever. As she
indicated to others, she signed the agreement because she loved Dave and did not want to
lose him. Kim would have signed the Cohabitation Agreement on the same terms in any
event.459
On the note of immateriality and the wife’s satisfaction to enter into the agreement, the judge in
JS inferred both given the totality of the evidentiary record. The judge noted that “[t]here was no
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duress or unconscionable circumstances. She said the contract was fair and I infer she would have
signed the contract even if full disclosure had occurred. In the result, section 56(4) disclosure
obligations have not been contravened.”460 Similarly, as in Golton and JS, the judge in McKenna
found that the wife “was advised of her rights to disclosure by her lawyer, but was satisfied with
the disclosure that she had.”461 Moreover, the judge described her as an “extremely intelligent,
articulate, educated woman who knows what she wants. She wanted out of this marriage and
wanted the separation agreement done as quickly as possible... Tanya was advised by Ms. Clarke
to be patient and to wait. Tanya chose to ignore this advice.”462 This evidence was both
documentary and testimonial. For example, it included her lawyer’s testimony as well as
documentary evidence by way of the wife’s email to her lawyer, which stated: “[w]e would like to
get the Separation Agreement done as quickly as possible.” 463 The immateriality of the disclosure
was inferred given the totality of the wife’s actions, including the fact that the non-disclosure was
at her behest.464
On the other hand, in Virc, where the agreement was set aside after the wife successfully
engaged subsection 56(4)(a), the non-disclosure section, as well as subsection 56(4)(c) on the
ground of misrepresentation, the effect of non-disclosure on the wife’s capacity for an informed
decision was material. While this will be considered in more detail under Section B below, it is
important to highlight here that unlike in Golton, JS and McKenna, the husband’s
misrepresentation of asset value significantly undermined the wife’s capacity for informed

460

JS, supra note 335 at para 49. [Emphasis added]. It should also be remembered that the wife in JS did not plead
this ground, so this was not even a factual finding by the judge, but rather the wife’s own evidence.
461
McKenna, supra note 335 at para 172. [Emphasis added].
462
Ibid at para 173.
463
Ibid at para 101.
464
As mentioned, the wife in McKenna was the one who provided the information regarding the disclosure; she
provided the values that she wished to provide while also insisting that she did not wish to pursue disclosure.

95

consent as it induced her to enter into the agreement. As the judge acknowledged during his
analysis of whether or not the doctrine of misrepresentation had been satisfied:
105 The husband's representation that the value of his interest in Renegade on the
marriage date was $7,603,685 materially impacted the calculation of his net family
property, and resulted in the wife being led to believe that she owed him a $954,000
equalization payment. The husband was prepared to waive this payment. There can be no
doubt, in my view, that this waiver was a major, if not the motivating, inducement to the
wife agreeing to the financial terms of the Separation Agreement.465
When these three important contextual elements are considered together, they shed light
on the wife’s capacity for informed consent. This is important, because as both Leckey and
Buckley have argued, capacity is a continuum. As a result, these three interrelated contextual
factors are in interaction with one another and when considered together, they significantly
impacted and informed the judges’ understanding of the wife’s autonomy by providing them
with an estimation of whether the wife exercised an informed choice and had a real reflective
capacity466 to do so. Where her reflective capacity was not undermined, the wife was at liberty to
exercise her choice and enter into an agreement waiving spousal support and/or releasing any
further or future claims. This relational approach illuminates the judges’ reasoning and highlights
the importance of relational theory’s “more realistic and nuanced” conceptualization of
contractual autonomy.467
While Section A focused on the judges’ estimation of the wife’s capacity for informed
consent in the context of the non-disclosure provision, Section B will explore the judges’
understanding of autonomy as they considered whether to set aside the agreement pursuant to the
law of contract. It will be shown that, similar to the application of the non-disclosure provision,
the five cases reveal that the judges were once again driven by a context-specific estimation of
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the wives’ capacity for informed consent when approaching the agreement from the law of
contract ground. In particular, the estimation of the wives’ capacity for consent was achieved
through the judges’ consideration of the context surrounding the formation of the agreement as
presented by the parties in their testimonial and documentary evidence.
Part II: 56(4)(c): Contextualizing the Law of Contract with the Capacity for Informed
Consent and Reflection
The wives in the four468 cases of Golton, McKenna, Butler and Virc sought to set aside
the agreement in accordance with the law of contract pursuant to section 56(4)(c) of the Family
Law Act. With respect to this ground, the wives claimed: (a) duress (in Golton, McKenna and
Virc) and undue influence (in Golton and McKenna); (b) unconscionability (in Golton, Butler
and Virc); and, (c) misrepresentation (in Virc). The agreement was set aside successfully in Virc
and Butler on the basis of misrepresentation and unconscionability respectively. Neither wife
received independent legal advice,469 a factor that was considered under unconscionability.
Despite the similarities and differences among the cases, the driving force in the judges’
determination as to whether the contract should be set aside was the relational estimation of the
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wives’ capacity for informed consent and reflection. This was achieved through the judges’
attentiveness to the context surrounding the formation of the agreement as presented by the
parties in their testimonial and documentary evidence. These contextual considerations included:
the duration, timing and nature of the parties’ negotiations; who the parties are and their
dynamics; the driving motive for entering into the agreements; and, the potential role of fear,
abuse, lack of free will and emotion, if any, as established by the evidence and synthesized by
this author.
1) Duress and Undue Influence in Context
Duress and undue influence were both pleaded in the two cases of Golton and McKenna
while the wife in Virc pleaded the former ground. With respect to the grounds of duress and undue
influence, the wife in McKenna made allegations of abuse and claimed that “she was in fear and
this motivated her to sign the separation agreement. She states that she told her lawyer, Ms. Clarke,
that money was no good to her if she was dead.”470 The wife in Golton also raised fear claiming
“she did not want to sign the agreement and only did so because [the husband] Dave threatened to
throw her and [her daughter] Kaelyn out on the street. She also feared that he would cause her to
be fired by Laidlaw where they both worked. She and Kaelyn would be destitute.” 471 Moreover,
the wife described him as “the dominant personality in their relationship” where she was
“submissive to his wishes to the point where she had no free will.”472 On the other hand, instead
of fear, the wife in Virc raised emotion in support of the allegation of duress. Specifically, the wife
“testified that she was physically affected by and emotionally fragile as a result of the breakdown
of the marriage, and particularly vulnerable during the weeks leading up to the signing of the

470

McKenna, supra note 335 at paras 178-179.
Golton, supra note 82 at para 222.
472
Ibid at para 223.
471

98

Separation Agreement.”473 In all three cases, the judges found that the wives did not sign the
agreement out of duress and/or undue influence. In reaching this conclusion, the judges were
attentive to the context surrounding the formation of the agreement as presented by the parties in
their testimonial and documentary evidence.
The judges in both Golton and McKenna considered the duration, timing and nature of
negotiations in order to contextualize the wives’ choice and determine whether it was exercised
under duress or undue influence. In Golton, the judge found that the wife “signed the agreement
freely and voluntarily as she confirmed in the Acknowledgement witnessed by Ms. Hornick, her
lawyer.”474 In reaching this conclusion, the judge listed thirteen factors that were taken into
consideration. Instead of an abstracted choice based on an automatic conclusion given the wife’s
receipt of independent legal advice, the first seven findings of fact that the judge pointed out
revolved around the conditions surrounding the Cohabitation Agreement. This included: Mr.
Golton first presented a draft agreement to Mrs. Golton “a year or more before she signed it;” the
wife met during the course of this year on three occasions with her counsel, “a well-known local
family lawyer” and received independent legal advice; amendments were made to the draft
agreement upon Ms. Hornick’s request; Mr. Golton was “not present” during any of these
meetings; Mrs. Golton “never indicated to Ms. Hornick that she felt compelled or pressured to
sign the agreement and her Acknowledgment says otherwise;” and, “[a]lthough they spoke of the
agreement from time to time, Dave did not exert any pressure on Kim to get the agreement
finalized and signed.”475 In fact, in a separate part of the decision titled “Circumstances
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Surrounding Cohabitation Agreement,” the judge explicitly found that the process unfolded “at a
relatively pedestrian pace.”476 This can be seen in the following excerpt:
Dave and Kim had infrequent discussions about the agreement in 1995 and early 1996. It
is not the case that Dave was pestering Kim or imposing arbitrary deadlines for execution
of the agreement. To the contrary, I find that process of negotiating and finalizing the terms
of the agreement took place at a relatively pedestrian pace.477
The duration, timing and nature of negotiations informed the court’s assessment of the wife’s
ability for reflective capacity and informed consent. The circumstances did not undermine the
wife’s ability to take the time to reflect and there was no urgency or pressure to make a hasty
decision about the parties’ relationship or agreement.
In order to determine whether fear played a role as alleged by the wife, the judge in Golton
also turned his mind to the evidentiary record and what it revealed about the contextual
considerations of who the parties are, their dynamics and what the driving motive was for entering
into the agreement. The judge found that the evidentiary record did not support the wife’s
allegations that the husband threatened to throw her out on the street478 and that she feared he
would have her fired. Instead, the judge explicitly found that the husband did not make either
threat. For example, the judge noted that “[t]here is no evidence that [he] threatened to have her
employment at Laidlaw terminated if she did not sign.”479 As the judge went on to explain, the
husband actually worked, “in a separate division and had no ability to do so. Her evidence that she
believed he would do so strikes me as entirely convenient at this stage. She never even hinted at
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such a concern when speaking with friends or family at the time.”480 Importantly, the judge also
considered the contextual backdrop to the agreement by considering who the wife was at the time
by turning his attention to her level of self-sufficiency, skills, resources and support. He observed
that she “had lived on her own with [her daughter] relatively recently. She had family in the area.
She had a job. She had work skills.”481 In addition to considering what the evidence established
about who the wife was, the judge also considered the parties’ dynamics and what motivated them
to enter into the agreement. This can be seen when the judge elaborated on the parties’
unremarkable dynamics and motivating desire to arrange their own affairs:
Dave's advice that their relationship was over and she would have to move out if they did
not have a Cohabitation Agreement does not constitute a threat. It simply reflects frankly
his willingness to end the relationship if they did not sign a Cohabitation Agreement, and
the natural consequence of that end.
….
The evidence that Kim tried to please Dave -- that things had to be done as he wanted them
-- again strikes me as an exaggeration. I have no doubt that Kim tried to please Dave by
doing things he liked. He undoubtedly did the same for her. The power dynamic of this
relationship was unremarkable. She was not lacking in free will when she signed the
agreement or at any point in their relationship.
….
When she signed the agreement she knew exactly what she was signing and what it meant.
She signed it because she loved Dave and did not want to lose him. She may have preferred
not to have an agreement but signing the agreement so that their relationship would
continue does not amount to duress.482
Thus, the judge concluded that the wife in Golton did not sign the agreement because of duress
or as a result of undue influence; it was not a matter of the husband holding “power” over her or
inducing her to sign the Cohabitation Agreement.483 Instead, given these contextual
considerations surrounding the formation of the agreement, which included the nature, duration
and timing of negotiations, who the parties are and their dynamics and the motive for entering
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into the agreement as established by the evidentiary record, the wife had the capacity to reflect
and make an informed decision about entering into the agreement on these terms.
Similarly, in McKenna, extensive testimonial and documentary evidence was considered
in contextualizing the wife’s capacity for informed consent to enter into the separation
agreement. Like the judge in Golton, the judge in McKenna took into account the following
contextual factors: the parties and their dynamics; the nature of negotiations involving the wife’s
receipt of legal advice; and, the motive for entering into the agreement, which was found to be
entirely driven by and in accordance with the wife’s wishes. For example, with respect to the
parties’ dynamics and interaction, the judge considered the wife’s allegations of abuse, but found
that the evidentiary record did not support them. He noted that the “police conclusion was that
this was a volatile relationship. And so it was.”484 Instead of establishing that the wife was
intimidated or pressured, the judge held that “[t]he evidence establishes only that the parties had
a volatile relationship.”485 These dynamics were a contextual factor that the judge considered in
addition to who the parties are themselves. For instance, the judge observed that the husband “is
an uneducated, unrefined and inarticulate man”486 while the wife “on the other hand is a
sophisticated, educated and articulate woman.”487 For the judge, these indicia highlighted the
wife’s capacity for informed consent. This was especially true given the nature of the
negotiations, which involved her lawyer’s legal advice and acknowledgment that she was acting
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of her own volition, as well as the wife’s financial astuteness, sophistication and motivation to
enter into the agreement on her own terms. This can be seen in the following excerpts:
179 … Tanya's lawyer dealt with Tanya during these negotiations and met with her
regularly, and certified that Tanya acted of her own volition without fear, threats or
compulsion by Howard or any other person -- see Exhibit 10 [Certificate of Independent
Legal Advice]. …I accept the Exhibit 10 opinion of Ms. Clarke who was a professional
lawyer with six years of experience doing 25 per cent of her practice in family law.488
181 …I find that there is no credible evidence that Tanya was subjected to intimidation
or illegitimate pressure to sign the agreement. I find the contrary. Tanya wanted rid of
Howard and wanted a separation agreement as quickly as possible in order to move on.
Her lawyer urged her to wait, but this advice was ignored. The separation agreement was
not unconscionable or even unfair, as Tanya was remarkably astute and prescient as to
what the assets were worth and what she was entitled to under the agreement.489

Thus, by considering who the parties are on their own and in relation to one another, their
dynamics, the nature of negotiations, the wife’s astuteness and her driving motive for entering
into the agreement, the judge was attentive to the wife’s capacity for informed consent and
reflection. Moreover, the provision of legal advice and the lawyer’s acknowledgement that the
wife was acting on her own volition further confirmed the judge’s findings pertaining to the
context surrounding the formation of the contract. This was especially the case as the testimony
of the lawyer who provided the wife with independent legal advice was found to be credible in
its totality and especially where it differed from the evidence of the wife and the husband.
Instead of supporting the wife’s allegations of duress and undue influence, it persuasively
confirmed the context of the wife’s informed consent and her contextualized choice.
Just as the judges’ contextualized relational analysis in Golton and McKenna became
apparent, so too the judge’s analysis in Virc revealed a relational conceptualization. In particular,
this was exhibited by the judge’s consideration of whether there was duress as advanced by the
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wife on the basis that she was “emotional” at the time of contract formation. The judge
considered the wife’s “emotional” state, but concluded that there was “insufficient evidence of
duress.”490 In reaching this conclusion, the judge’s understanding of emotion including its role
and implication for informed consent was relational. As both Leckey and Buckley have
acknowledged, “[t]he presence of emotion should not lightly be coded as indicative of the
absence of agency and thus of consent.”491 In this vein, the judge in Virc considered the wife’s
capacity for informed consent without automatically concluding that her emotion was
presumptively indicative of her lack of agency and consent. Instead, in hearing the wife’s
testimony regarding her emotional and vulnerable state, the judge’s analysis was driven by a
close consideration of what the totality of the evidence suggested about the wife’s capacity for
consent. The judge considered the role of emotion against the backdrop of the usual experiences
of a separating or divorcing person with a contextual sensitivity as to whether there was any
“domineering, manipulative and coercive conduct”492 affecting the formation of the agreement.
This can be seen in the following excerpt:
The wife testified that she was physically affected by and emotionally fragile as a result
of the breakdown of the marriage, and particularly vulnerable during the weeks leading
up to the signing of the Separation Agreement. But, as observed by the Supreme Court in
Miglin… emotional stress associated with a separation or divorce "should not be taken as
giving rise to a presumption that parties in such circumstances are incapable of assenting
to a binding agreement", and to quote the motions judge in this case, the wife's
description of her condition "is not an unusual constellation of experiences for a person
undergoing a separation or divorce". I agree. The evidence in this case falls short of
demonstrating the kind of domineering, manipulative and coercive conduct as described
in Rolland.493
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Thus, by considering the role of emotion without making general assumptions or jumping to
automatic conclusions, the judge’s conceptualization of the wife’s decision-making capacity was
understood as falling somewhere on the continuum where the wife was able to exercise her
agency and consent. Once again, this is resonant with the relational understanding that
“emotional pressure does not necessarily vitiate an individual’s decision-making capacity, since
capacity is a continuum, with a wide range between competence and incompetence.”494 Instead,
there should be “an increased level of scrutiny where an agreement [is] made in emotional or
pressured circumstances [and where it] seems particularly one-sided, without however adopting
any presumption of non-autonomy.”495
2) Unconscionability in Context
The wife in Virc also raised the role of emotion with respect to unconscionability.
According to her, “the Agreement was unconscionable in that it was negotiated under
impeachable circumstances. These included her emotional state, the absence of independent legal
advice and the short duration of the negotiations.”496 To frame his analysis, the judge first
referred to a summary of the law regarding the doctrine of unconscionability.497 In general, the
doctrine “focuses on whether or not there were unconscionable circumstances surrounding the
formation of the contract”498 and “the question to be asked is whether there were ‘any
circumstances of oppression, pressure, or other vulnerabilities, and if one party's exploitation of
such vulnerabilities during the negotiation process resulted in a separation agreement that
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deviated substantially from the legislation.’”499 The judge went on to cite examples of bargaining
inequality and to emphasize the role of preying that produces unconscionability:
[65] Examples of inequality in bargaining may include one party being intellectually
weaker by reason of a disease of the mind, economically weaker or situationally weaker.
Vulnerability may also arise due to a special relationship of trust and confidence…
However, the "mere presence of vulnerabilities will not, in and of itself, justify the court's
intervention. The degree of professional assistance received by the parties will often
overcome any systemic imbalances between the parties…"
[66] … the Ontario Court of Appeal states the question to be answered in determining
unconscionability is whether there was inequality between the parties, or a preying of
one upon the other, that placed an onus on the stronger party to act with scrupulous care
for the welfare and interests of the vulnerable. At para. 13 the Court notes it is: "not the
ability of one party to make a better bargain that counts. Seldom are contracting parties
equal. It is the taking advantage of that ability to prey upon the other party that produces
the unconscionability". [Emphasis added.]500
Within this framework, the judge in Virc considered what the evidence established with respect
to the context surrounding the formation of the agreement including the parties and their
dynamics, the motive for the agreement and the existence of a power imbalance, if any. Applying
the case law cited by the parties, the judge’s observations highlighted the driving force of his
analysis: his estimation of the wife’s capacity to understand and consent to the agreement. For
example, he noted that in one case, the wife alleged that “she was so distraught by the parties'
separation that she was forced to take medical stress leave…[yet] the evidence viewed in its
totality did not show a power imbalance between the spouses.”501 He also observed that “[t]he
wife in that case was described as intelligent and interested in moving forward with the
separation--not unlike the wife in this case.”502 Moreover, he distinguished his case from other
cases on which the wife relied where “there was compelling medical evidence of ‘dominance
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and control’… and mental illness…, neither of which were factors in this case.”503 As the judge
noted, “[t]he distinctive feature of all these cases… is a power imbalance that impacts a party's
ability to understand and freely assent to a legally binding agreement. This should not be
confused with signing an agreement in stressful circumstances where there has been financial
misrepresentation.”504
On this note, it is important to remember that Buckley stated that relational theory “offers
a more profound and detailed contextual examination of autonomy, which goes much further
than traditional legal doctrines in its examination of pressure and capacity, yet which still
recognizes and maintains the role of contract and permits diverse choices where individuals have
real reflective capacities.”505 While it can be argued that the judge did rely on the traditional
legal doctrines and case law as presented by the wife in examining her contractual autonomy,
these excerpts highlight that the judge considered closely whether the context surrounding the
formation of the contract included the presence of any of these features (ex: dominance, control
or mental illness) in order to determine whether the wife’s capacity for reflection and informed
choice was undermined. Having found that they were nonexistent, the judge concluded that the
wife failed to establish unconscionability.
Unconscionability was also raised in Golton and Butler with this argument succeeding only
in the latter case. In Golton, the issue of unconscionability was framed as follows: “[i]s the
Cohabitation Agreement unconscionable in the circumstances at the time it was entered into?”506
Like the judge in Virc, the judge in Golton similarly emphasized the notion that “[w]e must always
remember that it is not the ability of one party to make a better bargain that counts. Seldom are
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contracting parties equal. It is the taking advantage of that ability to prey upon the other party
that produces the unconscionability...”507 In this case, the judge’s analysis was once again driven
by a determination of the wife’s capacity to understand and consent to the agreement.
First, and as previously discussed above in the “Duress and Undue Influence in Context”
section, this can be seen by the judge’s consideration of the context surrounding the formation of
the contract. For example, this included the nature and duration of the negotiations in an attempt
to determine whether the husband exerted control over the wife and in turn her capacity to consent.
In addition, the judge considered mental illness as a factor, one that was previously raised by the
unconscionability case law on which the wife in Virc also relied. On this note, the judge in Golton
observed that there “is no evidence that Kim’s mental health issues [were] then in play.” 508 He
concluded that he was “not satisfied that there was an inequality between the parties that was
material to the negotiations and discussions surrounding the Cohabitation Agreement.”509
However, this conclusion was not made in a void. While the judge acknowledged that the husband
“came into the relationship with more assets and the better paying job…clearly st[anding] on
firmer financial footing…Kim was by no means economically dependent upon Dave.”510 He also
acknowledged that both parties “had a child for whom they had financial responsibilities”511 and
that the wife was employed, in receipt of child support and the child tax benefit, having “lived
independently before [with her daughter] and could no doubt do so again if need be.”512 This is
significant, because just as capacity exists on a continuum, so too does one’s level of self-
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sufficiency and independence even in the face of different levels of income or professional roles,
which also exist on a spectrum.
As the judge went on to explain, “[t]hat the agreement is more beneficial in the long term
to Dave than Kim, that he pays less than what would be required for equalization under the Family
Law Act or for spousal support under the Divorce Act many years later does not mean the
agreement was unconscionable at the time it was formed.”513 Instead, what was driving the
cohabitation agreement was the general theme of “there is only mine and yours, no ours. If we
break up, you keep yours, I keep mine. We go our separate ways with no obligations owing to the
other”514 and the wife’s desire to continue the relationship. To quote Buckley, there was nothing
in the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the contract that deprived the wife of her ability
to “reflect critically on equality norms…ultimately depart from them, and…feel that [she has] a
real choice in how [she responds] to a particular situation.”515 In this contextual environment, the
judge did not find that there was unconscionability.516
In Butler, the agreement was set aside for unconscionability. In this case, the wife claimed
that “all of the facts surrounding the making of the contract demonstrated a clear inequality of
bargaining position and the agreement itself was thereby rendered patently unconscionable.”517 In
determining that the wife successfully established unconscionability, the judge’s contextual
sensitivity came to light as well as the driving force in his analysis: the wife’s lack of capacity for
informed consent and reflection. Specifically, the judge turned his mind to important contextual
factors, which included the wife’s lack of sophistication, her trust and deference to the husband,
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the husband’s exertion of his will and her overall lack of capacity for reflection in light of these
interconnected factors. This can be seen in two important paragraphs that are illustrative of the
judge’s reasoning as follows:
50 Ms. Butler demonstrated a remarkable lack of sophistication when Mr. Butler was
sorting out their post-separation financial affairs for them. An important concern for her
was not to cause prejudice to Mr. Butler or the two rather feckless adult children the
parents had been protecting and assisting financially. It is not a difficult inference that
Ms. Butler felt some significant guilt that she was leaving an established family and a
very long marriage for another man. To their credit, neither spouse appears to have been
angry or vindictive towards the other, and Ms. Butler was forthright about her trust that
Mr. Butler, who had always been primarily responsible for financial matters, would be
fair and take care of everything. Unfortunately, the result was that she virtually threw
herself on his mercy -- instead of actually bargaining -- with respect to her reasonable
entitlements on separation. Her capitulation, while appearing magnanimous, was actually
a demonstration of a sad misunderstanding of her position and her actual rights.
51 In my view, Mr. Butler exerted his will over Ms. Butler and was in a demonstrably
stronger position which had the result of a real disadvantage to Ms. Butler. His telling her
what the result would be, in the context of her trust in him that he would be fair, represented
a pressure on her will that left her no realistic ability to freely decide…
These paragraphs capture both the judge’s contextual sensitivity and determination of the wife’s
lack of capacity for informed consent and reflection. Unlike the findings of the judges in Virc and
Golton, where the wives understood their rights and had the capacity to bargain and consent, the
judge in Butler held otherwise.518 Despite reaching a different conclusion, the analytical process
in reaching it was based on a shared relational driving force in the judicial analysis: whether the
wives had the capacity for informed consent and reflection.
3) Misrepresentation in Context
The judge’s contextual sensitivity is highlighted in the case of Virc where the judge set
aside the agreement in light of the misrepresentation on the part of the husband. This was actually
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the ground that was driving the wife’s entire case with respect to challenging the validity of the
agreement pursuant to the law of contract. While she did plead duress and unconscionability, “the
focus of her case was misrepresentation by the husband of the marriage date value of his interest
in Renegade.”519 As the judge observed, contract law requires that “a misrepresentation must be
material in the sense that a reasonable person would consider it relevant to the decision to enter
the agreement…[and it] must have constituted an inducement to enter the agreement upon which
the party relied.”520 This is understandable given that the materiality of a misrepresentation
significantly impacts a party’s ability for informed consent and reflective capacity regarding the
agreement. In observing whether the husband’s representation was material, the judge noted:
105 The husband's representation that the value of his interest in Renegade on the marriage
date was $7,603,685 materially impacted the calculation of his net family property, and
resulted in the wife being led to believe that she owed him a $954,000 equalization
payment. The husband was prepared to waive this payment. There can be no doubt, in my
view, that this waiver was a major, if not the motivating, inducement to the wife agreeing
to the financial terms of the Separation Agreement.521
In light of the foregoing, the judge concluded “the husband’s representations about the value of
his marriage date interest… were material. They significantly impact the determination of which
party must make the equalization payment due in these proceedings, and the amount thereof.”522
Moreover, the “material misrepresentation… induced the wife to sign the Separation
Agreement,”523 which significantly undermined the wife’s capacity for informed consent.
However, despite having found that there was a material misrepresentation, the judge
further noted that the framework for his analysis placed the prima facie onus on the wife of
“demonstrating that the husband misrepresented the value of his marriage date interest in
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Renegade. However, once a prima facie case… has been made out, the onus shifts to the disclosing
party to establish that the recipient actually knew about the falsehood.”524 On this note, the judge
found that “the wife has led sufficient evidence to call into question the veracity of the husband’s
representation about the value of his marriage date interest in Renegade.”525 In light of this, the
judge explained that the issue “is determining whether the husband has satisfied the onus of
proving the wife’s actual knowledge, the extent (or materiality) of his allegedly defective
disclosure and the degree to which that disclosure, if defective was deliberate.”526 While these
considerations are outlined by the case law itself, they are significant as they all impact and
highlight a judge’s context-specific estimation of a party’s informed consent and capacity for
reflection.
The judge considered extensively the evidentiary record before him. He recognized that
“[n]owhere in the husband’s evidence does he assert that the wife actually knew that he had
overvalued his marriage date interest in Renegade when the parties signed their Agreement”527 and
that “given this evidence and my assessment of the husband’s credibility, the representations he
made to the wife were deliberate.”528 In reaching his conclusion that the defective disclosure was
deliberate, the judge placed his analysis in context. In particular, he considered the husband’s
valuation skills, astuteness, expertise, experience and sophistication in dealing with complex
financial issues with reference to what the investment community, the courts and the husband
himself had said in this regard.
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For example, the judge noted that the investment community regarded the husband “as an
astute investor”529 and the Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge’s characterization that
the husband is “an experienced and sophisticated businessman.”530 The judge himself concurred
with this description “[a]fter observing him in court and the ease with which he dealt with
complicated financial issues.”531 These characterizations were not just those of third parties as the
husband himself admittedly “claimed substantial experience valuing businesses and enterprises…
he considered himself an expert in business valuations, and that he was quite capable of explaining
complex financial calculations and information to people.”532 As the judge acknowledged, “[t]hese
skills were evident at trial.”533 Against this contextual backdrop, it seemed rather convenient and
self-serving that the husband’s financial calculations and representations about the value of
Renegade in the legal proceedings with his former spouse were “materially different from the value
he represented in his NFP statement to the wife in this case.”534 While the husband claimed “he
would not have deceptively presented these calculations to his former spouse,”535 the judge
observed the financial advantage favoring the husband that this irreconcilable discrepancy in
values created. This can be seen in the following excerpt:
[T]he representations about the depressed value of their interests in Renegade made to
his former spouse in their litigation, reduced the husband's EP exposure in that case.
Conversely, the representations made to the wife in this case about Renegade's value
when they married suggested a different value, more than $6,000,000 higher, at almost
the same point in time. This latter representation increased his marriage date net worth,
dramatically reducing the value of his net family property and, it follows, his
equalization payment exposure. These representations were made in different legal
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proceedings, but in terms of content, proximate in time to each other. They cannot be
reconciled. Each was financially advantageous to the husband. 536
In light of all of these contextual considerations and the totality of the evidence, the judge found
that “wife was induced to sign an agreement that presumptively and, as analyzed later in these
Reasons, substantially misstated the parties' net family properties, to her financial prejudice.”537
The wife’s capacity for informed consent was significantly compromised and thus the judge went
on to conclude, “[t]he husband's non-compliance with the obligations imposed by sections 56 (4)
(a) and (c) of the Act, and the parties' evidence about their Separation Agreement, when viewed
contextually, lead to no other conclusion than that the Agreement should be, and is hereby, set
aside.”538
Section D: Constrained Contextualism - Commentary, Critique and Reflections
While Sections B and C above addressed the judges’ shared relational approach through
their contextual sensitivity pertaining to contract formation in their effort to determine the wives’
capacity for informed consent, Section D will provide this author’s commentary, critique and
reflections about the limitations of the relational contextual approach in the decisions of Golton,
JS, McKenna, Virc and Butler. Three main critiques about the cases are offered. First, the judges
in some of the cases did not consider all of the relevant contextual factors that could have impacted
the wife’s capacity for informed consent. Second, the judges were significantly constrained by the
pleadings and/or evidentiary record before them, which in turn limited their ability to apply the
(un)proven significant contextual factors to the context-specific estimation of the wives’ capacity
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for consent and reflection. Third, even though the judges were driven by a context-specific
estimation of the wives’ capacity for informed consent and reflection, it became apparent when
reading the cases that there were additional motivating forces or perspectives that drove the judges’
analysis and outcome in the cases as they appear to have been given great weight. These three
aspects of the cases will allow for reflection on lessons learned from a practitioner’s perspective
and the interesting implications for scholars going forward in Section E.
Part I: Additional Relevant Factors for Consideration and Context?
The judges in some of the cases did not consider, or as will be discussed further below,
were perhaps not in a position to entertain all of the relevant contextual factors in their estimation
of the wives’ capacity for informed choice and reflection. This includes a consideration of factors
like the differences in terms of the parties’ age, nature and length of employment, previous
experience with family law proceedings and the financial complexity of those proceedings, all of
which are additional factors that might stem either from age disparity or the unfolding of one’s life
experience. While the outcome in the cases might still have remained the same, as it all depends
on the weight attributed to factors, it would have been contextually prudent if the judges at least
could turn their mind to these considerations when performing their analysis. For example, this
contextual analysis can be seen in a case called Dillon v Dillon,539 where Justice Gordon noted
these factors stating that “[t]here may have been an inequality of bargaining power. Mr. Dillon
was older and employed in the business sector for some years. He had been through a separation.
There was no indication, however, that he took advantage of her situation.”540 In that case, the age
difference between the parties was 9 years. When the parties initially met, the wife was a university
student and the husband was working in his parents’ business. The judge in Dillon was attuned to
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these considerations as they may have been indicative of an “inequality of bargaining power,”541
but his ultimate conclusion was unaffected by them as he held that they were not in play or
impacting the wife’s capacity for informed consent and reflection.
In contrast with the Dillon case, where the 9-year age difference was considered as one of
the factors indicating a potential inequality of bargaining power, in the three cases where the age
discrepancy was more than 9 years, it was not even acknowledged as a contextual factor with a
potential impact on the parties’ bargaining power and the consequent effect on the wife’s capacity
for informed consent. In particular, in the cases of Golton, Virc and McKenna, the age difference
between the parties was 11, 20 and 10 years respectively with the husband being the older party.
Moreover, paralleling the cases to the reasoning in Dillon, while both parties went through a
previous separation in Golton and Virc, the husband’s separation in Virc was more comprehensive
and complex in terms of issues - especially financial ones.542
In addition, the husbands in both Golton and Virc were employed in the business sector
longer than the wives, in higher positions and earning higher salaries. In Golton, for example, the
husband eventually became a VP although this was not relevant to the point in time of the
formation of the cohabitation agreement. At the time when the parties met and the years leading
up to the cohabitation agreement, the wife was working as a waitress/bartender and when she was
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formally hired in 1991 at Laidlaw, the husband was already a general manager there.543 It is true
that the judge in Golton acknowledged the disparity in the parties’ incomes and assets when he
noted: “[i]f the disparity in their incomes and assets does give rise to an inequality in bargaining
power or vulnerability on Kim’s part, [it] …was compensated for adequately as Kim had
independent legal advice.”544 However, this failed to acknowledge the additional potential
implications of the husband’s higher position and work experience coupled with the additional life
experience arising from the age difference, which all may have affected the parties’ bargaining
powers. This is not to say that even if the judge had considered and weighed these factors that the
outcome would have necessarily been different. The judge might have still found that independent
legal advice “compensated…adequately” for the bargaining inequality “or vulnerability on [the
wife’s] part.”545 The point is that the factors could have been acknowledged and weighed when
determining whether there was a bargaining inequality and in turn whether they potentially lead to
the conclusion that the agreement should be set aside considering the totality of the evidence.
On this note of evidence, however, it is important to return to the author’s initial comment
at the outset of Part I: the judges were perhaps not in a position to entertain all of the relevant
contextual factors pertaining to a potential finding of bargaining inequality or to their estimation
of the wives’ capacity for informed choice and reflection. This is based on the fact that they were
limited by the pleadings, the arguments advanced by the parties and the evidentiary record itself.
For example, in Virc, there was a 20-year age difference and a significant discrepancy in terms of
the parties’ incomes and careers. Although the wife was a professional with the judge even
acknowledging that “the roles adopted by the parties during their cohabitation were those of two

543

Golton, supra note 82 at paras 20-21.
Ibid at para 234. [Emphasis added].
545
Ibid.
544

117

professionals, each of whom pursued their own career, although to different extents and in
different stages of development,”546 the age difference, income disparity, different professional
levels and length of experience were not advanced by the wife as factors affecting the parties’
bargaining (in)equality. The judge certainly considered the husband’s financial expertise and the
wife’s deference to that expertise within the grounds of misrepresentation. However, when it came
to the grounds of unconscionability, where the existence of a potential bargaining inequality is a
consideration under this doctrine, the judge noted that the wife’s arguments about the
unimpeachable circumstances included her “emotional state, the absence of independent legal
advice and the short duration of the negotiations.”547 The judge did note that the arguments
“included” those factors, thus implying that there were additional ones, but the point is that the
factors as outlined by Dillon and potentially in play here do not appear to have been advanced by
the wife and thereby affected the judge’s ability to consider same. In light of this, even with the
adoption of a contextual sensitivity, the judges were inevitably constrained by the pleadings, the
arguments advanced by the parties and the evidentiary record itself. This can especially be seen in
the cases of Golton, JS and McKenna, which will be discussed in Section B below.
Part II: Constrained Contextualism: Credibility and Evidence
As mentioned, the judges in Golton, JS and McKenna were significantly constrained by
the pleadings and evidentiary record before them, which in turn limited their ability to apply what
would have been otherwise significant contextual factor(s) for the context-specific estimation of
the wives’ capacity for consent and reflection. Specifically, the existence of abuse was a factor
that was raised in both Golton and McKenna and touched upon in JS, the case where the wife only
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sought to set aside the agreement for lack of disclosure and lack of independent legal advice.548
While abuse was cited in all three cases, Golton also mentioned an additional element: mental
health issues on the part of the wife. However, to quote Buckley, although “additional scrutiny” is
warranted where there are “sufficient indications of vulnerabilities,”549 the judicial analysis in
these cases was limited by the court process in this regard.
In Golton, where the wife signed a cohabitation agreement, she had experienced physical
abuse at the hands of her ex-partner. As part of the judges’ introduction of the parties, the judge
noted that the wife testified to being admitted to a hospital “for a period of time for mental health
issues. She received counselling to help her deal with a physically abusive relationship and to build
her self-esteem. Kim was prescribed medication for depression.”550 It appears that this happened
sometime in the 1980s while the parties in Golton signed the cohabitation agreement in 1996.
Although the wife did not experience any abuse at the hands of Mr. Golton, the past abuse could
have potentially impacted her sense of self including her capacity for consent and reflection when
interacting with Mr. Golton, whom she described as a “dominant personality.” Researchers have
acknowledged that “survivors of intimate partner violence have lost a sense of self while being
with their abuser”551 and that “partner violence damages women’s sense of self by way of an
ongoing process of physical and psychological abuse. Intimate Partner Violence devalues
women’s self-perceptions, needs and capacity to operate effectively.”552 Applying this to Golton,
given the wife’s intimate relationship history, she might have felt that she had no voice or choice,
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but to submit and defer to the husband’s wishes and desires. In fact, she did claim that in her
relationship with Mr. Golton she was “submissive to his wishes to the point where she had no free
will,”553 but the judge found that “[t]he power dynamic of this relationship was unremarkable.”554
However, considering this power dynamic against her formative past abusive relationship might
have played a role as to whether the judge would have reached this conclusion.
Throughout the decision there was also evidence of more serious episodes of mental
health,555 but these occurred much later during the parties’ marriage and were thus not relevant to
the judge’s consideration of the context surrounding the formation of the cohabitation agreement.
However, while at first glance this author did have some concerns that perhaps the past assault and
mental health issues should have been considered in more detail in the judge’s application of
section 56(4), it became clear that the judge was limited in this regard given the evidentiary record
before him. Specifically, in concluding that there was “no inequality between the parties that was
material to the negotiations and discussions surrounding the Cohabitation Agreement,”556 he noted
at the outset of his list of reasons in support of his conclusion that “[f]irst, there is no evidence that
Kim’s mental health issues was then in play.”557 While the mental health issues presented as early
as the wife’s past assaultive relationship and could have been dormant if not actively present, this
conclusion based on the evidentiary record says it all. It highlights the fact that the wife’s mental
health was a factor that was considered, but based on the evidence presented, it was not in play at
the relevant point in time from the perspective of the judicial process. As a result, it could not be
weighed as a relevant contextual factor pertaining to the formation of the cohabitation agreement.
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While the judge in Golton was limited by the evidentiary record, the judge in McKenna
was especially constrained by it. The wife in McKenna testified to her husband’s abuse. She
“testified that over time, [the husband] became more and more abusive. The abuse was mostly
verbal, with some pushing and shoving. Tanya did not take any action.”558 Significantly, there
were “no contacts to the police, the CAS or anyone else regarding abuse of any kind by Howard
prior to the parties’ September 16, 2012 separation date.”559 After the date of separation, the wife
contacted the police, who in turn contacted the CAS. She advised that the husband: “had threatened
to slit her throat;” “had a rake and threatened to put it between her eyes;” and, “threatened that
there would be a murder/suicide.”560 In addition to these threats, the wife “reported sexual abuse
by Howard, but provided no further details.”561 Following the police investigation, which the judge
described as appearing “to be a thorough investigation,”562 the police concluded “there is
insufficient evidence, everyone reports a volatile relationship with no direct confirmation of threats
but they have cautioned him.”563 In the end, the police did not lay any charges against the husband,
who had no criminal record to date, and the CAS also closed their file.
In light of this, the judge did consider the allegations of abuse, but found that they were
unsubstantiated. It is not to say that it is impossible for the criminal justice system to fail a victim
of domestic violence,564 but given the totality of the evidence including the wife’s general lack of
credibility, the judge was left to conclude that the wife “attempted to portray Howard as a man
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who could not control his temper and who abused her by engaging in threats, violence (pushing
and shoving) and sexual abuse. Little of this is actually borne out by a detailed analysis of the facts
proven at trial.”565 While the author also acknowledges that separating spouses are at an increased
risk of violence at the time of separation,566 the judge noted the questionable timing of the wife’s
unsubstantiated allegations observing that “[i]t was only after Tanya left the house and was
negotiating the separation agreement that she reported to the police a number of threats alleged to
have been made by Howard, as recently as….11 days before the separation agreement was
signed.”567 However, this further highlights the evidentiary constraints when dealing with
allegations of domestic violence; the credibility and the timing of the victims’ reports might be
called into question despite the reality that they might only feel safe after leaving the house and
the abusive relationship. In general, the harsh reality remains that there are evidentiary challenges
of proving allegations of domestic violence including in the context of family law. As Boyd and
Lindy568 found, “Evidentiary issues remain among the most significant challenges faced by victims
of family violence when they come to court.”569 Given the “generally private nature of domestic
violence…litigation often takes the form of a he-said, she-said scenario, in which proving the
violence turns largely on the court’s assessments of each party’s credibility.”570 However,
“[e]stablishing credibility is an uncertain judicial exercise, arguably complicated by the family
violence context”571 and “fitting into male-developed credibility norms is difficult for a victim,
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particularly abused women.”572 Not only is the credibility of women being assessed based on both
stereotypes and myths in the justice system, but family law is also found to be an area where they
are more likely to arise. These unfound or unproven assumptions include the following: “a credible
woman would disclose violence early; a credible women would report the assault to the police; a
credible women would leave the relationship; … there is now family violence symmetry--women
are just as “guilty” as men; and abuse will likely stop once the relationship ends so there is no risk
of future harm.”573
Similarly, the judge in JS was limited by the pleadings and evidence presented at trial.
Initially, this author was concerned that the existence of abuse was a factor that was perhaps
overlooked or overshadowed by other elements in the judges’ determination of the wife’s
autonomy under section 56(4). In JS, the husband was described by the wife “as a drunk and
abusive.”574 In addition to testimonial evidence about his verbal and physical abuse, there was
evidence of the husband’s assaults on the wife, at least on two occasions by way of his criminal
charges and resulting assault convictions in 1998 and 2009.575 The former date is relevant as the
parties’ cohabitation agreement was signed in 1997.
It is relevant to consider the possibility that the abusive and assaultive behavior already
existed at the time of the cohabitation agreement. This assumption was based on the general
knowledge that partner violence is generally underreported (i.e. not all instances of assault result
in the police being called)576 and that the assault charge could have been laid sometime in 1997,
but that it took until 1998 to resolve given the speed of criminal justice and the accused’s right to
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The Honourable Donna Martinson and Professor Emerita Margaret Jackson, “Family Violence and Evolving
Judicial Roles: Judges as Equality Guardians in Family Law Cases” (2017) Can J Fam L 11 at 18.
574
JS, supra note 335 at para 100.
575
Ibid.
576
See for example Decker, M.R., Holliday et al. “You Do Not Think of Me as a Human being”: Race and Gender
Inequities Intersect to Discourage Police Reporting of Violence against Women. (2019) 96 J Urban Health 772-783.
572
573

123

decide and change his mind whether to plead guilty or take the case to trial. Even if the physical
assault did not occur as early as the time surrounding the formation of the agreement, there are still
other characteristics and party dynamics leading up to the first assault when a party is in a
relationship with an abuser and someone capable of abuse. The potential presence of abuse at the
time of contract formation or the important nuances of the parties’ interaction given that they paved
the way for future incidents of assault warrant additional scrutiny. However, it became clear that
it was not considered under section 56(4) as the wife only sought to set the agreement aside based
on not knowing the value of the husband’s assets and not having received independent legal advice.
In terms of setting aside the agreement pursuant to section 56(4), the judge was limited by the
pleadings, the evidence and the arguments advanced by the wife at trial in support of her claims as
pleaded.
Thus, the allegation of abuse was a factor to which the judges turned their attention, but in
determining whether or not it played a role, the judges were restricted by the evidence before them
and as it related to the conditions surrounding the formation and execution of the agreement.
Although this element is significant for the purposes of relational theory and its understanding of
autonomy, applying relational theory to these cases exposed the limitations of the court process.
Part III: The Weighing of Contextual Factors and Resulting Outcomes: Motivating Forces
beyond the Context-Specific Estimation for Consent
Third, even though the judges were driven by a context-specific estimation of the wives’
capacity for informed consent and reflection, it became apparent when reading the cases that there
were motivating factors that drove the judges’ analysis and outcome in the cases as they were
given great weight. As Leckey acknowledged, “where one person weighs a bundle of contextual
factors differently than another would, it does not follow that the other person overlooks those
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factors.”577 Building on this notion, while it can be said that the factors as presented by the parties
were not overlooked, it also became apparent that some underlying factors or considerations were
emphasized or perhaps prioritized as they were given great weight in the judge’s determination of
the wife’s capacity for informed consent. Against this backdrop, this section will explore what
appears to be the judges’ additional driving emphasis in the cases of Golton, JS, McKenna, Virc
and Butler. It is this author’s position that in the cases where the agreement was not set aside
pursuant to section 56(4), themes and factors such as the importance of the parties’ ability to
structure their own affairs and the provision of legal advice played an important role in the judges’
final determination. On the other hand, in the cases where the agreement was set aside pursuant to
section 56(4), the contextual interplay of factors such as sophistication, expertise, deference and
trust highlighting the parties’ dynamics had a significant impact on the final outcome.
You Want It, You Got It: Contracting Motives and Legal Advice Seal the Deal
In Golton, JS and McKenna, where the agreements were not set aside pursuant to section
56(4), it became apparent that the judges valued “the power of the parties to determine their own
affairs”578 and that the provision of legal advice or the opportunity to obtain it was given great
weight. The importance of the parties’ power to determine their own affairs can be seen in the two
cohabitation agreement cases of Golton and JS as well McKenna, the separation agreement case.
The judges in these cases placed a great emphasis on the parties’ desire to enter into and execute
these agreements. For example, in both cases, the judges acknowledged the husbands’ motives to
execute the cohabitation agreements as well as the fact that the wives knew what they themselves
wanted and what motivated them to enter into the agreements. Both husbands had bad previous
breakups and wanted to not go through the same turmoil again. In Golton, it was acknowledged

577
578

Contracting Claims, supra note 12 at 30.
JS, supra note 335 at para 126.

125

that the agreement was “entirely” the husband’s idea as he wanted “no financial obligations to [the
wife] if their relationship broke down.”579 He was “unhappy that he had paid [his ex-spouse] a
substantial sum for property division and for spousal support” and was thus “determined not to
find himself in that predicament again.”580 In the same vein, in JS, the husband’s “bad previous
breakup”581 served as the motive for “his desire to have a cohabitation agreement.”582 As the
husband explained, his prior relationship was “a ‘nightmare’ and he wished to avoid the turmoil
he had gone through….and said he would not go through that again.”583 As Leckey acknowledged,
while it is precisely the desire to protect one’s assets or to have a peace of mind of what will happen
upon the breakdown of one’s marital relationship that motivates a prenuptial agreement,584 the
judges also acknowledged the wives’ motivations for entering into the cohabitation agreements.
In Golton, for example, the judge observed that “[w]hen [the wife] signed the agreement
she knew exactly what she was signing and what it meant. She signed it because she loved Dave
and did not want to lose him. She may have preferred not to have an agreement but signing the
agreement so that their relationship would continue does not amount to duress.”585 While the fact
that Mr. Golton was prepared to walk away from their relationship (i.e. there would be no future
unless they entered into a cohabitation agreement) may be construed as indicative of the parties’
dynamics, this was a choice that the wife was free to make. He did not coerce her to stay in the
relationship. Instead, she was free to exercise the choice of whether she wanted the relationship to
continue, and if so, the parties would be separate as to property in the event of the relationship’s
rupture in the future.
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On this note, it is important to mention that out of all five cases, this characterization of
“choice” in Golton is most akin to the characterization of choice in Hartshorne with Mr. Golton
living out his intention to maintain control of his income and his assets.586 However, as Buckley
observed, “[r]elational autonomy should allow her to make this decision, provided she can reflect
critically on the issue”587 and questions like “why” did she make this choice and “where was [the
husband] in the decision-making process”588 need to be asked. Interestingly, it can be inferred that
the judge in Golton found that she could reflect critically on the issue after turning his mind to the
wife’s motive (i.e. wanting the relationship to continue) and the husband’s involvement in the
decision-making process. On the latter note, the judge found that while the husband was clear that
the relationship would be over if the cohabitation agreement was not signed, the “process of
negotiating and finalizing the terms of the agreement of took place at a relatively pedestrian
pace”589 and “there was no duress, undue influence or unconscionable circumstances.”590
However, it could be argued that where one is offered an ultimatum with respect to the relationship
yet wishes for the relationship to continue, then the ability to reflect is reduced to a dichotomous
choice, which consists of the two following options: (1) agree to the terms or (2) do not marry
and/or do not have the relationship continue.591 For example, the wife claimed, “I’m just going to
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sign it. I am not going to lose him. I love him too much”592 and “I guess love does crazy things”
in response to her brother’s opinion that “she was ‘crazy’ to sign it.”593 The timing594 of the
ultimatum appears to play a role as courts likely wish to avoid the slippery slope that can be created
if this dichotomous choice would result in marriage agreements being set aside as a matter of
course given the fact that prenuptial agreements are often created precisely for the purposes of
protecting one’s assets. This is especially true in subsequent marriages where the requirement to
execute such an agreement might make or break the relationship. As can be seen in the decision,
the judge inferred that the wife could reflect critically when he concluded, “[s]he may have
preferred not to have an agreement but signing the agreement so that their relationship would
continue does not amount to duress.”595
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Similarly, in JS, the judge observed that the wife wanted to move into the parties’ newly
built home and that this motivated her to enter into the agreement.596 However, he also
acknowledged that “[a]t the time of the signing of the agreement, [the wife] thought it was fair and
that it fairly outlined their discussions regarding the house purchase. As they were each making
$70,000 per year, the provision regarding neither paying spousal support was fair and
reasonable…”597 While the wife in JS advised that the husband “said he was not going through
with the house purchase unless the contract was signed,”598 which can be paralleled to the husband
in Golton stating that he was not going through with the parties’ relationship unless the contract
was signed, the judge observed that the wife “thought the agreement was fair at that time regarding
the home.”599 Like the husband in Golton, the husband in JS was found not to have coerced the
wife to enter into the agreement. Instead, the judge explicitly noted that “[t]here was no fraud,
coercion, or duress.”600 The wife did not allege any of these factors and the parties were thereby
free to arrange their affairs as they saw fit and in accordance with their respective motives.
Like the wives in Golton and JS, the wife in McKenna also knew what she wanted. While
the wives in Golton and JS wanted to stay in the relationship, the wife in McKenna wanted out. As
the judge observed, “I find that there is no credible evidence that Tanya was subjected to
intimidation or illegitimate pressure to sign the agreement. I find the contrary. Tanya wanted rid
of Howard and wanted a separation agreement as quickly as possible in order to move on.”601 This
is again resonant with the theme of this section that the parties are free and encouraged to arrange
their own affairs especially where there is no evidence of intimidation, coercion or pressure. On
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this note, the significant weighing of the provision of legal advice as a contextual factor enters the
picture.
The cases of Golton and McKenna show that it is difficult to establish that a bargaining
inequality affected the formation of the contract where the party was in receipt of independent
legal advice. This can be seen in the cases as the judges placed a significant emphasis and weight
on legal advice as a contextual factor pertaining to the formation of the contract. However, even
where legal advice was not obtained, like in the case of JS, it proved difficult to set aside the
agreement in the context where there was ample time to obtain independent legal advice and no
evidence or allegations of fraud, coercion or duress.
In Golton, the significance of the wife’s receipt of legal advice was apparent in several
parts of the decision as it was found to compensate for any vulnerabilities or bargaining
inequalities. First, when discussing the disparity in the parties’ income and assets, the judge opined
that if it “does give rise to an inequality in bargaining power or vulnerability on Kim’s part, I find
that was compensated for adequately as Kim had independent legal advice for which she was
paying nothing.”602 Second, the judge went on to find that the husband “did not prey upon [the
wife]. The provision of independent legal advice in these circumstances negates that inference.”603
In addition, the role of legal advice as ample or adequate compensation was also emphasized in
relation to the existence of any vulnerabilities on part of the wife generally. While the judge did
not elaborate on the specifics of those vulnerabilities, he opined that he was “satisfied that there
were no vulnerabilities or, if present, they were amply compensated for by the involvement of legal
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counsel. There is nothing in the manner in which the agreement came about that causes me to
discount it.”604
The importance of legal advice can also be seen in McKenna. While the wife in McKenna
was not found to be a credible witness overall,605 with the credibility factor certainly playing a part
in how her evidence regarding the husband’s alleged abuse was received, the significant role of
legal advice became evident within the judge’s reasoning. When the judge explicitly elaborated on
all of the evidence that was not supportive of the wife’s allegations, he also showed the great
weight he attributed to the wife’s receipt of independent legal advice as can be seen in the
following excerpt:
Tanya's lawyer dealt with Tanya during these negotiations and met with her regularly,
and certified that Tanya acted of her own volition without fear, threats or compulsion by
Howard or any other person -- see Exhibit 10 [Certificate of Independent Legal Advice].
I note that in an e-mail … Tanya writes to her lawyer that Howard is being difficult. No
mention is made of abuse, threats or violence. I accept the Exhibit 10 … opinion of Ms.
Clarke who was a professional lawyer with six years of experience doing 25 per cent of
her practice in family law.606
JS is bit of an outlier amongst the three cases in the sense that the wife there did not seek
or receive independent legal advice. However, as mentioned earlier in this section, even if a party
did not obtain independent advice, but there was no evidence or allegations of coercion, fraud,
duress or any other type of intimidation or pressure exerted on the will of the party trying to set
aside the agreement, this too will be damaging for the party seeking to set aside the agreement.
For example, in addition to acknowledging that “[t]here was no fraud, coercion, or duress,”607 the
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judge noted that the agreement outlined the wife’s “right to obtain ILA… [and that] on her
evidence she had at least six weeks to get ILA and on his evidence several months to get ILA.”608
The judge noted at the outset that one of the issues to be determined in the case was whether “a
cohabitation agreement is valid in circumstances where…[t]he wife does not seek independent
legal advice.”609 On this note, he emphasized that the wife “had ample time to seek ILA and failed
to do so. She indicated there was no fraud or coercion and that the agreement reflected their
discussions regarding the disposition of the home.”610 This combination proved to be fatal to her
case as the judge went on to conclude that in addition to having “ample time to obtain ILA if she
had wished to…she thought the agreement was fair at the time it was signed and I find….contrary
to her claims otherwise, that she understood the nature and consequences of the contract.”611
The overall impression created by these judgments is that the judges value the parties’
desire to contract and will uphold the contract unless there are significant factors that would
suggest otherwise. However, any potential factors suggesting otherwise are de-emphasized as a
great emphasis is placed on the provision and receipt of independent legal advice or the ability of
the party to have sought it. In those cases, the provision of independent legal advice plays an
important role in the final outcome of the cases as to whether the agreement should be set aside.
The Dynamics of Trust, Deference, Expertise and Sophistication
Interestingly, the cases of Butler and Virc, where the judges exercised their discretion to
set aside the agreement pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act, also share some
thematic similarities, which once more highlight the contextual factors that are significantly
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weighed and emphasized by the judges. In both cases, given the length612 of the parties’
marriage, there are prevalent interrelated themes of trust, deference, expertise and sophistication.
For example, in Butler, the wife trusted and relied on the husband’s claims about her financial
entitlements like the wife in Virc relied on her husband’s claims about his date of marriage
interest in Renegade. This trust, deference and reliance in turn impacted both wives’
understanding of their financial entitlements and obligations (i.e. the wife in Butler was told that
she was not entitled to anything whereas the wife in Virc was told that she owed a significant
equalization payment), which significantly undermined their capacity for informed consent.
In her cross-examination, the wife in Butler “swore that Mr. Butler, after seeing [his
lawyer] Mr. Friend, told her that she was not entitled to anything from him because she did not
work outside the home and therefore did not contribute.”613 As she explained, “I didn’t question
him because I didn’t think he would lie to me about that.”614 Instead, when she was confronted at
trial as to why she would give up her financial entitlements, the wife in Butler responded: “I was
trusting him. So yes, when I read it, I thought, okay, that’s what he had said. I didn’t contribute
because I wasn’t working so I wasn’t entitled to half the house…I believed him. I’ve never been
through a divorce before.”615 The wife’s general trust and deference to the husband was based on
the parties’ lengthy marriage with the wife stating as follows: “I was trusting that I was being
treated fairly after 34 years of marriage”616 and “[n]o, I did not [ask a lawyer]. Again, I trusted
the 34 year old relationship.”617 The wife’s trust and deference to the husband was even
acknowledged by him when he “[i]mportantly… admitted that Ms. Butler was ‘trusting [him] to
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handle everything.’”618 While neither the wife nor the husband had any “expertise” in Butler
unlike the husband’s expertise in Virc, the wife in relation to the husband and on her own
“demonstrated a remarkable lack of sophistication when Mr. Butler was sorting out their postseparation financial affairs for them.”619 This was once again significant in informing the judge’s
estimation of the wife’s capacity for informed consent and reflection and was in turn weighed
significantly by the judge.
Similarly, in Virc, the wife trusted and deferred to her husband, a fact that was known by
the husband himself. As the wife indicated in her testimony, “she would need to find a ‘large
error’ (in fact more than $1,900,000) in the husband's NFP to negate the payment he claimed she
owed. And she trusted him.”620 As the judge observed, “[t]he husband knew that the wife
respected and deferred to his expertise in business valuations... His waiver of her payment of an
EP of $954,000 was, notwithstanding the other financial terms of the Separation Agreement, a
material inducement.”621 As the judge acknowledged, the wife exhibited a “general deference to
the husband's financial abilities”622 and especially in the context of where she would have needed
“to find a very significant discrepancy in the husband's figures…to negate any [equalization
payment]...“623 As the judge went on to explain “[h]er experience during the 16 years of their
cohabitation was that the husband had mostly prevailed in the many lawsuits…[and the evidence
shows] that she relied on the general probity of the husband's disclosure and was reluctant in the
circumstances to challenge him.”624 This is resonant with the Butler paragraphs reproduced
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above. Like the wife in Butler trusted the husband and their 34-year marriage, so too “[t]he wife
in these proceedings testified that she did not know the value of the husband's marriage date
interest in Renegade, and that given the husband's expertise in financial matters, she had no
reason to doubt him.…625 These similarities between the two cases highlight the significant
emphasis placed by the judges on the factors of sophistication, expertise, deference and trust.626
While the wife in Virc was a lawyer by profession and the wife in Butler a homemaker for the
last 26 years, the judges’ significant consideration and weighing of these factors comes to light
and impacts the similar outcome in these two cases that are so different and yet so alike.
Section E: Conclusion
This chapter explored the concept of contractual autonomy through the lens of relational
theory with a focus on the circumstances surrounding the formation of a contract involving a
spousal support release or waiver. This analysis of contractual autonomy as it relates to the
formation of the contract was made with reference to five cases, Golton, JS, McKenna, Butler
and Virc, and was restricted to the judge’s determination of the validity of the agreement
pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act. However, regardless of whether section 56(4)
was successfully engaged and whether the judges in turn exercised their discretion to set aside
the agreement, a notable feature resonant with relational theory and shared by all five cases came
to light. Specifically, the judges’ analysis pertaining to the formation of the contract was driven
by a contextualized conception of choice and a context-specific estimation of the wives’ capacity
for informed consent and reflection. Despite this notable feature, there were limitations on the
judges’ relational contextual analysis in the cases as well as the greater emphasis placed by
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judges on certain contextual factors, which all produce lessons to be learned from both a
practitioner’s and scholar’s perspective.
First, these cases serve as a reminder that the judges are constrained by the pleadings and
the evidence as presented by the parties and their lawyers. Even if the judges wish to adopt a
relationally sensitive contextual assessment, there will be limits placed on their ability to do so if
the parties do not raise and apply the existence of relevant contextual factors themselves.
Understandably, given the role of the judges, the parties and their lawyers need to carefully
consider the facts and how they might support the relevant legal tests. For example, while a
difference between the parties in terms of age and professional experience might be relevant in
determining whether there was a bargaining inequality, the judges will not consider this
contextual factor in their analysis if this fact was merely raised as part of a party’s background
and not presented by the parties and their lawyers as a relevant fact in support of the legal
doctrines they are relying on. Thus, it is critical that the parties and their lawyers reflect carefully
on the facts and how they pertain to the relevant legal analyses. In turn, the pleadings need to be
carefully drafted and the documentary and testimonial evidence at trial needs to be focused and
supportive of what the parties are trying to achieve. The lawyer’s role is paramount in this regard
as the clients will be able to relate the relevant facts to the lawyer if the lawyer asks the right
questions and follows up on the information provided. However, it is incumbent that the lawyer
then reflects on how certain facts support the relevant legal test and ensures that the evidence in
support of it is provided and applied. Thus, while parties and lawyers need to be aware that the
courts are adopting a contextual approach, the lawyers must effectively present the relevant
contextual factors before the judge. Otherwise, the judge will not be in a position to consider
them.
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Second, a well-executed relational approach will not provide a determinate outcome.
Even if the judges adopt a relational approach and consider all the contextual factors, outcomes
might still vary in cases going forward depending on the weight and importance that judges give
to certain factors. This of course is true in any case where the judge has to weigh and consider
the totality of the evidence in order to reach his or her final determination. Thus, more factors
might be taken into account, but depending on how they are weighed, they might not make a
tangible impact in the end. From this perspective, while a contextual and relational approach is
more sensitive in nature, from a practical standpoint it might not always make a difference in the
final outcome of the cases.
Third, these cases serve as a cautionary tale that a great emphasis will likely be placed on
the provision of legal advice and that it might be difficult to establish successfully that an
agreement should be set aside in accordance with section 56(4) of the Family Law Act in that
context. Where a lawyer certified that a party acted on their own volition or where a lawyer did
not pursue disclosure yet could have, it will prove difficult to convince the judge that the
agreement should be set aside for a lack of disclosure, an inability to understand the terms of the
contract or on a law of contract grounds. Moreover, if a party did not receive independent legal
advice, but also did not plead any of the law of contract grounds, it will also be challenging to set
aside the contract on the basis that no legal advice was obtained.
Fourth, it would prove useful for future research to obtain a copy of complete court files
as well as the transcripts of the summary judgment or trial proceedings in order to have a full
appreciation of how the parties pleaded and presented their evidence instead of relying on the
court’s written decision alone. Given that lower court judgments are not written in great depth
like Supreme Court of Canada ones, this analysis was limited by how the judges themselves
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wrote their decisions and how they summarized the evidence as presented. While great deference
is given to a trial judge, it would be interesting to obtain the complete picture as presented to the
judge instead of relying on the judge’s final presentation of the facts and evidence.
Fifth, it would also be interesting, to analyze a more substantial case sample and
categorize it by judges to see if certain judges tend to weigh certain factors above others or tend
to emphasize the finality of agreements. For instance, even in this case sample, it is interesting to
note that two cases where the agreement was not set aside were both judgments of Justice
Skarica. Perhaps there are patterns and trends that would be revealed or other thematic and
contextual factors that would come to light when comparing the case sample.
Sixth, the larger case sample should categorize the cases by those involving prenuptial
and separation agreements as well as domestic contracts waiving spousal support fully and those
providing for some spousal support followed by releases. These distinctions might play a role
when the judges are weighing certain factors and deciding whether to set aside the agreement
pursuant to section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.627
In conclusion, and as Buckley herself acknowledged, while “relational theory is more
realistic and nuanced in its conceptualization of autonomy…relational theory may not always
make the degree of practical difference that many feminists might expect.”628 As she explained,
“a relational approach does not necessarily mean that the court will automatically overturn ‘bad’
agreements since relational theory must accommodate agency and choice. Accordingly, much
depends on the contextual analysis and the application of theory to the facts.”629 However, as she
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recognized, it can make a significant difference in certain cases as “[c]ourts taking a relational
approach to autonomy may accord less weight to agreements or set them aside where they were
tainted by exploitation or unfair pressure, where legal advice was inadequate to counteract
vulnerability, or where procedures are questionable in some way that potentially undermines the
quality of consent.”630 While she stated that “it is to be hoped that the Supreme Court of Canada
does not regress from its adoption of relational theory and continues to apply relational
understandings to marital agreements,”631 it is also desired that lower courts follow suit and
continue to apply a relational lens in their determination of a party’s contractual autonomy by
way of an estimation of a party’s capacity for informed consent and reflection.

630
631

Ibid at 307.
Ibid at 308.

139

Bibliography
Legislation
Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp).
Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F3.
Jurisprudence
Berdette v Berdette, 1991 CarswellOnt 280 (ONCA).
Bracklow v Bracklow, [1999] 1 SCR 420.
Butler v Butler, [2015] OJ No 6881 (SC).
Caron v Caron [1987] 1 SCR 892.
DBS v SRG, [2006] 2 SCR 231.
Dillon v Dillon, [2014] OJ No 1992 (SC).
Dougherty v Dougherty, 2008 ONCA 302.
Fisher v Fisher, [2008] OJ No 38, 2008 ONCA 11.
Golton v Golton, [2018] OJ No 5446 (SC).
Hartshorne v Hartshorne, [2004] 1 SCR 550.
JS v DBS, [2016] OJ No 1485 (SC), aff’d [2017] OJ No 5115 (CA).
LMP v LS, [2011] SCJ No 64, [2011] 3 SCR 775.
Lukovnjak v Weir, 2016 ONSC 6893.
McCain v McCain, 2017 ONSC 7344
McKenna v McKenna, [2015] OJ No 2814 (SC).
Miglin v Miglin, [2003] 1 SCR 303.
Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813.
Murray v Murray, [2003] OJ No 3350 (SC).
Pelech v Pelech [1987] 1 SCR 801.
Quinn v Epstein Cole LLP (2007), 2007 CanLII 45714 (SC), aff’d 2008 ONCA 662.
Richardson v Richardson [1987] 1 SCR 857.
Rick v Brandsema, 2009 SCC 10, [2009] 1 SCR 295.
140

RP v RC, [2011] SCJ No 65, [2011] 3 SCR 819.
Tian v Cheung, 2016 BCSC 950.
Toscano v Toscano, [2015] OJ No 315 (SC).
Virc v Blair, [2016] OJ No 2813 (SC), aff’d Virc v Blair 2017 ONCA 394.

Secondary Material: Books
Beiner, Ronald & Wayne Norman, eds., Canadian Political Philosophy: Contemporary
Reflections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Donchin, Anne. “Autonomy and Interdependence: Quandries in Genetic Decision-Making.”
Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, edited by
Catriona Mackenzie & Natale Stoljar, Oxford, 2000.
Fletcher, George. Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
Frazer, Elizabeth & Nicola Lacey, The Politics of Community: A Feminist Critique of the
Liberal-Communitarian Debate (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).
Leckey, Robert. Contextual Subjects: Family, State, and Relational Theory (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2008).
Mackenzie, Catriona & Natalie Stoljar, eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on
Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Mossman, Mary Jane. Families and the Law: Cases and Commentary, Second Edition (Concord,
ON: Captus Press, 2015).
Nedelsky, Jennifer. “Citizenship and Relational Feminism.” Canadian Political Philosophy:
Contemporary Reflections, edited by Ronald Beiner & Wayne Norman, Oxford, 2001.
Nedelsky, Jennifer. Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011).
Nedelsky, Jennifer. “Should Property Law Be Constitutionalized? A Relational and Comparative
Approach.” Property Law on the Threshold of the 21st Century, edited by G.E. van Maanen &
A.J. van der Walt, eds., Apeldoorn, 1996.
Roy, Alain. Le contrat de marriage invente: perspectives socio-juridiques pour une reforme
(Montreal: Themis, 2002).
Tétrault, Michel. Droit de la famille, 3d ed. (Cowansville, QC: Yvon Blais, 2005).
Williams, Rowan. Lost Icons: Reflections on Cultural Bereavement (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
2000).
141

Secondary Material: Articles
Bailey, Allen M. “Prioritizing Child Safety as the Prime Best-Interest Factor” (2013) 47 Fam L
Q 35.
Bailey, Martha. “Marriage a la carte: A Comment on Hartshorne v. Hartshorne” (2004) 20 Can J
Fam L 249.
Bailey, Martha. “Pelech, Caron, and Richardson” (1989-90) 3 CJWL 615.
Boyd, Susan & Claire Young. “Feminism, Law, and Public Policy: Family Feuds and Taxing
Times” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall LJ 545.
Boyd, Susan and Ruben Lindy. “Violence Against Women and the B.C. Family Law Act: Early
Jurisprudence” (2016) 35 CFLQ 101.
Buckley, Lucy-Ann. “Relational Theory and Choice Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of Canada”
(2015) 29 Can J Fam L 251.
Cornish, Mark. “Case Comment: McCain v McCain and Barton v Sauve: A New Approach to
Autonomous Domestic Contractual Bargaining in Ontario,” 32 Can J Fam L 195.
Decker, M.R., C.N. Holliday et al. “You Do Not Think of Me as a Human being”: Race and
Gender Inequities Intersect to Discourage Police Reporting of Violence against Women. (2019)
96 J Urban Health 772.
Epstein, Phil. “Epstein’s This Week in Family Law, Family Law Newsletters” (2016) Fam L
Nws.
Gan, Orit. “Contractual Duress and Relations of Power,” (2013) 36 Harvard Journal of Law &
Gender 171.
Leckey, Robert. “Contracting Claims and Family Law Feuds” (2007) 57 U Toronto LJ 1.
Lynch, Shannon. “Not Good Enough and On a Tether: Exploring How Violent Relationships
Impact Women’s Sense of Self” (2013) 41 Psychodynamic Psychiatry 219.
Martinson, The Honourable Donna & Professor Emerita Margaret Jackson, “Family Violence
and Evolving Judicial Roles: Judges as Equality Guardians in Family Law Cases” (2017) Can J
Fam L 11.
Maur, Mary-Jo. “Compensatory Support Update: Why It’s Important to Get the Basis for
Spousal Support Entitlement Right,” The Six-Minute Family Law Lawyer, 2010.
Minow, Martha & Elizabeth V. Spelman, “In Context” (1990) 63 S Cal L Rev 1597.
Nakonechny, E. Llana. “Spousal Support Decisions at the Supreme Court of Canada: New
Model or Moving Target?” (2003) 15 CJWL 102.

142

Nedelsky, Jennifer. “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities” (1989) 1
Yale JL & Fem 7.
Rogerson, Carol. “Developments in Family Law: The 2002-2003 Term,” (2003) 22 Supreme
Court LR (2d) 273.
Rogerson, Carol. “Miglin v. Miglin 2003 SCC 24: ‘They Are Agreements Nonetheless’” (2003)
20 Can J Fam L 197.
Rogerson, Carol. “Spousal Support After Moge” (1996-1997) 14 CLFQ 281.
Rogerson, Carol. “Spousal Support Agreements and the Legacy of Miglin” (2012) 31 CFLQ 13.
Rogerson, Carol. “Spousal Support Post-Bracklow: The Pendulum Swings Again?” (2001) 19
CLFQ 185.
Shaffer, Martha. “Developments in Family Law: The 2003-2004 Term” (2004) 26 Supreme
Court LR (2d) 407.
Shaffer, Martha. “Domestic Contracts, Part II: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Hartshorne v.
Hartshorne,” (2004) 20 Can J Fam L 261.
Shaffer, Martha. “Separation Agreements Post-Moge, Willick and L.G. v. G.B.: A New Trilogy?”
(1999) 16 Can J Fam L 51.
Sheppard, Colleen. “Uncomfortable Victories and Unanswered Questions: Lessons from Moge”
(1995) 12 Can J Fam L 283.
Thompson, Rollie. “Ideas of Spousal Support Entitlement” (2015) 34 CFLQ 1.
Thompson, Sharon. “Feminist Relational Contract Theory: A New Model for Family Property
Agreements” (2018) 45 Journal of Law and Society 617.
Williams, Joan. “Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice” (1991) 66 NYUL
Rev 1559.

Secondary Material: Dissertations and Theses
Crayton, Tiffany. “Rediscovery of Self After Counseling for Female Survivors of Intimate
Partner Violence” (2018). Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies. 4722.

Other Material
Family, Children and Youth Section, Department of Justice. Spousal Support Advisory
Guidelines by Carol Rogerson & Rollie Thompson (Ottawa: Department of Justice, Canada,
2008), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/spousal-epoux/spag/index.html>.

143

Family, Children and Youth Section, Department of Justice. The Spousal Support Advisory
Guidelines: A New and Improved User’s Guide to the Final Version by Carol Rogerson & Rollie
Thompson (Ottawa: Department of Justice, Canada, 2010), online:
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/spousal-epoux/spag/index.html>.
Family, Children and Youth Section, Department of Justice. Spousal Support Advisory
Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide (Ottawa: Department of Justice, Canada, 2016), online:
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/spousal-epoux/ug_a1-gu_a1/index.html >.

144

